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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I am concerned not with immanent causation, 
but with transeunt causation. 
In the Introduction I show how the Conditional Analysis and 
the Regularity Account of causation can be used to defend Causal 
Anti-realism and to supplement the Manipulability Account. I also 
mention three theses about Metaphysics which my discussion of 
causation illustrates. 
In Chapter One, I discuss some preliminaries. In Section One, 
I consider the method to be used for testing the permissibility of 
accounts of causation. I provide a stricter and a less strict 
criterion: the Analysis-criterion and the Reduction-criterion. The 
former is used in Chapter Two, the latter is used in Chapter Three. 
In Section Two, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of 
transeunt causation : explanatory and producing causation. I con-
centrate on producing causation in this thesis. I also argue that 
the class of particulars which can be producing causes - I call this 
the class of quasi-events - is larger than the class of events. 
Quasi-events are defined in terms of the notion of a causal field, 
which I discuss and defend. In Section Three, I briefly expound the 
kinds of conditional required for the Conditional Analysis. 
Chapter Two has two parts. In Part One, I defend the Condition-
al Analysis of causation. I begin with Mackie's account in The 
Cement of the Universe and I successively modify this account to 
meet various objections. The objections considered include the 
problems raised by collateral effects, overdetermination and 
vii. 
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simultaneous causation. I also briefly consider Lewis' account of 
causation. In Part Two, I discuss what account might be given of the 
conditionals used in the Conditional Analysis. I conclude that these 
conditionals should be treated as meta-inference conditionals based 
on a special kind of non-deductive inference. 
Chapter Three also has two parts. In Fart One, I defend the 
possibility of a regularity account, provided it is to satisfy only 
the Reduction-criterion. 	In Part Two, I provide a regularity account 
based on Mackie's account of causal regularities in The Cement of the 
Universe. 	Objections similar to those of Chapter Two are discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter Four, I discuss backwards causation, which 
I ignore in Chapters Two and Three. I argue that a causal anti-
realist can quite rationally hold the position that backwards causa-
tion is logically possible but metaphysically impossible. 	More 
precisely, there are no coherent examples, described in non-causal 
terms, which a causal anti-realist need interpret as cases of 
backwards causation. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I shall be concerned not with immanent causa-
tion, in which an agent directly causes an effect, but with transeunt 
causation, in which one event or state-of-affairs causes another 
event of state-of-affairs. I have two reasons for discussing trans-
eunt causation. My first reason is that I wish to defend a regular-
ity account of causation in the tradition of Hume 1 - I also defend 
another, compatible, account of causation in terms of conditionals, 
in the tradition of one of Hume's definitions of cause: 
... we may define a cause to be 
an object followed, by another ... 
where, if the first object had not 2 
been, the second never had existed. 
My second reason is that my discussion of causation illustrates, and 
perhaps to some extent confirms, three theses about Metaphysics and 
its relation to ordinary language. 
.0.1 First I shall discuss why I consider it important to give a 
conditional analysis and a regularity account of transeunt causation. 
These two accounts of causation are used to defend the anti-realist 
view of causation. 	Causal Anti-realism, expressed in the language 
of Hume, is that an account of causation "in the objects" can be given 
in non-causal terms and that in any sense in which the cause necessi-
tates the effect, causal necessity is "in the mind". Another way 
of stating the anti-realist view of causation would be to claim that 
causation is not a primary but a secondary relation between events. 
Of course, the eausal anti-realist is not denying that one event can 
Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Section 14. 
Hume, D., Enquiries Concerning the Human UnderRtanding, 
Section VII, Pt.2. 
2. 
cause another, nor is he denying that there is causation "in the 
objects". The causal anti-realist is merely denying that there is 
any irreducible element "in the objects" such as a mysterious causal 
necessity or power. Even leaving aside any difficulties with the 
notions "in the objects" and "in the mind", the anti-realist view 
is as vague as the phrase 'non-causal term' is. Are, for example, 
nomic necessity and physical probability causal notions? If they 
are, then someone giving an account of causation in terms of nomic 
necessity is a causal realist. This vagueness is of no great conse-
quence provided one supplements the anti-realist view by a positive 
account of causation "in the objects". In Part 2 of Chapter Two on the 
Conditional Analysis, I shall propose an account of causation in terms 
of inferences and non-accidental generalisations (non-accidental gen-
eralisation might he considered a causal notion); in Chapter Three 
I propose a regularity account of causation in terms of indisputably 
non-causal notions. 
I shall now examine two initially plausible accounts of causa-
tion which might seem to make the Conditional Analysis and the Regu-
larity Account at best unnecessary labour spent in defence of Causal 
Anti-realism, and at worst either incorrect or misguided. 
0.2 The Singularist Account  
The singularist adopts the straightforward policy of carefully 
examining individual causal situations and, he claims, finding neces-
sary and sufficient conditioas for event C to cause event K. Ducasse 
has given an account of this kind: 
Considering two changes, C and K 
the change C is said to have been 
sufficient to, i.e. to have caused, 
the change K. if: 
l, The change C occurred during a 
3. 
time and through a space 
terminating at the instant I at 
the surface S. 
The change K occurred during a time 
and through a space beginning at the 
instant I at the surface S. 
No change other than C occurred during 
the time and through the Epace of C, 
and no change other than K during the 
time and through the space of K. 3 
If C and K satisfy these three conditions I - shall say that they satis-
fy the Ducasse criterion. Satisfying the Ducasse criterion certainly 
seems to be a good evidence that C causes K. Indeed, one might even 
accept that satisfying the Ducasse criterion is a part of a sufficient 
truth-condition for C to cause K. More precisely, if the Ducasse 
criterion is satisfied but C does not cause K, then there must be some 
kind of outside interference. 	Now if the Ducasse criterion is satis- 
fied, this interference must not be considered to result in a (macro-
scopic) change occurring through the space of process C or process K; 
so the interference cannot occur near S. Either the interference 
involves the direct action of a spirit (immanent causation presumably) 
or it involves action-at-a-distance, or it involves a (non-causal) 
process deemed not to be considered a change for the purposes of condi- 
tion 3. 	Action-at-a-distance is ruled out by the Ducasse criterion, 
so this leaves as possible kinds of interference the intervention of 
a spirit and non-causal processes. Suppose, when giving the account 
of causation, only perceptible macroscopic processes are considered 
as changes. Then processes which are explained in terms of the theo-
retical entities of Physics could be used to interferewith the situ-
ation; these would be examples of interfering non-causal processes. 
But, I shall now argue, the Ducasse criterion cannot provide neces-
sary and sufficient truth-conditions for causation and hence cannot 
Ducasse, C.J., Truth, Knowledge and Causation, pp. 3, 4. 
4. 
provide a list of features on which causation is supervenient. 
For suppose a hollow metal sphere is at rest, apparently unsupported, 
three feet above the ground, and then it begins to move sideways. 
Suppose that there is no interference, say by means of magnets. Sup-
pose also that the only change to occur in the vicinity of the sphere 
is that a significant proportion of the electrons in the sphere 
change their spin. The advocate of the Ducasse criterion as a neces-
sary condition is now faced with a dilemma: does he take into consi-
deration the theoretical entities of Physics or not, when using the 
Ducasse criterion? I shall now consider four replies: 
Reply One: A operationalist might rrply that the theoretical 
entities of Physics do not exist so the movement of the sphere 
has no cause. Thus the Ducasse criterion is vindicated. But 
now consider the case in which electromagnets are used to 
move magnetic spheres. According to the operationalist, the 
cause of the motion of the magnetic spheres is the switching 
on and off of the magnets. Thus if there are no theoretical 
entities of Physics, these must be cases of action-at-a- 
distance. So the operationalist is committed to action-at-a-
distance; hence the defender of the Ducasse account is commit-
ted to the denial of Operationalism. 
Reply Two: One might reply that submicroscopic processes are not 
considered to be changes, although the theoretical entities 
of Physics do exist. In this case, a non-causal process 
results in the motion of the sphere. 	But there is a diffi- 
culty with this reply. Suppose that, as is conceivable, the 
fundamental particles were very small hard spheres obeying the 
laws of Newtonian Mechanics. Then one particle could hit 
5. 
another so that the first stops moving and the second starts 
without, according to this reply, there being any causation. 
It would seem peculiar if the notion of causation were relevant 
to the macroscopic situation but not to asubmicroscopic situ-
ation identical in all respects but scale. 
Reply Three: The theoretical entities of Physics are always taken 
into account when using the Ducasse criterion. In this case 
the Ducasse criterion never results in simply described causes 
and effects. For there are always many processes occupying 
the same region as C; either there will be changes in fields 
or there will be processes involving the movement of subatomic 
particles. 
Reply Four: 	The events occurring in or to the theoretical entities 
of Physics are initially considered not to be changes and to 
provide non-causal processes. But if (using the Ducasse cri-
terion) no cause is found, then one considers these theoretical 
entities. In this case, when there is no macroscopic cause, 
there would be too many candidates for the cause under consider-
ation, and hence the true cause on the Ducasse criterion would 
involve excessive and unnecessary detail. Thus perhaps the 
laws of Nature entail that the change in electron-spin is 
followed by the movement of the sphere, yet a quite irrelevant 
change in the spin of neutrons which also occurred would also 
have to be considered part of the cause. 
Although the Ducasse criterion is important as evidence, it 
fails as an account of causation: I suspect that any singularity 
theory of causation will also fail to provide necessary and sufficient 
6. 
truth-conditions for causation and hence fail to provide a list of 
non-causal features on which causation is supervenient. 
0.3 The Manipulability Account  
One way of defendingCausal Anti-realism is based on the Manipul-
ability Account of Causation, in which event C causes event E if by 
bringing C about one can bring E about, or if by preventing C one 
can prevent E. 4 One might give the following version of this defence 
of Causal Anti-realism. 
Hume's regularity account is based on. a misguided response to 
the discovery that causation is a supervenient (consequential) 
relation: the world could not be altered so that A did not cause 13. 
without altering some other features of the world. An account of 
causation "in the objects" is an account of those features on which 
causation is supervenient. 'Hume's mistake was to attempt the task 
of explicitly listing those features. Any attempt to make such a list 
. is -either unsuccessful because there are counter-examples, or unsatis-
factory because it becomes excessively complicated. (14y version of 
the Regularity Account could be considered an example of this exces-
sive - one might even say tedious - complexity.) The hard work of 
explicitly describing, without using anthropocentric terms, the 
features on which causation is supervenient is unnecessary for two 
reasons. 
The first reason is that the supervenience of causation is 
itself good evidence against causal realism. One can be confident 
that one could in principle provide an adequate accdunt of the feat-
ures on which causation is supervenient; bea:ing in mind that the 
4. 	See Gasking, D., "Causation and Recipes", Mind, Vol.64, 
(October 1955), pp. 479-487. 
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term 'cause' might have some degree of open-texture. 
The second reason is that an adequate, simple and informative 
- account of causation can be given by considering people's purposes 
in using causal language. Compare causation with tablehood. Table-
hood is supervenient on the (non-tabular) properties of a material 
object. Here one might make the proviso that a table be manufactured 
or at least, if it is a naturally occurring object, Selected. Also, 
I assume, for the sake of giving an example, that it is not true by 
definition that a table is used as a table; a table could be used 
as a work of art and still be a table, and not merely -like a table. 
One might find an explicit list of the features on which tablehood 
is supervenient; but this is a misguided approach, for one can dis-
cuss these features without actually listing than. Thus one might: 
begin with the following account of tablehood. 
Account of Tablehood, One: 
In addition to being either manufactured or selected, a table 
is a material object which has features F 1 ... Fm (whatever they may 
be) which make it eminently suited for use-as-a-table. A material 
object M is used-as-a-table if one or more people sit near M and put 
down or pick up small objects on M (small enough to be manipulated 
easily with one hand), without undue stretching or bending, but they 
do not put objects in containers inside M. (I hope the reader will 
ignore any inadequacies in this account of 'use-as-a-table'.) 
• 	It might be objected that one could have a table ten feet high. 
It is debatable whether such a giant's table is a table, or whether 
it is merely somthing like astable. Nonetheless, one might modify 
one's account of tablehood to cover all such counter-examples in 
8. 
either of two ways. One would then have: 
Account of Tablehood, Two:  
A material object is a table if it is manufactured or selected 
and if it has most of the features F 1 ... Fm (whatever they may be) 
such that a material object with all the features of F 1 	Fm is 
eminently suited for use-as-a-table. 
Account of Tablehood, Three: 
The paradigms of tables are manufactured material objects which 
are eminently suited for use-as-tables. A material object is a 
table if it is manufactured or selected and if it is sufficiently 
similar to the paradigms. 
Surely some such account is as satisfactory as one could re-
quire of the features F 1 	Fm on which tablehood is supervenient. 
Causation is related to the activities of manipulation, explan-
ation, and prediction, as tablehood is related to the activity of 
using a material object as-a-table. Thus one obtains an initially 
extremely attractive account of the features on which causation is 
supervenient: 
Account of Causation, One: 
In addition to the requirements that A and B occur, that A and 
B are distinct exisftences and (perhaps) that A is not later than B, 
A causes B if and only if features F 1 ... Fm (whatever they may be) 
are present in the situation which ensure that: 
Bringing A about could be used as a means of bringing 
B about, and/or preventing A could be used as a means 
of preventing B; and/or 
The occurrence of B can be explained in terms of the 
occurrence nf A; and/or 
9. 
(3) The occurrence of A can be used to predict the 
occurrence of B. 
This account needs some modification. For if A and B are 
collateral effects of some third event C and A occurs before B, 
then the occurrence of A can be used to predict the occurrence of B. 
For example, the flowering of one species of tree in the rain-forest 
might be used to predict the ripening of the fruit of another species 
a few days later; both being effects of an imperceptible change in 
temperature. Therefore sufficient condition (3) should be discarded. 
Also, as I shall argue in Chapter One, Section Two, there are two 
distinct notions of transeunt causation: explanatory causation in 
which one fact explains another fact; and producing causation in 
which, in the paradigms, one event causes another event. In this 
thesis I shall proceed as if the notion of explanation is unproblema-
tic in order to avoid a lengthy discussion of explanatory causation; 
I shall concentrate on producing causation. Thus one obtains the 
following account of producing causation: 
Account of Causation, Two: 
In addition to the requirements that A and B are distinct exist-
ences, that A and B occur and (perhaps) that A is no later than B, 
AcausesBifandonlYiffeatur"F1—"whatever they may be) 
are present which ensure that bringing A about could be used as a 
means of bringing B about, or preventing A could be used as a means 
of preventing B. 
Account Two needs further modifications for there are two 
objections to it as it stands: 
Objection One: 	In some situations it is technically impossible to 
bring about A, so how can one bring about A in order to bring 
10, 
about B? For example, one might say that the explosion of 
a star caused the presence of a nebula. To this it might be 
replied that in principle exploding a star could be used to 
. produce a nebula or that, if God exists, God could explode a 
star in order to produce a nebula. This reply is unsatisfactory, 
for it seems that the grounds one has fpr saying that in prin- 
ciple one could explode a star in order to produce a nebula, 
or for saying that God could explode a star in order to produce 
a nebula, is that exploding the star causes the nebula. Hence 
someone might argue that the features which ensure that in 
principle one could explode a stal in order to produce a nebula 
include the generalisation that explosions of stars cause 
nebulae. So the account is circular. 
Objection Two: 	There is an important example due to Chisholm5 in 
which someone raises his arm in order to make certain events 
occur in his arm a little earlier. Raising the arm is here 
considered to be a movement of the arm, not the intention to 
move the arm. Suppose that these neural events consist of 
small electric currents which can be made to sound an alarm, 
say by using a radio-transmitter built into the arm. Suppose 
the alarm sounds later than the raising of the arm. Then one 
could raise one's arm as a means to sounding the alarm, and 
one could refrain from raising one's arm in order to prevent 
the alarm sounding. Yet surely the raising of the arm does not 
cause the alarm to sound; both are collateral effects of the 
neural events. Hence there seem to be situations which, accord-
ing to Account Two, should be cases of cause and effect but are, 
5. 	Chisholm, R.M., "Freedom and Action", in Freedom and 
Determinism, ed. Lehrer, K., pp. 43, 44. 
11. 
in fact, cases of collateral effects. - 
To meet these three objections I modify Account Two to obtain: 
Account of  (Producing)  Causation, Three: 
In addition to the requirement that A and B occur, that A and 
B are distinct existences and (perhaps) that A is no later than B, 
A causes B if and only if there are present features F 1 ... Fm in 
virtue of which the situation is similar to the paradigms of causation. 
The first paradigm of causation is a situation in which a person, engag-
ing in ordinary human activities, brings about A in order to bring 
about B, but he could have prevented B by preventing or not bringing 
about A. The second paradigm is the converse situation in which a 
person, engaging in ordinary human activities; preventsB by .preventing 
A, but he could have ensured that B occur by bringing about A or by 
not preventing A. 
While . I accept this third account of producing causation, there 
is a good reason why one requires some explicit account of the features 
F1 ••• Fm on which causation is supervenient, whereas one did not re-
quire such an account in the case of tablehood. The reason is that it 
is not absurd to be a causal realist. Suppose one could not explicit-
ly describe the features F 1 ... Fm , in non-causal terms (that is, one 
could not say in what non-causal respects cases of causation are simi-
lar to the paradigms), then the causal realist could argue that at 
least one of the features F1 ... Fm should be described in causal 
terms. Conversely, if one can explicitly describe the features 
F1 •.• Fm  in non-causal terms, then, using Ockham's Razor, one can 
argue against there being any irreducibly causal element "in the oh-
jects"., 	But in the case of tablehood, no one claims that 
there is an irreducible element of tablehood "in the objects" 
and so there is no need to explicitly describe the features on 
12. 
which tablehood is supervenient. Thus neither the Conditional 
Analysis nor the Regularity Account is a rival anti-realist theory 
of causation to the Manipulability Account, but rather both supple- 
ment the Manipulability Account by describing in what respects causal 
situations are similar to the paradigms of causation. 
The need for both a conditional analysis and a regularity account 
arises from the possibility of a stricter and a less . strict require-
ment for an account of the features on which causation is supervenient. 
The stricter requirement is that in all coherent examples, even hypo-
thetical ones, A causes B if and only if the features F1 ... Fm are 
present. The less strict requirement is that, as part of one's me-
physical hypothesis, one might rule out some coherent hypothetical' 
examples as impossible (in a non-logical sense of 'impossible'), so 
one only requires that A causes B if and only if the features F 1 ... Fm 
are present in actual examples, or in possible hypothetical examples. 
Using the stricter requirement, that is, the Analysis-criterion, one 
obtains the Conditional Analysis which, as I argue in Part Two of 
Chapter One, provides an account of the features on which causation 
is supervenient in terms of the history of the world up to the causal 
situation and in terms of non-accidental generalisations. Using the 
less strict requirement, that is, the Reduction-criterion, one obtains 
the Regularity Account which gives an indisputably non-causal descrip-
tion of the features F 1 ... Fm 
-0.4 There are three theses about Metaphysics which my discussion of 
causation illustrates. 
Thesis One: 	Although ontological theories about what is "in the 
objects" and what is "in the mind" might be considered rather 
13. 
vague, the arguments used to discuss such theories can be quite 
precise and detailed. For, using the method of counter-examples 
(to be discussed in Chapter One, Section One), one can provide 
a clear and coherent counter-example to some claims about what 
is "in the objects". That vague theories are supported by pre- _ 
cise arguments is no more surprising than that the longest worm 
(whose length varies at it moves) is definitelY longer than the 
standard metre. 
Thesis Two: An interesting metaphysical theory (such as the Regu-
larity Account of Causation) can be held as part of a metaphysi-
cal hypothesis, which, although it cannot be conclusively proved 
or disproved, can be compared with rival metaphysical hypotheses. 
Thesis Three: Even if one is interested in what occurs "in the 
objects" and one wants to describe what occurs without using 
anthropocentric terms, one needs to consider ordinary language. 
In the discussion of causation, if there were situations in 
which, according to the account, A should cause B, but it is 
not ordinary usage to say that A causes B, then one has not 
succeeded in describing the features F 1 	Fm on which the 
ordinary notion of causation is supervenient, and so one is open 
to the objection that one of the features F 1 	Fm can only be 
described in causal terms. Once one has argued for an anti-
realist theory of causation one is then at liberty to ignore 
ordinary usage and to stipulate a new use for the word 'cause'. 
• 0.5 My account of causation is based on Mackie's in The Cement of 
the Vniverse,who provides an excellent discussion both of the Condi-
tional Analysis and of 	regularities. 
14. 
I assume that causes are no later than their effects until I 
discuss backwards causation in Chapter Four. In that chapter I argue 
in favour of two negative theses. On the one hand, there are no 
good arguments for the logical impossibility of backwards causation. 
On the other hand, there are no examples which cannot be reasonably 
interpreted by the causal anti-realist as not involving backwards 
causation. It follows that no proposed case of backwards causation 
could be used as a counter-example to an anti-realist account of 
causation. In particular, the accounts of Chapters Two and Three need 
no revision in the light of Chapter Four. 
15. 
CHAPTER ONE 
SOME PRELIMINARIES 
Section One: The Method'of'COLinter-examples  
1.1 	As I have indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, my 
aim is to provide two accounts of transeunt causation: one is based 
on Mackie's Conditional Analysis of causation; the other is based on 
his discussion of causal regularities. 	In this section I expound 
the method which I propose to use for testing the permissibility of 
accounts of causation. I assume that in any account of causation, 
sentences of the form 'X causes Y' are systematically correlated with 
sentences stated in non-causal terms. For example, one might attempt 
to give an account of causation by correlating 'X causes Y' with 
'X occurs, Y occurs, X and Y are distinct e::istences, and if X did not 
occur Y would not occur'. 	Such a correlation is systematic in the 
sense that the same correlation is made for a large variety of Xs and 
Ys say for any events X and Y. I do not think that anyone would 
accept an account of causation which is not systematic in this sense. 
It would, for instance, be arbitrary in the extreme to give a regu-
larity account of causation if cause and effect occurred before 1900, 
but to give some other account if cause and effect occur after 1900. 
Thus any proposed account of causation should he a systematic 
correlation of sentences with sentences of the form 'X causes Y'. By 
'sentence' I mean asentence in a natural language rather than marks 
on paper. For the purposes of this thesis it seems best to consider 
sentences rather than propositions. I do not want to consider 
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propositions since it is possible that the sentence 'X causes Y' 
is not strictly speaking true or false. In that case one can discuss 
its "truth" or "falsity" using generally accepted pre-philosophical 
criteria of truth-values, yet the sentence does not correspond to a 
proposition. 
1.2 	The Analysis-criterion: 
The method which I shall use in examining accounts of causation 
is the method of counter -examples._ Suppose, initially, that the 
purpose of the account is to provide a sentence p - called the 
analysans - which is synonymous with a given sentence q - toe analys-
andum. Thus p and q are to have the same cognitive meaning. If one 
can coherently describe a situation in which p would be true and q 
would be false or vice versa, then p and q cannot have the same mean-
ing; so one has found a counter-example to the account. For example, 
suppose p is the sentence 'This animal has a heart' and q is the 
sentence 'This animal has a kidney'. Then I claim one can tell the 
following coherent story: 
A certain species of insect, with neither 
heart nor kidney, lives in the adult stage 
only for twenty-four hours and so in fact 
requires no organs for eliminating waste. 
Like all insects it is too small to need 
a pump to pump its blood. Now suppose that 
from this species there evolves a species 
of insect the size of a rabbit which has 
a pump to pump its blood, but since it still 
lives only twenty-four hours in the adult 
stage it requires no kidneys. 
In this case, p would be true and q would be false. This example 
shows how sometimes, by providing sufficient details, one can argue 
that a proposed counter-example is empirically possible and, a fort-
iori, coherent. Another method of arguing for the coherence of a 
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counter-example is to argue that the impossibility of the counter-
example was discovered a posteriori and so is merely a nomic (or some 
other non-logical) impossibility. For example, an account of material 
objects in terms of aggregates of molecules could not satisfy the 
analysis-criterion since it was discovered a posteriori that material 
objects are not made of homogeneous matter. Again, one can sometimes 
argue that a counter-example is coherent on the grounds that it can 
be imagined. Thus one can imagine what it would be like if all red 
objects seemed green and all green objects seemed red; so, it could 
be argued, hypothetical examples of colour-reversal provide coherent 
examples (perhaps counter-examples to some analysis of perception in 
terms of discrimination-behaviour). 
If it is assumed that a necessary condition for the correctness 
of an account, say of 'X causes Y' is that there are no coherent 
counter-examples in which the two sentences to be correlated differ 
in truth-value, then I shall say that the analysis-criterion is being 
used'. 
'1.3 	Some Remarks on 'the Analysis-Criterion 
There are accounts which satisfy the analysis-criterion hut in 
which the analysans and the analysandum are not synonymous. 
In particular, if p and q are any two logical or mathematical 
truths, an account in which p and q are correlated would satisfy 
the analysis-criterion. Thus, if Goldbach's conjecture is true, 
there could be no counter-example in which '2 + 2 = 4' is true 
but 'Goldbach!s conjecture is true' is false. Yet  
and 'Goldbach's conjecture is true' do not have the same meaning. 
Furthermore, there might perhaps be sentences p and. q such that 
it is neither a mathematical nor a logical truth that pEq but such that 
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an account correlating p and q satisfies the analysis-criterion. 
(Here, if p and q were synonymous, I would treat p E q as a logi-
cal truth.) For example, suppose it is synthetic a priori that 
nothing can be uniformly red and uniformly green at the same time. 
Let p be the sentence 'This surface is uniformly red' and q be 
the sentence 'This surface is uniformly red and not uniformly 
green'. Then p E q is neither a logical nor a mathematical truth; 
but one could not, I suggest, find a coherent hypothetical example 
in which p is true and q is false. 
To this it might be objected that if the sentence 'No surface 
is uAiformly red and uniformly green' is synthetic then it follows 
that one can coherently describe a hypothetical situation by . 
simply saying that there is a surface which is uniformly red and 
uniformly green. To this I reply that the analysis-criterion, 
to be useful, requires an independent criterion of coherence. 
Suppose one argues that p E q is neither logically nor mathemati-
cally necessary and so p & -q is a coherent description of a 
counter-example to an analysis in which p is the analysandum and 
q is the analysans. In that case the analysis-criterion is cir-
cular and hence of no interest. I stipulate that the analysis-
criterion is to be used with examples whose coherence is not 
asserted purely on the grounds that two sentences are not logi-
cally equivalent. 
(3) The analysis-criterion is not a precise criterion. There are two 
reasons for this imprecision. The first is that some examples 
are of debatable coherence. For example, consider the following 
famous passage from Descartes: 
"I will suppose ... that there is an 
evil spirit ... I will suppose that 
... colours, shapes, sounds and 
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and all external objects are 
mere delusive dreams ... I will 
consider myself as having no hands, 
no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no 
senses, but just as having the false 
belief that I have all these things." 
This example might perhaps be used as a counter-example to an idealist 
analysis of sentences about material objects. But its coherence is 
debatable. 
The second reason is that in some proposed counter-examples, 
the example is described coherently but the situation being considered 
diverges so much from paradigms that there could be dispute over the 
truth-values of the analysandum and/or the analysans. For example, 
Dummett considers the following as an example someone might want to 
give of backwards causation: 
Someone who believes in magic ... 
has among his spells a formula for 
producing good weather in a particular 
place on a particular day; this 
formula works without fail. ... An 
occasion arises when he has a reason for 
wanting the weather at, say, Liverpool, 
to have been good on the previous 
day, but he does not know whether 
there was [good weather] or not; 
he therefore recites his spell, putting 
in yesterday's date. Subsequently 
he finds out that there was fine 
weather at Liverpool on that day; 
and he finds that whenever he recites 
the formula with a past date, not 
knowing what the weather was like 
on that date, later investigation 
proves the weather to have been fine 
then. 2 
This example is coherent, but it has been disputed whether the 
magician's spell caused the clear weather the day before, 
Descartes, First Meditation. 
Dummett, M.A.E., "Can an Effect Precede its Cause?' 
Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supp. Vol.28 (1954), 
p.35. 
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However, it would be rash to conclude that the analysis-criterion 
is useless as a necessary condition for the analysis to be correct. 
Even if one restricts oneself to using counter-examples, which 
are clearly coherent, and in which analysans and analysandum have 
truth-values assignable without controversy, one can find counter- 
examples to many initially plausible analyses. For example, I 
claim3 that one can coherently describe a world in which one 
would say of two events A and B that A caused B but no event like 
A ever occurred on any other occasion. This counter-example pre- 
vents one treating certain regularity accounts of causation as 
analyses. 
(4) The analysis-criterion is nevetheless interesting even if one 
rejects, like Quine, the analytic-synthetic distinction. Suppose 
one accepted Quine's conclusion: 
Any statement can be held true come what may, 
if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere 
in the system ... Conversely, by the same 
token, no statement is immune to revision. 
Revision even of the logical law of the 
excluded middle has been proposed as a means 
of simplifying quantum mechanics. 4 
It does not follow that people are able to treat at will any 
truth as synthetic. The available range of conceptual schemes 
. or systems is determined by culture, language, and available 
-scientific theories, or even, by human nature. Hence the task of 
discovering what pairs of sentences are treated as equivalent would 
still be an. important part of the study of conceptual schemes. 
As cOnceptual schemes change so, presumably, would . the judgments 
about the truth of sentences in coherently described situations. 
See pp.165, 166 for the details of this example. 
Quine, W.V.O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in From a Logical 
Point of View, p.43. 
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(5) Presumably there are other necessary conditions for an analysis, 
in addition to satisfying the analysis-criterion and in addition 
to the requirement that the analysis be systematic. For example, 
if p is the analysandum and q is the analysans, there is another 
candidate for an analysis in which p is the analysandum and p & q 
is the analysans. This would be systematic and it would satisfy 
the analysis-criterion. But surely this is not a permissible 
analysis. In some way, the analysis has to result in some clari-
fication or simplification. However, I shall ignore such consid-
erations which are hard to state formally; when I am discussing 
the analysis of causation I shall consider only the analysis-
criterion. 
1.4 The Reduction-Criterion  
An account which fails to satisfy the analysis-criterion might 
still be important. For example, a regularity account of causation. - 
which fails to satisfy the analysis-criterion - might well be the 
correct account of causation "in the objects". 	Again, suppose one 
makes the contingent identification of material objects with aggregates 
of molecules, and one contingently identifies the colour of the surface 
of a material object with the property of emitting light of certain 
wave-lengths. In that case, one obtains an account of the sentence 
'This material object is red' as 'This aggregate of molecules emits 
light of wavelength of 7,000 to 8,000 Angstrom units'. This account is 
not an analysis, yet the scientific realist claims the account gives, 
in some sense, a better or more fundamental description of some state-
of-affairs. This is admittedly somewhat vague. Yet I claim the vague 
notion of providing an account of what occurs "in the objects" or of 
providing a more fundamental account, is clear enough to provide one 
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with a new criterion in place of the analysis-criterion. Therefore 
in my discussion of a regularity account of causation I shall use 
this new criterion without either considering what it means to pro-
vide an account of what occurs "in the objects", or considering what 
it is to provide a more fundamental account. 
Such accounts 1 shall call, for want of a better term, reductions. 
What criterion should one have for reduction? A necessary condition 
for any account of what occurs "in the objects" is surely that there 
be no actual example in which reductiandum and reductians have differ-
ent truth-values. For example, suppose the reductiandum is 'X causes 
Y' and the reductians is a regularity account. The claim is that 
when someone says 'X causes Y', and according to the usual criteria. 
he is correct, whatever he thinks might be happening, all that is 
actually happening "in the objects" is that there is an instance of 
some regularity. If on some actual (not hypothetical) occasion, 
'X causes Y' is true but the reductians is false, then one has incor-
rectly described what is occurring "in the objects". Conversely, 
if the reductians is true but X does not cause Y, the account is 
incomplete; one has perhaps discovered some of what occurs "in the 
objects" in cases of causation, but, presumably, one has omitted 
part of the description of what occurs "in the objects". 
Now this criterion that truth-values are preserved could be 
used in two different ways. Suppose there is a proponent of a 
reduction and an objector to that reduction. On the one hand if one 
assumed that the objector was required to find actual counters-examples 
to the proposed reduction, then the proponent of the reduction would 
benefit from the objector's human limitations. So the proponent 
would be able to put forward excessively strong reductions. For 
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example, if the universe is large enough, there are probably regions 
of the universe in which accidental regularities occur which an 
observer would rationally believe to be causal or non-accidental 
regularities. Yet an objector to a regularity reduction of causation 
obviously could not, when challenged, provide an example of a regu-
larity which is accidental and yet which is rationally believed to be 
causal. So I reject this use of the criterion. 
On the other hand, if the proponent of the reduction has to 
demonstrate that there are no actual counter-examples to the reduction 
anywhere, he would have to argue that such counter-examples are impos-
sible - perhaps in some non-logical sense of 'impossible'. 	However, 
a metaphysician is likely to argue for the impossibility of a kind " 
of example on the grounds that it is inconsistent with his metaphysical 
theories. For example, if someone claims that nowhere is there a 
material object made of homogeneous matter, his claim . is part of a 
metaphysical theory and is not, say, based on straightforward induction 
from known to unknown material objects. For an operationalist could 
believe that in fact material objects are composed of homogeneous 
matter but that the properties of homogeneous matter are conveniently 
described in terms of fictions called molecules. Thus it is plausible 
that the proponent of a reduction which is not an analysis can only 
defend his reduction as part of a general metaphysical hypothesis. 
I shall adopt the following procedure, which I shall call the 
reduction-criterion: 
A reduction is demonstrably incorrect if an actual 
counter-example can be found. In addition, the proponent 
of the reduction is required to incorporate into his meta-
physical hypothesis some principle or some assertions from 
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which it follows that no counter-example occurs 
anywhere at any time. In the event that ad hoc or 
totally implausible assertions are incorporated into 
the metaphysical hypothesis one can reject the reduction. 
If the assertions incorporated into the metaphysical 
hypothesis are fairly plausible, then one has no 
objection to the reduction, but one has merely revealed 
the commitments of a metaphysician who proposes the 
reduction. 
Note: In Truth, Probability and Paradox Mackie considers what he 
calls factual analysis. He says "There is then, a problem about 
• 
the factual analysis of causation; we have the task of finding 
out what goes on in the world in those sequences and processes that 
we mark off as causal." 5 The factual analysis is an answer to the 
question "Is there anything common to and distinctive of the members 
of this class?" 6 One might interpret Hackle's notion of factual 
analysis in such a way that if by accident there are no counter-
examples to the factual analysis then it is correct. 	However, 
suppose that it were the case that (by accident) men and only men 
were, to use Russell's example, featherless bipeds. Would a 
factual analysis of a man as a featherless biped be acceptable to 
Mackie? I am not sure. But if some kind of non-arbitrariness or 
non-accidental character is required for an account to be a factual 
analysis, then,I suggest, Mackie's notion of factual analysis is 
rather close to what I call reduction. 
Mackie, J.L., Truth, Probability and Paradox, p.12. 
/bid., p.12. 
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1.5 Two Examples of the use of the Reduction-criterion 
Example One: Action at a Distance 
Suppose that an account of causation is propOsed, and if there is 
action at a distance the reductiandum is true but the reductians is 
false. Suppose also that the proponent of the account accepts that 
action at a distance is coherent. Then the - proponent of the reduction 
is committed to include in his metaphysical hypothesis some claim 
which entails that there is no action at a distance. Now it would 
not be surprising if there was no action at a distance. Nonetheless, 
the incorporation of the no action at a distance principle into a 
metaphysical hypothesis is, I suggest, a defect - though not a great 
one - in the theory. Other things being equal, one would prefer a 
metaphysical hypothesis that did not contain as an unargued assump-
tion the principle that there is no action at a distance. For one 
would like metaphysical hypothesies to be compatible with all kinds 
of scientific theory which one might expect scientists to produce in 
the future. Thus while a reduction of causation which commits one 
to the denial of action at a distance would not be absurd or demon-
strably incorrect, it would be less attractive than a simple modifi-
cation of that reduction without this commitment. 
Example Two: Causation and Recipes 
On Gasking's account of causation "A statement about the cause of 
something is very closely connected with a recipe for producing it, 
or for preventing it." 7 Suppose (as Casking does not) that one is 
always to give a straightforward recipe account of transeunt.causation. 
That is, consider the reduction in which the reductiandum is 'X causes 
Y' and the reductians is 'Events of the Y sort can be produced by 
7. Gasking, D., "Causation and Recipes", Mind, Vol.64 
(October 1955), p, 483. 
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producing events of the X sort'. One might object to this account 
on the grounds that it is conceivable that the Solar System was 
caused by the approach of another star near the Sun. 8 More precisely, 
suppose that another star approaches the Sun and that later (as in a 
now discredited hypothesis about the origins of the Solar System) a 
cigar-shaped cloud of gas and dust is dragged away which condenses 
into the planets. Assume that this example is coherent and also 
assume that the proponent of the reduction admits that in this situ-
ation one would say that the approach of the star caused the Solar 
System to come into existence. In that case the proponent of the 
.reduction would be committed to the non-occurrence of such events 
as part of his metaphysical hypothesis. 	If he could not derive 
the non-occurrence of such events from more plausible premises, his 
hypothesis would, I suggest, contain an ad hoc assertion; so one 
would reject the reduction. Perhaps the proponent of the reduction 
would claim that God produced the Solar System by making a star 
approach the Sun. In that case the ad hoc character of the metaphysical 
hypothesis is lessened, but the metaphysician has now committed him-
self to an account in which God produces one event in order that 
another event should come about; the objector to the reduction could 
then set about examining the peculiar consequences of the proponent's 
commitment. 
8. This example is Mackie's. See Mackie, J.L., 
The Cement of the Universe, p.170. 
Section Two: 	Events and Causal Fields 
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In Section Two I consider the notions of a quasi-event and 
of a causal field. The notion of a quasi-event is required to make 
precise the categoxy to which cause and effect belong in cases of 
producing causation.. The notion of a causal field is required for 
two purposes. First, it enables one to define quasi-events. Second, 
the claim that causation is a three-term relation between cause, 
effect and causal field enables one to give an account of the peculi-
arity of some causal sentences. I want to treat these peculiar 
sentences as false in order to keep the notion of causation which 
am analysing fairly close to those producing paradigms, in which 
person produces the cause as a means to producing the effect - and 
not merely to the "preventing paradigms" in which one could have 
prevented the cause by preventing the effect. The features which in 
ordinary circumstances no one ever has to produce because they are 
always present are thus not treated as causes. For example, there 
is something peculiar, I claim, about the sentence 'The presence of 
oxygen in the atmosphere was a cause of the fire'. There is a 
broader notion of causation, departing further from the paradigms, 
in which one would say that the presence of oxygen was a cause of the 
fire. This broader notion can be obtained by considering the null 
causal field; in that case almost any 'fact about what occurs in 
some region of space-time can be treated as a quasi-event. 
I also mention causal fields when I discuss the notion of 
distinct existences and the notion.of a regularity. 
My thesis is concerned only with transeunt causation - not 
with. immanent causation. 	The paradigms of transuent causation 
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I take to be cases in which one event causes another event. However, 
if one asked 'What caused the fire?' one might accept as equally 
appropriate the answer 'Dropping a cigarette', which describes an 
event, and the answer 'A fault in the wiring' which does not describe 
an event but rather a condition. 	This suggests that cases of 
causation in which the cause is an event might form an artificially 
restricted class. So I shall not rule out cases of transeunt 
casuation in which the cause is not, strictly speaking, an event. 
However, someone might argue that one can always analyse sentences 
about causes in terms of sentences about events. Thus one might 
attempt to analyse 'The faulty wiring caused the fire' as 'The 
occurrence of a fault in the wiring caused the fire'. 	Davidson • , 
suggests that examples of causal idioms which resist such an analysis 
are rudimentary causal explanations 9 ; 	he gives the example "The 
collapse was caused not by the fact that the bolt gave way, but by 
the fact that it gave way so suddenly and unexpectedly". 	It seems 
that Davidson would claim that the cause of the collapse was the 
event of the bolt giving way, and the purpose of this rudimentary 
causal explanation is to point to some feature of the covering causal 
law. In this case, even if we cannot fully state the covering law 
it would be of the form: 'If e is an event ... which is rapid enough 
and occurs at time t then e is followed at time t+E . by an event ....' 
Thus the properties of events are considered in the description of 
the causal law rather than in the description of the cause itself. 
However, the difficulty with Davidson's account is that there are 
. cases of transeunt causation in which there is no event which is 
9- 	Davidson, D., "Causal Relations", The Journal of Philosophy,. 
vol.64, (Nov. 1967), pp. 702-703. 
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identifiable as the cause. For example, consider the question 'What 
caused the fire to burn out of control?' An acceptable answer might 
be 'The use of a water-based fire extinguisher'. An equally accept-
able answer would be 'The presence of pure oxygen'. In this latter 
case what is the event which caused the fire to burn out of control? 
Surely not the same event, say dropping a cigarette, as caused the 
fire to burn, since Dropping a cigarette' would not - be the correct 
answer to 'What caused the fire to burn out of control?' Nor need 
it be the event of the oxygen coming to be present, for there might 
always be pure oxygen in that room. On Davidson's account one seems 
to have a causal explanation without any cause. 
Hence there seem to be cases of transeunt causation in which a 
fact rather than an event is a cause. Indeed there is an idiom in 
which 'A causes B' might be analysed as 'A and B are logically inde-
pendent and A explains B'. 
I shall now argue that the notion of transeunt causation is 
based on two different kinds of paradigm of causation; producing 
paradigms and explanatory paradigms. 
In many cases in which one can 1-roduce Y by producing X, the 
occurrence of X explains the occurrence of Y. For example, if a 
short-circuit causes the fuse to blow, one could have made the fuse 
blow by producing the short-circuit. One can also explain the blowing 
of the fuse in terms of the short-circuit. 
However there are some cases in which a producing paradigm is 
not an explanatory paradigm. For example, suppose that it is dis-
covered empirically that an extract of jojoba beans sends people to 
sleep. Suppose that it is not known what chemical compound in the 
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extract is responsible for this property, and that it is not known 
how the extract acts on the central nervous system. This, I claim, 
is a producing paradigm; people are sent to sleep by being given 
extracts of jojoba beans. No doubt, in this case, one might explain 
the person going to sleep by saying that he had taken an extract of 
jojoba beans. But, I claim, the explanation depends on the prior 
knowledge that jojoba bean extracts can be used to produce sleep. 
So this is not an explanatory paradigm. 
Conversely, there can be explanations which do not closely 
resemble producing paradigms. Suppose, for example, that a "mechani-
cal tortoise" moves around and that one is perplexed by its movement 
until one notices that, when it reaches an electric power-point, it 
recharges its batteries. In that case, one has partially explained 
the motion of the mechanical tortoise in terms of the event of its 
recharging itself. Yet one cannot prevent or produce that motion by 
preventing or making the tortoise recharge itself. One is reluctant 
even to say that the tortoise recharging itself causes its (earlier) 
motion. Rather, one tends to assume that there is some mechanism in 
the tortoise which causes its power-point-seeking behaviour. But the 
tendency. to assume that there is such a mechanism is based on the 
prior success of the explanation of the motion of the tortoise in terms 
of its recharging itself. 	If, on the one hand, one does say that 
the tortoise recharging itself causes its (earlier) motion then one 
has an example in which there is an explanatory paradigm which is not 
a producing paradigm. If, on the other hand, one does not say that 
the tortoise recharging itself causes its (earlier) motion then it 
seems that the notion of transeunt causation is based more on produc-
ing paradigms than on explanatory paradigms. Instead of settling this 
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dispute ever the use of the term 'cause', I shall distinguish two 
kinds of transeunt causation; explanatory and producing causation. 
Explanatory causation is based on the explanatory paradigms; produc-
ing causation is based on the producing paradigms. I shall concen-
trate, in this thesis, on producing causation. Thus I shall investi-
gate the features in virtue of which cases of transeunt causation re-
semble producing paradigms, and I shall largely ignore any features 
in virtue of which some cases of transeunt causation - it might be 
claimed - resemble those explanatory paradigms which are not also 
producing paradigms. However, in Chapter Four (Section 3.5) I shall 
discuss why (producing) causes seem to explain their effects not 
vice versa, in order to answer an objection to Causal Anti-realism.- 
2.2 	Causal Fields  
In The Problem of Causaiityl°Anderson claims that the cause is 
a differentia of some genus and the effect a variable property of 
members of the same genus. The genus is the causal field. Anderson 
says 
• The inquiry into causes, ..., is only a 
special case ... of the solution of problems 
in general. In trying to determine when a 
phenomenon is present,• and when it is absent, 
in a given field, we are endeavouring to divide 
a genus (the field) into two species, one of 
which has a certain property, while the other "ll has the opposite. 
Thus to take . Anderson's example, if one asks for the cause of my 
anger, the anger of men or the anger of animals in general, one is 
considering three different causal fields and so one should expect 
different answers. 
Anderson, J., "The Problem of Causality", Australasian, 
Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol.16 (Aug.1938), 
pp. 127-142. 
fbid.3-p.134. 
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Anderson's theory of the causal field does not enable one 
to discover to what category causes and effects belong until one has 
discovered to what category the causal field belongs. In many cases 
both cause and effect are changes in some objects, so the causal 
field might be the existence of and persistent properties of these 
objects. However, if the effect is a fire, it is the destruction 
of an object in a certain manner rather than a change. Such examples 
suggest that a causal field is a genus whose species consist of cer-
tain states of affairs in various regions of space-time. Morc gener-
ally, to cover the case of determinables,it seems that Anderson's 
zausal field consists of a range of possible states of affairs in 
regions of space-time. For example, one says 'The spark caused the. 
fire' but, I claim, there is something peculiar about 'The presence 
of oxygen in the atmosphere caused the fire'. This is because all 
the states of affairs in the range being considered are ones in which 
oxygen is present, but not all are ones in which there are sparks. 
The difficulty with Anderson's account of the causal field 
is in determining, in any given case, what the causal field is. 
Anderson himself seems to have considered that one should specify 
a causal field when asking what caused a certain event; he claims 
that "only confusion can result, if we have not begun by specifying 
(a) the field, ( b) the phenomena ... ,, 12 	In the manner of Anderson 
I shall adopt the principle that the specification of a causal field 
is either stated or presupposed when one asks 'What caused B?' or 
'What will A cause?' 	It follows that there is a weighty objection 
to this account of causal fields; a completely unexpected answer 
might be quite acceptable. For example; if I ask 'What caused the 
12 . 	Anderson, J., op.cit., p.134. 
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house to burn?' I have in mind a range of possibilities. In parti- 
cular, I assume that the atmosphere consists of ordinary air, but the 
answer 'The atmosphere in Hobart was, for two hours, 100% oxygen' 
would, if true, be an acceptable answer. 
There might be several ways of avoiding this difficulty. I 
choose the following. The causal field is not a range of possibilities, 
• 
but rather a norm or standard with which the actual Situation is com- 
pared. Thus, when one asks 'What caused the house to burn?', one pre-
supposes the normality of an atmosphere containing some oxygen, but 
not the normality of an atmosphere of pure oxygen. Hence the presence 
of oxygen in the atmosphere is not a departure from the norm, but 
the presence of 100% oxygen in the atmosphere is a departure from tfie 
norm. So the latter - but not the former - is a candidate for the 
cause of the fire. I do not assume that there are objective criteria 
for when a state-of-affairs is normal. I merely assume that people 
make judgments about what is normal. These judgments could vary from 
context to context. Strictly speaking, there is a whole class of 
normal states-of-affairs - the norms; a cause or an effect can be a 
departure from any member of this class. For example, if the speaker 
assumes that Joe always drives home by either route five or route ten 
then there could be two normal states-of-affairs; in one, Joe drives 
home byroute five, in the other by route ten. In that case 'Joe's 
driving home by route five' might be an acceptable answer to 'What 
caused Joe to be late?', because Joe's driving home by route five 
differs from one of the normal states-of-affairs. 
Accordingly, I define the causal field to be the class of all 
states-of-affairs which are not considered to be abnormal; I define 
quasi-event to be a state-of-affairs which differs from at least one 
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of the normal states-of-affairs in the causal field. Three points 
should be noted about these judgments of normality: 
Since there can be several normal states-of-affairs, a state-
of-affairs can be judged moderately unusual ani still be normal 
in the required sense. 
in some contexts, in particular in scientific contexts, very 
little is deemed abnormal. 	(However the state-of-affairs in 
which in the year 2000 A.D. all blue objects turn green and 
vice versa would still be considered abnormal.) The resulting 
causal field I call the nut' field. 
Judgments of normality era made on background evidence only; 
one does not take into consideration knowledge of the effect or' 
the cause when judging what is normal. 
If A is a quasi-event, A isnot usually the total state-of- - 	 . 	_ 
affairs. A is merely some fact or facts about what is occurring in 
some region R of space-time. Contained in and perhaps identical to 
R will be a region D of space-time in which A differs from some normal 
state-of-affairs. D is the spatio -temporal location of A. 
If A and B are two quasi-events, A is said to be strictly 
earlier than B and B is said to be strictly later than A if the loca-
tions of A and B do not overlap and any point in A is earlier than any 
point in B. 
. Someone might argue that the class of quasi-events should be 
restricted so that excessively remote regions of space-time, or exces-
sively minute details, are not considered. Thus an elaborate account 
of the evolution of a species of virus and of the evolution of Homo 
sapiens would not, for instance, be acceptable as part of an answer to 
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'What caused the 'flu epidemic?' However, in this case there are 
other, shorter, answers which are more appropriate in most contexts; 
it is a matter of conversational point that one does not give exces-
sively detailed answers where simpler ones satisfy the curiosity of 
the questioner. 
The criterion for discovering the causal field presupposed by 
the question 'What caused B?' or the question 'What Will A cause?' 
is to decide what answers would be considered unacceptable or peculiar, 
and why. Some answers are peculiar because of considerations of 
conversational point. Other answers are unacceptable because they are 
part of 'fne description of every normal state-of-affairs in the causal 
field. 
2.3 	Two objections  to the Notion of a Causal Field  
In this subsection I reply to two objections to the use of 
the notion of a causal field in discussing causation. 
Objection. One: 	There is no need to use the notion of a causal field 
when analysing causation. Rather, one should distinguish be-
tween the conversational point of a sentence and the truth-
conditions of that sentence. Consider the example in which it 
is said to be false that the presence of oxygen caused the house 
to burn. In this example it is equally peculiar to say 'The 
presence of oxygen was a cause of the house burning' and to 
say 'The presence of oxygen was not a cause of the house burn-
ing'. 	It is not that it is false that the presence of oxygen 
is a. cause, but rather that there is no point in saying that 
the presence of oxygen is a cause. Typically one does not 
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make assertions that are uninformative or uninteresting. 
A condition that is always present is not of much interest 
as a cause, so one rarely, if ever, says 'The presence of 
oxygen caused the fire'. From lack of use the sentence seems 
peculiar.. 
Reply: The following five considerations should meet this objection. 
However, I admit that in many cases considerationsof conversational 
point could replace or supplement the reference to causal fields. 
I claim that both the sentence 'The fire was caused by the presence 
of oxygen in the atmosphere' and its internal negation make the 
false presupposition that the phrase 	' .the presence of oxygen 
in the atmosphere' refers to a particular in the correct category 
for a producing cause. For the phrase 	'the presence of oxygen 
in the atmosphere' does not describe a quasi-event (relative to 
a causal field in which oxygen is present in the atmosphere in 
all normal states-of-affairs). 
What rules are there for deciding when it would be pointless 
to utter a sentence? Considerations of what the hearer knows 
do not explain why some causal sentences are peculiar. 	For, 
presumably, there is point in reminding someone of something he 
knows but of which he is not explicitly thinking. For example, 
Jane might remind Harry that it is-one o'clock and that his train 
leaves at two o'clock, even though Harry knows perfectly well what 
• the time is and when his train leaves. In the same way, there 
might be point in reminding someone that oxygen is a cause of the 
- fire, provided he is not thinking of the fact that oxygen is a 
cause of the fire. Thus I suggest that some criterion of the 
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relevance, importance, or interest of the sentence would have 
to be used in order to show...that it is, usually, pointless to 
say 'The presence of oxygen caused the fire'. 
There are cases in which 'X was . a cause of Y' would be a point-
less utterance, yet 'X was a cause of Y' does not seem peculiar 
in the way that 'The presence of oxygen in the atmosphere was a 
cause of the fire' seems peculiar. For example, consider the 
sentence 'Striking the match caused it to light'. Everyone 
knows that one strikes matches to make them light. Of course 
in this example the phrase 'striking the match' refers to an 
event, not a condition. But why should that affect consider-
ations of conversational point? 
The notion of the causal field enables one to distinguish be- 
tween the non-occurrence of a quasi-event and the Occurrence of 
a negatively described quasi-event. Thus suppose someone is 
poisoned and fails to take the antidote - a weed growing in his 
garden - which in fact he does not know is an antidote and which 
is never eaten. In that case one would not say that the failure 
to take the antidote was cause of the man's death. For the 
' failure to take the antidote would be part of every normal state-
of-affairs, and so is not a quasi-event but is merely 
absence of a quasi-event. But now suppose that a man works in 
an area where it is common to be bitten by deadly snakes. Sup- 
pose also that all people working in this area are trained in 
the use of the antidote and provided with the antidote. In that 
case, if a man is bitten, if he does not use the antidote and if 
he dies, one would say that his failure to use the antidote was 
a cause of his death. For the failure to use the antidote is 
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a difference between the actual and at least some of the normal 
states-of-affairs. 
Presumably, if one replaces the notion of the causal field by 
considerations of conversational point, one: claims that in all 
cases the failure to take an antidote is a cause of death, but 
only in some cases is there any conversational point in mention-
ing that case of death. One might, perhaps; claim that one is 
influenced by the procedures of law-courts in finding legal 
responsibility; consequently, there is point in mentioning a 
failure to take the antidote only when someone would reasonably 
be blamed for the failure to take the antidote. 
Now consider the following example. A chemist discovers a 
cheap non-toxic- chemical compound called Diazoquimoline. Diazo-
quinoline when sprayed on plants, enables them to withstand 
a great degree of drought. This compound has never been used 
commercially. The chemist passes a field of wheat - obviously 
suffering from drought - and is asked 'What caused that crop to 
fail?' He replies (correctly) 'The lack of rain caused the crop 
to fail, but if the farmer had used Diazoquinoline he would 
have saved his crop'. I suggest that the chemist would not reply 
'The lack of rain and the failure to use Diazoquinoline caused 
the crop to fail', unless he believed that it was the practice 
of farmers to use Diazoquinoline. In this case, the remark 
'If the farmer had used Diazoquinoline he would have saved his 
crop' is informative, interesting, and relevant, and so also, 
I suggest, would be the remark 'The failure to use Diazoquino-
line caused the crop to fail'. Hence, if it is a matter of 
conversational point that normal occurrences (here the failure 
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to use Diazoquinoline) are not mentioned as causes, there seems 
to be no explanation for this principle in terms of the require-
ment that an assertion be informative, interesting and relevant. 
Furthermore, if the absence of an event is always considered . 
a cause when that absence could sometimes be considered a cause, 
then it seems that in almost any causal situation the absence of 
intervention by agents (human beings or, perhaps, God) would 
have to be considered a cause. Yet this proliferation of nega-
tive causes seems counter-intuitive. 
(5 ) 
	 I propose, as a criterion for distinguishing conversational 
point from truth-conditions, that one considers answers to 
questions in a questionnaire. Assuming that one is co-operative, 
one answers yes/no questions in a questionnaire even if the 
question seems pointless. I suggest that the perplexity felt 
on being asked 'Was the presence of oxygen (in normal concen-
trations) a cause of the fire?' is a sign that, with respect to 
commonly accepted causal fields, the question is based on a 
false presupposition, namely that the presence of oxygen is the 
kind of particular which could be a producing cause. If it is 
merely a matter of conversational point, one would write 'Yes' 
with irritation, perhaps, but not with perplexity. 
Objection Two: 	To make causation relative to a causal field is to 
commit oneself to the claim that causation is to some extent 
subjective. 
Reply: 	To the extent . that the causal field depends on what the 
speaker assumes to be normal, causation is subjective. The following 
three considerations should make this conclusion more palatable. 
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Suppose two people are arguing at cross-purposes because they 
have in mind different causal fields. If they are aware of the 
way in which causation is relative to a causal field they are then 
in a position to reach agreement on the choice of , a causal field. 
Moreover, there seems to be a convention whereby if someone says 
• 'X causes Y' the hearer assumes a causal field is being considered 
such that the utterer of 'X causes Y.' does not make false presup- 
positions. For example, suppose that in answer to the question 
'Why did the grass grow so well this winter?' Jim says 'The rain 
caused the growth'. Suppose that Anne had thought that the un-
usually warm weather caused the growth and Anne assumes that 
winters are wet. Then Anne would infer that Jim had in mind a• 
different causal field from hers, namely one in which 'reliable 
winter rain is not considered part of every normal state-of-affairs. 
Hence I conclude that the subjective nature of causation in no 
way lessens the usefulness of sentences about causation. 
In order to obtain an objective notion of causation one can stip-
ulate that one is considering the null casual field. The sentence 
'Relative to the null field, the presence of oxygen was a cause 
of the fire' is true. There is, however, a good reason why one 
does not always consider the null field. For, relative to the 
null field, there are too many causes. Here one could, of course, 
appeal to considerations of conversational point to limit the 
range of mentioned causes. But I have argued that this is Pot, in 
fact, the practice of speakers of English. 
It is important to distinguish between a subjective relation and a 
subjective relational sentence. For example, someone might claim 
that the ineffable content of coloured sense-data is subjective in 
the sense that it varies from person to person. Nonetheless, the 
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relational sentence 'The sense-datum intuited when someone looks 
at a ripe tomato differs in hue from the sense-datum intuited 
when someone looks at a lettuce' would, presumably, be objective. 
If, as I claim, there is a three-term relation between causal 
field, cause, and effect, the relational sentences are objective 
in the following sense: given a causal field, a proposed cause, 
and a proposed effect, if two people diffe:: in their judgments 
about whether the relation holds, at least one person is mis-
taken. However, one of the relata - the causal field - is (in 
many cases) subjective, in that it depends on what the person 
judges to be normal. 	Thus the two -term relational sentence 
'X is a cause of Y' as well as one of the relata for the three-
term relation are subjective, but the three -term relational 
sentence 'Relative to F, X is a cause of Y' is objective. 
2.4 	The Logic of Quasi-events 
A. quasi-event is a state-of-affairs differing from at least 
one norm. Two quasi-events are said to be equivalent if the only 
difference between them is part of every normal state-of-affairs. Thus 
'Joe's taking route five' and 'Joe's not taking route ten' are des-
criptions of equivalent quasi-events if it is part of every norm that 
Joe takes either route five or route ten. 
One can apply truth-functional connectives to quasi-events 
only if the resulting state-of-affairs differs from some norm. For 
example, if it is part of every norm that one but not both of events C 
and E occur, then the occurrence of C and the occurrence of E are 
individually quasi-events but they have no disjunction. 
I shall say that quasi-event A contains quasi-event B, if A 
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is equivaZent to B & C for some quasi-event C. 
Next I shall consider the problem of when two quasi-events 
are distinct existences. It is assumed that if A causes B, A and B 
are distinct existences. If A causes B, A and B must not be equiva-
lent. Moreover, it seems that A should not contain B. For example, 
one would not say 'The burning of the house. caused the burning of the 
bedroom'. Again, the effect does not contain the cause. One would 
not say 'The burning of the bedroom caused the burning of the house', 
but rather 'The burning of the bedroom caused the burning of the 
remainder of the house'. Thus a necessary condition for A and B to 
be distinct existences is that A does not contain B and B does not 
contain A. 
Furthermore, it seems that cause and effect do not even over-
Zap. 	Thus, while one might say 'Last year's disasters caused this 
year's disasters', one would not, I think, say 'Last term's disasters 
caused this month's disasters' where some of the disasters occurred 
both in last term and this month. 
However, it is not obvious what is meant by the overlapping 
of quasi-events. For, if A and B are quasi-events, A is the same as 
(A v B) & (A v -B) and B is the same as-(A v B) & (-A v B), so A and 
B have an overlap, namely A v B. One might be tempted to consider 
spatio-temporal overlaps, but there seems to be no prohibition on 
cause and effect occupying the same region of space-time. For example, 
one could say that salt being at a temperature of 1000 0  causes it to 
emit yellow light. Here both cause and effect occupy the same region 
of space-time. 
I propose a somewhat more complicated account of over-lapping, 
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based on a claim that (relative to the causal field) one can recognise 
disjunctive quasi-events. 	If N is any normal state-of-affairs in 
the causal field and A a quasi-event, there might be a possible state-
of-affairs, unique up to equivalence, obtained by modifying N so that 
A occurs, but no quasi-event occurs which is neither contained in N 
nor contained in A./ In that case, one can call this modified state-of-
affairs the product of N and A, written 'N x A'. 	One can recognise 
disjunctive quasi-events, since if Y is disjunctive there will be some 
normal state-of-affairs N such that there is no product N x Y. For 
if one modifies N so that A v B occurs, and both A and B are departures 
from N, then there is in general no state-of-affairs obtained from N 
such that A v B occurs but not such that either A occurs or B occurs. 
Here I make a proviso about what is not specified in the description 
of hypothetical states-of-affairs. One can consider a hypothetical 
state-of-affairs in which certain kinds of detail are not specified 
and so the corresponding sentences have truth-gaps. But such a lack 
of detail must be systematic. 	For example, if it is not specified 
whether one frog is made up of cells, then it should not be specified 
whether any frog is made up of cells. This consideration, though some-
what vagqe, enables one to reply to the objection that N x (A v B) 
might be such that the sentences 'A occurs' and 'B occurs' have no 
truth-values. Of course, in some cases this would happen - for 
example, if A is equivalent to C & D and B is equivalent to C & -D 
where D and its negation -D involve excessive detail. 
I now define regular parts of quasi-events as follows. A 
quasi-event B is a regular part of quasi-event A if there •is some 
quasi-event C such that, for every normal state-of-affairs N: 
(1) N x A is defined; 
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(N x B) x c and/or (N x C) x B are defined; 
N x A is equivalent to (N x B) x C and to (N x C) x B, 
or if only one is defined to whichever is defined. 
Accordingly, I claim that the following conditions are indivi-
dually necessary and jointly sufficient for A and B to be distinct 
existences. 
A does not contain B; 
B does not contain A; 
A and B have no regular part in common. 
I now consider an example which might seem to be a case in which the 
above account of distinct existences fails. 
Joanne has a child and so Harry becomes 
a father. Yet one does not say that Joanne's 
having a child caused Harry to become a 
father. 
One is tempted to say that it is part of the causal field that if 
Joanne has a child it is Harry's. But, of course, it might be consid-
ered a departure from a normal state-of-affairs that Harry rather than 
Tom or Dick was the father. This example, I suggest, incorporates 
some of the features of collateral effect situations. Here is suffices 
to say that Harry becoming a father is a quasi-event contained in the 
conjunction of Joanne giving birth and all earlier quasi-events. 14 
Based on an example due to Kim. See Kim, J., "Causes and 
Counterfactuals", journal of Philosophy, vol.70, (Oct.1973), 
p.571. 
Seepp.87-8 for the details of this modified distinct 
existences requirement. 
2.5 	Causal Fields and Regularities  
A regularity is a universal (or almost universal) generalisa-
tion with, I assume, at least one instance. Usually a regularity has 
many instances. The typical form of the regularities -which I consider 
in Chapter Three is: 
Whenever a quasi-event qualitatively identical 
to A occurs then a quasi-event qualitatively 
identical to B occurs. 
The notion of a regularity is related to that of a causal 
field, because one can define qualitative identity relative to causal 
fields as follows: 
Quasi-events A and B are qualitatively identical 
relative to the causal field F if they have descriptions 
differing only in time and place and without reference 
to other quasi-events such that for ail times and places 
that description is of a possible quasi-event. 
Example One: If the description is 'A house burns at position x 
and time t', then for no position x and time t is it 
part of every norm that a house burns at position x and 
time t. Hence the quasi-event A that a house burns 
at position x, and time t1 is qualitatively identical 
to the quasi-event B that a house burns at positive x, 
and time t 2 . 
Example Two: The description 	'An emerald turned grue at 
position x and time t' is not allowed when discussing 
qualitative identity, since with respect to all usual 
causal fields, it does not describe a quasi-event if 
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t is the year to in which everything bleen turns 
grue. (The predicates 'grue' and 'bleen' are those 
15 of Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. -. ) 
The second example illustrates the convenience of considering qualitat-
ive identity relative to a causal field. By considering the causal 
field one avoids treating the event that an emerald turns blue (in 
some year t1 before to) as qualitatively identical to the "event" 
that an emerald stays green (in the year t o). The New Riddle of 
Induction can be seen as a problem about the way causal fields are 
chosen, that is a problem about the judgments of normality which people 
make. The New Riddle of Induction dots not threaten the Regularity 
Account of causation, since both causation and regularities are re-
lative to the same causal field. 
Note One: One might, in a , regularity, specify the spatio-temporal 
relation between the correlated quasi-evellts. I shall 
ignore the spatial relation but, typically, I shall consider 
regularities in which quasi-events identical to A are 
followed by quasi-events identical to B. 
Note Two: Since there can be disjuncts and conjuncts of quasi-events, 
'7 a complex regularity can be put in the form given above. 
Note Three: In Chapter Three, I shall consider time -dependent 
regularities.16 
• 
See Goodman, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast, pp. 73, 74. 
See pp. 129-30. 	
I
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'Three: 	The Conditionals Used in . the - AnalySis of  
Causation. 
In Part One of Chapter Two I shall discuss a conditional 
analysis of causation, which involves counterfactuals such as 'If 
A had not occurred, B would not have occurred'. 	In Part Two of 
Chapter Two I shall give an account of the conditionals used in that 
analysis. I avoid giving a general account of counterfactuals,rather 
I consider five accounts of counterfactuals and I use these accounts 
to provide stipulative definitions of kinds of counterfactuals. 
I assume that four of these kinds, namely condensed argument 
conditionals, meta-inference conditionals, supposition/assertion 
conditionals and rationality-judgment conditionals are genuine cases 
of conditionals and so are candidates for the conditionals used in 
the analysis of causation. But I do not assume that all conditionals 
are of these four kinds. 
I avoid the question of whether Lewis-conditionals are genuine 
-conditionals and I only consider them in the context of Lewis' cwn 
account of causation. T do not consider Lewis-conditionals to be 
candidates for the conditionals used in my conditional analysis. This 
reflects my bias against an ontology of possible worlds. 	I require 
the features on which causation is supervenient to be features of 
the actual world. 
Note: 	I am not attempting to provide a detailed discussion of 
various accounts of conditionals. My purpose in discussing these 
five kinds of conditional here is merely to simplify my discussion, 
in Part Two of Chapter Two, of the kind of conditionals to be used 
in the Conditional Analysis. Any details of the accounts of condition-
als that affect the discussion in Chapter Two will be discussed in 
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that chapter. 
(1) Condensed Argument . COnditiOnals and Meta-inference Conditionals 
In "Counterfactuals and Causal. Laws", Mackie puts forward 
a condensed argument account of counterfactual conditionals. Counter-
factuals were, he claimed, condensed and incomplete arguments. Thus 
he said of the counterfactual 'If you had had the brakes fixed there 
would not have been a collision' that it might be expanded to 'Suppose 
that you have had the brakes fixed. Then when the other car turns 
across your path you press the brake pedal. So your car stops quick- 
ly. So there is no collision'. 17 
In any analysis of ordinary counterfactuals, it is important 
to stress the incompleteness of the argument, that is, the need for 
extra premises. However, if one is analysing causation in terms of 
counterfactuals it seems best to explicitly state the missing premises. 
Therefore I stipulate that 'If p then q' is a condensed argument con-
ditional, if it can be expanded as a condensed complete argument: 
'Suppose p, then ... q'. In the analysis of 'Quasi-event A caused 
quasi-event B' I shall use the conditional 'If, under the circumstances, 
A had not occurred B would not have occurred'. The phrase 'under the 
circumstances' reminds one of the extra premises required in the 
analysis. 
In a discussion of the meaning of counterfactuals, it is 
necessary to distinguish the condensed argument 'Suppose p therefore 
q' from its metalinguistic counterpart ' 
The former is a better candidate for the 
.17. Mackie, J.L., "Counterfactuals and 
Analytical Philosophy, ed. Butler, 
q can be inferred from 'p' 
 of counterfactuals 
Causal Laws " in 
R.J., p.68. 
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since one would say that counterfactuals are not about sentences 
- 
	
	or inferences. However, for the purposes of the analysis of causation, 
the metalinguistic sentence seems preferable, because arguments are 
not the kind of item which is true or false. Therefore I shall con-
sider no condensed argument conditionals but rather meta-inference 
conditionals, where I stipulate that 'If p, then q' is a meta-inference 
conditional if and only if it is synonymous with ' 'q' can be infer-
red from 'p' '. I shall be considering meta-inference conditionals 
based on non-deductive inferences. 	In this respect my account 
differs from Nagel's. 18 
(2) Supposition/Assertion Conditionals and Rationality-judgment  
Conditionals. 
In Truth, Probability and Paradox, Mackie proposes a more 
general account of conditionals than the condensed argument account. 
His account is based on suppositions. Thus he says "I want to offer, 
then, this general analysis: to say 'If P, Q' is to assert Q within 
the scope of the supposition that p•"19 The supposer gives his 
supposed situation or world some features including various features 
of the actual world he knows nothing about (for example, the supposer 
says 'Suppose the circumstances were like the actual ones except that 
Cleopatra's nose was longer'). He then can make discoveries about 
his supposed world. I now stipulate that 'If p, then q' is a 
supposition/assertion conditional if it is synonymous with 'Suppose p, 
then. q'. 	I shall also be concerned with a meta-linguistic,variant 
of supposition/assertion conditionals. 
Roughly speaking, I 'stipulate that 'If p then q' is a . 
See Nagel, E., The Structure of Science, p.72. 
Mackie, J.L., Truth, Probability and Paradox, p.93. 
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rationality -judgment conditional if it is synonymous .with 'It is 	t l 
rational to believe q on evidence p'. The situation which I envisage 
is one in which a rational man who has a set of antecedent beliefs, 
B, is asked to suppose new evidence p . (which might be inconsistent 
with his antecendent beliefs) and then he rationally asserts q. Thus 
I stipulate that 'If p, then q (relative to BY is a rationality-
judgment conditional if it is synonymous with 'Someone with set of 
antecedent beliefs B on supposing p could rationally assert q'. 
Note  One: If one is an objectivist about rationality-judgments then 
rationality-judgment conditionals would have• truth-values. 
Even if one is not an objectfvist about rationality-judgments, 
one would say that a rationality-judgment conditional is 
"true" or "false", where the scare-quotes indicate that the 
rationality-judgment conditional is usually, in pre-philoso-
phical contexts, taken to be true or false. Since the 
sentence 'X causes Y' is also usually taken to be true or 
false, it seems that rationality-judgment conditionals are 
more stilted to the analysis of causation than supposition/ 
assertion conditionals. 
Note Two: Of special importance is the case in which B, the set of 
antecedent beliefs, contains beliefs about laws of Nature. 
If a sentence p is inconsistent with these laws of Nature, 
the rational man is asked to suppose that there is an 
exception to some law of Nature. If it is objected that 
laws of Nature have no exceptions, then I suggest that the 
rational man supposes that some generalisation is not universal 
* but is-not accidental either. 90  For example, if the set 
20. See pp.110-3for a discussion of non-accidental generalisations. 
ii 
51. 
of antecedent beliefs contains Newton's laws and if the 
rational man were asked to suppose that a thousand years ago 
a stone - for no reason - stayed two minutes above the earth 
without falling, then he would nonetheless assert that if, 
now, a stone is thrown up it will fall to the earth. Thus 
Newton's laws are supposed to be neither universal nor acci-
dental. 
Note Three: 	One respect in which meta-inference conditionals differ 
from rationality-judgment conditionals is the following: 
If p is inconsistent with the set of antecedent beliefs B 
then one could, according to many accounts of deduction, infer 
anything from the set of beliefs Bu{p}. 	However one might 
rationally modify B in the light of p and so obtain a new 
set of beliefs from which q can, but -q cannot, be inferred. 
Thus there is, in this case, an important difference between 
the meta-inference conditional 'If p and B, then q' and the 
rationality-judgment conditional 'A person, with antecedent 
beliefs B, on supposing p could rationally assert q'. 
Note Four: 	In Chapter Two, I. shall consider meta-inference condi- 
tionals based only on certain specified rules of inference. 
I claim that if the . new evidence p is consistent with the set 
of antecedent beliefs B and if the judgments of .rationality 
were based only on the specified rules of inference, then the 
meta-inference conditional and the rationality-judgment condi- 
tional would be equivalent. Both would be analysed as: 
can be inferred from 'p' and the set of antecedent 
beliefs B using only the specified rules of inference. 
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Note Five: 	I assume that the supposed new evidence p itself 
belongs to the set of beliefs obtained when B is modified 
by p, that is, I suppose that one does not refuse to accept 
p. Also, if there are beliefs which one refuses to modify, 
these beliefs could conveniently be included with the new 
evidence. These assumptions are for the sake of simplicity. 
One could, instead, consider not simply the antecedent beliefs 
but the strengths of the various antecedent beliefs and con-
sider not merely new evidence but the strength of the new 
evidence. The both antecedent beliefs and new evidence of low 
strength would, if necessary, be modified to preserve con-
sistency. 
Lewis-conditionals  
Both Stalnaker and Lewis have proposed accounts of condition-
als based on possible worlds; I shall consider Lewis' account only. 
One assumes that there is a relation of comparative similarity between 
possible worlds. Lewis suggests that the conditional 'If it were 
the case that ck, then it would be the case that IP 'is true at some 
world i if and only if either 
there is no world accessible from i at which 4) is true; 02 
there is a world k accessible from i at which cl) is true and 
if some world j is at least as similar to i as k is, then 
D 4) holds at j. 21 
If one is only concerned with truth in the actual world and also one 
ignores the case in which the antecedent is impossible, Lewis' account 
is equivalent to: 
.21. Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, p.49. 
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'If p then q' is to be analysed as: 'There is a possible 
world w1 in which p and q are both true, and if w2 is any 
world in which p is true but q is false w 2 is less like 
the actual world than wI is. 
I shall stipulate that if 'If p then q' is a Lewis condition-
al it is synonymous with the above proposed . analysans of 'If p, 
then q'. 
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CUATTER TWO 
CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS 
Part One of this chapter is principally a defence of a condi-
tional analysis of causation based on Mackie'si , but I also compare 
Mackie's account with Lewis'. 2 In Sections. One and Two I expound 
Mackie's and Lewis' accounts without detailed discussion. In Section 
Three I consider the Necessity Thesis, namely that the analysis of 
'X causes Y' is: 
X and Y both occur and are distinct existences 
and X is necessary-in-the-circumstances for Y. 
I defend this thesis against some preliminary objections and,. as part 
of this defence, I provide an account of the circumstances referred 
to. Finally in this section I argue that Lewis' account is-unsatis-
factory and the modifications required to make it satisfactory also 
make it converge with Mackie's account. Section Four is a discussion 
of the claim that, in addition to necessity, causes should be sufficient 
in the circumstances for the effect. I conclude that it is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for X to cause Y, that: 
X and Y occur and are distinct existences 
and X is sufficient-in-the-circumstances for Y. 
In Sections Five, Six and Seven, I examine some further objections to 
the Necessity Thesis based on the problems of Collateral Effects, of 
Underdetermination and Overdetermination, and of Simultaneous Causation. 
I modify the conditional analysis to meet these objections, 
obtaining the final version (Nec 5) in Section Seven.
3 Throughout 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, Chapter 2, pp.29-58. 
Lewis, D., "Causation", Journal of Philosophy, vol.70, 
(Oct.1973), pp. 556-569. 
See p. 105. 
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Part One I use the Analysis-criterion, 4 and I ignore the possibility 
of backwards causation. 
In Part Two I discuss what account might be given of the 
-conditionals occurring in the analysis of causation. In Section Eight 
. I discuss the notion of a non-accidental generalisation. In Section 
Nine I argue in favour of treating the conditionals occurring in the 
analysis of causation as (non-deductive) meta-inference conditionals: 
'If p then q' is analysed as "q' can be inferred from ' p t  and the 
• 
correct non-accidental generalisations'. In Section Ten I use the 
conditional analysis together with this account of conditionals to 
provide an account of the features on which causation is supervenient. 
Section One: 	Mackie's Account of . Causation - in Terms of  
Conditionals. 
J./ 	In Chapter Two of The Cement of the Universe, Mackie says: 
My main concern in this chapter has been 
to analyse our actual concept of causing, 
to formulate what we commonly take to be 
the distinguishing mark of causal 5 sequences. 
Mackie's method is to begin by comparing a causal with an 
otherwise similar non-causal sequence, and to see what distinguishes 
the two. He compares: 
A chestnut is stationary on a flat stone. 
I swing a hammer down so that it strikes 
the chestnut directly from above. The 
chestnut becomes distinctly flatter than 
before. 
A chestnut is stationary on a hot sheet 
of iron. I swing a hammer down so that 
it strikes the chestnut directly from above. 
At the very instant that the bawler touches 
it, the chestnut explodes with a loud p9p 
and its fragments are scattered around. ° 
See pp. 16-7. 
Mackie, J.L.,The Cement of the Universe, p.57. 
Ibid., p.29. 
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Mackie suggests that in A a counterfactual conditional holds, namely 
'If the hammer had not struck the chestnut, the chestnut would not 
have become flatter'. But in B the.analogous counterfactual does not 
hold; the chestnut wuld have exploded even if the hammer had not 
struck it. 
Having obtained this initial suggestion for an analysis of 
causation, Mackie then uses the method of counter-examples as dis-
cussed in Chapter One, Section One of this thesis. On the whole, 
Mackie's examples are empirically possible ones. 	For even Mackie's 
indeterministic chocolate machines L and M could, perhaps, be construct-
ed using a radio-active substance and a Geiger-counter. 7 The one 
exception occurs when Mackie says "We can coherently consider the 
	0 
possibility of backwards causation". 8 Mackie is there modifying an 
	0 
earlier account in order to accommodate cases of backwards causation, 
not on the grounds that backwards causation is empirically possible, 
but on the grounds that backwards causation is coherent. 	Thus 
. Mackie seems to be using the Analysis-critemon. 9  
1.2 Mackie's Discussion of the Necessity Thesis  
Mackie's initial suggestion is that 'X caused Y' means 'X 
occurred and Y occurred and Y would not have occurred if X had not. 10 
Mackie then considers a counter-example.(Because he denies that 
counterfactuals, in general, have truth-values, he does not present 
his counter-examples by arguing that analysandum and analysans have 
different truth-values. Rather, Mackie talks in terms of what one 
says and what one admits. However, I shall misrepresent Mackie on 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, pp. 40-42. 
Ibid., p.52. 	9. 	Ibid., pp.16-7. 
	
10. 	Ibid., p.31. 
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this point and talk of the truth-values of analysandum.and analysans. 
The words 'true' and 'false' could be put in scare-quotes.) The 
example is: Striking a match caused the appearance of the flame, but 
if the match had been touched with a red-hot poker then the flame 
would still have appeared. So, Mackie argues, the counterfactual 
'If the match had not been struck the flame. would not have appeared' 
is false. Thus the analysandum is true, the proposed analysans is 
• false, so the analysis is incorrect. 	This counter-example is effective 
only if one gives some extra information, such as the inforMation that 
someone intends to make the flame appear using, if necessary, a .red- 
hot poker. For the counterfactual 'If the match had not been struck 
the flame would not have appeared' might be considered true even if 
there were other possible, but unlikely, sufficient conditions for 
the flame to appear. Mackie then modifies his analysis to: 
'X caused Y' means 'X occurred and 
Y occurred and in the circumstances 
Y would not have occurred if X had not.' 11 
The phrase 'in the circumstances' is somewhat vague. One of my aims 
in discussing Mackie's account is to give a more precise accountof 
the circumstances. 
Also, Mackie points out that cause and effect are to be 
distinct existences. 	He notes that the description of cause and 
effect need not be logically independent, but he does not give an 
account of what is meant by 'distinct existences'. 
Mackie makes a further modification to his analysis in order 
to handle examples of collateral effects. He gives the example in 
which Labour's defeat at the election pleases Jamesbutsaddens John. 
In this example, James' being pleased does not cause John's being 
11. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.31. 
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sad, but one might say that in the circumstances John would not have 
been sad if James had not been pleased. 12 To handle these examples 
Mackie introduces the notion of causal priority; the earlier of two 
collateral effects is not causally prior to the latter. Mackie then 
proposes an anlysis of causal priority and so obtains a modified 
analysis of 'X caused Y', namely: 
X and Y occurred and if X were kept 
out of the world in the circumstances 
referred to and the world ran on from 
there, Y would not occur. 13 
At this point, Mackie further modifies his analysis in order 
handle cases of backwards causation. For the above analysis is 
such that causes would have to precede effects. In Chapter Two, Mackie 
only sketches the modification required; one indirectly keeps X out 
of the world by keeping some event W, earlier than both X and Y, out 
of the world, and then one lets the world run on from there. 
Mackie defends his analysis of causation against three other 
objections. The first objection is based on a proposed counter-example 
in which the analysandum is 'Jane's eating fishpaste in the pantry 
caused her feeling ill' and the analysans is 'Jane ate fishoaste in 
the pantry and felt ill and in the circumstances she wouldn't have 
felt ill if she hadn't eaten fishpaste in the pantry'. 14 Here it 
might seem that the analysandum is true but that the analysans is 
false. Mackie's reply is that if 'Jane's eating fishpaste in the 
pantry' is treated as a reference to an event (the same event as that 
referred to by 'Jane's eating fishpaste'), then both analysandum and 
analysans are true (provided 'Jane ate fishpaste in the pantry' is 
treated as asserting that the event occurred which is referred to 
Mackie, J.L., ' , 12e Cement of the Universe, p.33. 
Ibid., p.51. 	14. Ibid., p.33 
1 
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by 'Jane's eating fishpaste in the pantry'). But if the phrase 'Jane's 
eating fishpaste in the pantry' is treated as synonymous with 'the 
fact that Jane ate fishpaste in the pantry', then both analysandum 
and analysans are false. So in neither case is the analysis itself 
threatened. Now I have assumed that, in cases of producing causation, 
the cause, whether it is the occurrence of an event or the presence 
of a condition, is a quasi-event. Therefore, in Section Three I shall 
restate Mackie's reply to the objection in terms of whether the phrase 
'in the pantry' is considered part of the description of the quasi-
event or not. 
The second objection is that if, for example, a block of flats 
explodes, one would not say that Jones' striking a match to light 
his cigarette was the cause of the explosion because it is assumed 
that people normally light matches in blocks of flats. In this case 
the analysandum 'Jones' striking a match to light his cigarette was 
a cause of the explosion' is false, but the proposed analysans 'Jones 
struck the match and the block of flats exploded and in the circum-
stances if Jones had not struck the match the block of flats would 
not have exploded' is true. To this Mackie replies that cause and 
effect are seen as differences within a causal field and anything 
that is part of the description of the field itself will be auto-
matically ruled out as a candidate for the role of cause. 15 
Finally, Mackie considers at some length the problem ot over-
determination. Mackie's account is satisfactory in cases of symmetric 
overdetermination provided one denies that either alternative is the 
cause. 16 He consi ,lers among others the following example: 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.35. 
Throughout this thesis I interpret examples of symmetric 
overdetermination "charitably". See the Note at the end of 
this section. 
1 
60. 
Lightning strikes a barn in which straw 
is stored, and a tramp throws a burning 
cigarette butt into the straw at the same 
place and at the same time: the straw 
catches fire. 17 
One does not say, according to Mackie, that the lightning caused the 
fire. Now although the lightning was sufficient in the circumstances, 
it was not necessary in the circumstances; that is, the counter-
factual 'In the circumstances, if the lightning had not struck the 
straw would not have burnt' is false. 
However, cases of asymmetric overdetermination raise diffi-
culties. Mackie considers among others the following ingenious 
example: 
A man sets out on a trip across the desert. 
He has two enemies. One of them puts a 
deadly poison in his reserve can of 
drinking water. The other (not knowing 
this) makes a hole in the bottom of the 
can. The poisoned water all leaks out 
before the traveller needs to resort to 
this reserve can; the traveller dies of 
thirst. 18 
In this example the analysandum 'Puncturing the can caused the death 
of the traveller' is considered true by Mackie, but the proposed 
analysans 'The can was punctured, the traveller died and in the cir-
cumstances if the can had not been punctured the traveller would 
not have died' is false. In this case Mackie argues that if the 
effect is treated as an event it could be described as the death of 
the traveller by thirst. In that case the proposed analysans-is 
true. Mackie also claims that if the effect is treated as a fact, 
namely the fact that the traveller died, then the analysandum, 
namely 'Puncturing the can caused the fact that the traveller died' 
is false. 
Mackie, J.L.,The Cement of the Universe, p.44. 
Ibid., p.44. 
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Mackie also discusses whether what counts as a cause depends 
on the speaker's interests. He gives an example in which "an electric 
current in a certain wire (A), decayed insulation at a point on that 
wire (B), and inflammable material near that point (C)" are individu-
ally necessary and jointly sufficient for a house catching fire. 19 
If one presupposes a set of circumstances one might treat, say, B and 
C as the circumstances, so that A but neither B nor C caused the fire. 
But if in the analysis of 'X caused Y' one is asserting that there 
are circumstances in which if X had not occurred Y would not have
occurred, then A, B. and C could all be causes of the fire. Mackie 
suggests that the presupposition account is better for catching the 
force of a causal statement in use, but the assertion account repre-
sents a desirable tidying up of the meaning of causal statements. It 
is worth noticing that although Mackie is using something . like an 
analysis-criterion he claims that, strictly speaking, the analysandum 
and analysans have no truth-values. Hence Mackie resorts at this 
point to considerations of the use of sentences rather than their 
truth - onditions. If one ignores Hackle's scruples about the truth-
values of counterfactuals, one could argue that his assertion account 
is a permissible analysis on the grounds that even if one were 
interested in the cause A, one would admit that B and C were also 
causes. 
Note: 	In a case of symmetric overdetermination of C by A and.B, 
I assume that if A but not B, or if B but not A occurred, then C 
occurs - not some slightly different quasi-event. Thus if two bullets 
(bullet number one and bullet number two) enter a man's heart simul-
taneously, I assume for the sake of the example that all the later 
events leading up to tleath are exactly as if only one bullet had 
19. 	/bid., p.37. 
62. 
entered the heart. In actual cases, if one considered enough detail, 
one would argue that both bullets were necessary in the circumstances 
for some event D which, in turn, causes death. Hence, even on the 
Necessity Thesis, the entry of bullet number one and the entry of , 
bullet number two would be causes of D and consequently causes of 
' death. The interesting case - but one in which people's intuons 
disagree - is the hypothetical 
one in whiCh the affect of A and B is exactly the same 
as the effect of A or B 
alone. 
The Sufficienc'Thesis 
Mackie also discussec the plausible suggestion that part of 
the meaning of 'X caused Y' is that 'X is 
sufficient in the circum- I stances for Y' As Mackie points out, if X and Y both occur then the conditional 'If X occurred, Y did' is automatically true.. So.Mackie 
proposes to discuss 
.a strong conditional sense of 'sufficient-in-the- 
circumstances', namely 'In the circumstances, if Y had not teen going 
.to occur then X would not have occurred' 20
; that is, the absence of . 
Y is 
necessary-in-the-circumstances for the 
absence of X. Mackie 
argues that although, in general, causes are sufficient-in-the-circum-
stances for their effects, there are counter-examples to the Suffici-
ency Thesis. He considers three chocolate bar machines K, L and M. 
K is a deterministic machine. But neither L nor M are deterministic; 
their operation involves random processes. 21 
A shilling in the slot 
is necessary but not sufficient for L to produce a chocolate bar, 
and a shilling in the slot is sufficient but not necessary for M to 
Produce achocolate bar. Mackie suggests that one would say that 
putting the shilling into machine L caused the bar to be produced, 
Mackie, J. L., The Cement of the Universe; p.39. Ibid., pp.40-42. 
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but putting the shilling into machine M was not a cause of producing 
the chocolate bar, even if in both cases a bar of chocolate was pro-
duced. If Mackie is correct here, then he has shown that the Suffi-
ciency Thesis can he rejected. Mackie supports his claim by arguing 
that one is prepared to say 'Tom's saying what he did caused Bill to 
hit Tom' without prejudging whether human beings are deterministic. 22 
He gives other proposed counter-examples to the Sufficiency Thesis: 
There being a radon atom here now 
is a causal consequence of there 
having been a radium atom here a 
little earlier; 23 
and 
Tom's being colour-blind is a causal 
consequence of Jim's being colour-blind. 24 
In both cases it is plausible that the processes are non-deterministic. 
However, Mackie also provides arguments in favour of the 
Sufficiency Thesis. He argues that if P caused Q one can say that 
Q occurred because P did. He then claims that 'Q occurred because 
P did' is practically equivalent to Goodman's factual conditional, 
which is a combination of the conditional 'If P occurred Q occurred' 
4r 
with the presupposition that P did occur. 25  Mackie also argues 
that the future causal statements 'P will cause Q' and 'P would cause 
Q seem to claim that P is sufficient in the circumstances for Q. 
Although I shall accept something like Mackie's conclusion, I find 
both these. arguments confusing because they seem only to show that 
causes are weakly sufficient for their effects. Consider the case 
of the future and conditional causal sentences 'P will cause Q' 
and 'P would cause Q'; although weak sufficiency is entailed by the 
occurrence of P and Q, it is nonetheless important that P is weakly 
22. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.43. 
" 
	 Ibid. s p.48. 	24. Ibid., p.43. 	25. Ibid., pp.48-49. 
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sufficient for Q; that is, the conditional 'If P occurs, Q occurs' 
holds. For if one believes that P will occur and believes also that 
if P occurs Q occurs, then on those grounds onebelieves that Q occurs 
and hence that P will cause Q. Again, if one speculates that P might 
occur, and believes that if P occurs Q occurs, then one believes 
that P would cause Q. Thus I cannot understand how Mackie's argu-
ments are intended to establish a strong sufficiency thesis based 
not on the conditional 'If P occurs Q occurs', but on the non-equi- 
valent conditional 'If Q were not going to occur, P would not occur'. 
Mackie's Account of the Origins of the Concept of 
Causation 
. Because Mackie holds that counterfactuals are supposition/ 
assertion conditionals the counterfactuals used in the analysis of 
causation have, in general, no truth-values. Furthermore, even if 
it is claimed that counterfactuals have truth-values, their truth 
cannot be observed in the actual sequence which is described as causal. 
Hence Mackie considers that a psychological explanation should be 
given for why people assert Some counterfactuals rather than others 
On Mackie's account of counterfactuals one requires an explanation 
fer how people decide what to assert within the scope of a supposi-
tion. Mackie suggests that the sophisticated way of deciding what 
to assert is a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning. 
Presumably one uses what one believes to be non-accidental (bit per-
haps not universal) generalisations, together with what is supposed 
(Which might, perhaps, be an exception to the corresponding universal 
generalisation), and one makes theassertion accordingly. 	The 
primitive method according to Mackie is based on imagination and ana- 
logy. 	Finally, he ccnsiders the concept of causal priority, the 
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origins of which he sees, plausibly enougb, in the experience of 
intervention in the world. If one introduces a change X and change 
Y occurs, then one sees X as causally prior to Y. 
Section Two:  A  Brief Account of Lewis' Theory of Causation  
Lewis' article "Causation' ,26  is not intended as a completely 
satisfactory account of causation. In particular, Lewis confines 
himself to causation among events, and to an analysis "that works 
properly under determinism". 	Nonetheless, his account is important, 
and I shall want both to criticise it and to borrow from it certain 
features when I -modify Hackle's aeco -int. As the two accounts are 
modified they converge. 
Lewis defines causal dependence as follows: 
If c and e are events and if 0(c) 
and 0(e) are the propositions that 
c occurs and e occurs respectively, 
then e is causally dependent on c 
if the two Lewis-conditionals 
'If 0(c) then 0(e)' and 'If -0(c) 
then -0(e)' are true. 
As Lewis points out, the conjunction of 0(c) and 0(e) entails the 
Lewis-conditional 'If 0(c) then 0(e)', which thus corresponds to 
what Mackie calls weak sufficiency. 	Hence Lewis' account is 
essentially a Necessity Thesis, 
Next, Lewis analyses 'c causes e' as: 
c and e occur and there is a 
finite sequence of events of 
which c is the first, of which 
e is the last and such that each 
member (except the first) is 
causally dependent on the previous 
member. 
26. Lewis, D., "Causation", Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol.70 (Oct.1973), pp. 556-569. 
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Lewis requires these causal chains to ensure that causation is 
transitive. 	For the inference-pattern 
'If ch then. tp; 
if ip then x_ 
If q then x' 
is not valid for Lewis-conditionals (or for counterfactuals in genera1) 27. 
However, it is worth noticing that if one also requires what Mackie 
calls a strong sufficiency thesis, in this case the Lewis-conditional 
'If -0(e) then -0(c)', then one would not require causal chains. For 
the inference pattern 
'If 45 then 
if :I) then 4) 
if IP then x 
.% if (P then X' 
is valid for Lewis-conditionals. 28 
In "Causes and Counterfactuals", Kim 29 argues that the "sort 
of dependency expressed by counterfactuals is considerably broader 
than strict causal dependency": that is, Kim argues that Lewis' 
account provides at best sufficient but not necessary truth-conditions 
for causation. Kim gives four kinds of example to support his claim. 
There are cases in which. there is a logical not a 
causal connection, for example 	'If yesterday had 
not been Monday, today would not be Tuesday.' 
There are cases in which one event is part of 
another. For example 	'If I had not written 'r' 
twice in succession, I would not have written 'Larry'.' 
(3) - There are cases involving actions of agents. 
For example ''If I had not turned the .knob, I would 
not have opened the. window.' 
(4) There are examples like. 'If my sister had not given 
birth at t, .1 would not have become an uncle at t.' 
Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, p.32. 
/bid., p.33. 
Kim, J., "Causation and Counterfactuals", Journal of 
Philosophy, vol.70 (Oct.1973), pp.570-572. 
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I claim that the first three examples are covered by some requirement 
that cause and effect be distinct existences. In the case of example 
(3), the action of turning the knob is contained in the action of open-
ing the window. 	Example (4) is similar to the example of Joanne 
giving birth resulting in Harry becoming a father, 30 which is also 
ruled out as a case of causation by a less straightforward distinct 
existences requirement. 
Thus I suggest that what is required to make Lewis' account 
initially plausible is merely a distinct existences requirement. 
Section Three: 	The Necessity Thesis  
In this section my aim is to defend against some preliminary 
objections a version of the Necessity Thesis (Nec 2), based on Mackie's 
account. Also, I shall begin my criticism of Lewis' account of 
causation. 
3.1 	A preliminary version of the Necessity Thesis as stated by 
Mackie, is: 
Nee 1: 'X caused Y' is analysed as 
(I) X and Y are distinct existences and both occurred. 
and 
(2) In the circumstances Y would not have occured if X had not. 
That the truth of the proposed analysans is, in all coherent examples, 
necessary for the truth of the proposed analysandum I shall call the 
necessity of the Necessity Thesis; that the truth of the analysans 
is sufficient I shall call the sufficiency of the necessity Thesis. 
I shall now discuss the initial objections which Mackie considers to 
the Necessity Thesis. 
30, 	See p. 44. 
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Objection One (To the necessity of the Necessity Thesis) 
Mackie discusses the example 'Jane's eating fishpaste in the pantry 
caused her feeling ill' 31 and the suggested expansion 'Jane ate fish-
paste in the pantry and felt ill and in the circumstances she wouldn't 
have felt ill if she hadn't eaten fishpaste in the pantry'. The 
objection is that the analysandum is true but the analysans is false; 
if Jane had eaten the fishpaste in the kitchen she would still have been 
sick. 
Reply: Mackie claims that either one would reject both the enalysans 
and the analysandum, or one would accept them both- Mackie's claim 
is based on a separation of the case in which the cause in an event 
from the case in which the cause is a fact. 	However, I am consider- 
ing causes and effects to be quasi-events, so I restate Hackie's argu-
ment as follows: 
There are at least two possible paraphrases for the sentence 'Jane's 
eating fishpaste in the pantry caused her feeling ill': 
Paraphrase One: The quasi-event described by 'Jane ate fishpaste 
in the pantry' caused the quasi-event described by 'Jane felt 
Paraphrase Two: The quasi-event described by 'Jane ate fishpaste' 
caused the quasi-event described by 'Jane felt ill', and Jane. 
ate the fishpaste in the pantry. 
The difference in spoken English would be one of stress. If 
the phrase 'in the pantry' were stressed, then Paraphrase One would 
be appropriate. Otherwise, Paraphrase Two would be more appropriate. 
Now, if the place where the fishpaste is eaten is irrelevant, Para-
phrase One is false and Paraphrase Two is true. The analysans for 
31. 	Mackie, J,L., The Cement of the Universe, p.33. 
Paraphrase Two would also be true. So in this case the difficulty 
- such as it is - is in paraphrasing the ordinary English causal 
sentence into a sentence about the causal relation between quasi- 
events; the analysis of sentences about the causal relation between 
quasi-events is not threatened. 
There is an objection to this reply which should be met. The 
objection is that someone could correctly utter 'Jane's eating the 
open jar of fishpaste caused her feeling ill' without committing him- 
self to whether the fact that the jar of fishpaste was open was causal-
ly relevant or not. Hence it might be claimed that neither of the 
above paraphrases is suitable, and that one should adopt a sufficiency 
thesis rather than a necessity thesis. Such cases I consider to be 
sentences involving causal overdetermination due to the ignorance of 
the speaker who does not know what is the necessary condition, but who 
merely indicates an area in which a necessary condition is to be found. 
claim that one need not abandon the necessity of the 
Necessity Thesis, for one can retain the Necessity Thesis when dis-
cussing causal relations between quasi-events provided suitable care 
1 
is taken in paraphrasing the ordinary English into sentences about the 
causal relations between quasi-events. 	Thus in the case of 'Jane's 
eating the open jar of fishpaste caused her feeling ill' the pare-, 
phrase is the following: 
• Either 	the quasi-event described by 'Jane ate the open ja17 
of fishpaste' caused the quasi-event described by 
'Jane felt ill'; 
or 	the quasi-event described by 'Jane ate a jar of 
fishpaste' caused the quasi-event described by 
'Jane felt ill', and the jar which Jane ate was open. 
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Again, suppose one says 'The weather caused sickness in the sheep'. 
This could be paraphrased as: 
There was some deviation from normal weather conditions, 	9 
which caused the sickness in the sheep. 
- Another preliminary objection to the Necessity Thesis is: 
Objection Two: (To the sufficiency of the Necessity Thesis) 
Some conditions are not causes but are nonetheless necessary for the 
effect. For example, the presence of oxygen is necessary . for the fire. 
4 
Hence the Necessity Thesis is not, it might be claimed, sufficient 
for X to cause Y. 
.Reply: I have already dealt with this kind of objection in Chapter 
One, Section Two. 32  The presence of oxygen is not a quasi-event 
because all normal states of affairs are ones where oxygen is present. 
This is essentially the same reply as Mackie's. 33 
A third objection which might be made to Mackie's Necessity 
. Thesis is: 
Objection Three: 	The phrase 'in the circumstances' is rather vague. 
If there are several jointly sufficient and individually necessary 
- causes A, B etc. for E, is the occurrence of B etc. to be considered 
part of the circumstances or not? Are the events such as the presence 
of oxygen part of the circumstances? What is not part of the circum-
stances? 
Reply: I admit that the phrase 'in the circumstances' is rather vague 
• and should be made more precise. If one is discussing a necessity 
thesis the phrase 'in the circumstances' must be interpreted as rul-
ing out sufficient conditions that did not in fact occur. Thus if 
..one claims that .the faulty wiring was necessary in the circumstances 
32. .See pp. 31-35. 
33 - Mackie, i.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.35. 
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for the house to burn, one is ruling out sufficient conditions which 
did not occur. For example, the faulty wiring was not absolutely 
necessary for the house to burn; it tight have been struck by lightn-
ing. Now it might be argued that the counterfactual 'If there had 
not been faulty wiring the house would not have burnt' is true, al-
though some extraordinary event such as a lightning strike would have 
been sufficient for the house to burn. Indeed, even if the sufficient 
condition that did not occur was not at all extraordinary, the counter-
factual might be true. 	Suppose the lightning strike caused the 
house to burn but it had only been exceptional good luck that the in-
flammable material was never near the fault in the wiring. In that 
case one would still say 'If the lightning had not struck then the 
house would not have burnt'. This might seem to show that the phrase 
the circumstances' is redundant. However, there are two reasons 
for not simply eliminating the phrase 'in the circumstances'. 	The 
first is that ordinary counterfactuals without a description of the 
circumstances are as vague as the phrase 'in the circumstances' itself. 
When I modify the Necessity Thesis to handle, say, cases of collateral 
effects, I require the precision obtained by explicitly. mentioning 
the circumstances in the conditional. 	The second reason is that, 
while I claim that the truth of the meta-inference conditionals or 
rationality-judgment conditionals is sufficient for the truth of 
corresponding ordinary counterfactuals, I do not claim that all-, 
counterfactuals correspond to suitable meta-inference or rationality-
judgment conditionals. It is by eaTticitly mentioning the circum-
stances that one obtains counterfactuals which correspond to meta- 
inference or rationality-judgment conditionals. Thus when discussing 
the Necessity Thesis one should mention the circumstances, which 
involves mentioning all the quasi-events that do not occur but would 
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be (causally) sufficient if they were to occur. To avoid the circu- I 
1 
larity due to the phrase 'causally sufficient', I shall stipulate that 
the circumstances (at the time of the cause) are such that no quasi-
events occurred that did not in fact occur. 
Now one might also be interested in the notion of sufficiency-
in-the -circumstances. If, which is plausible, the faulty wiring is 
to be sufficient-in-the-circumstances for the house to burn then, ob-
viously, the other necessary conditions which actually occurred are 
to be part of the circumstances. 	Again, to avoid circularity, one 
supposes that all the quasi-events occurred which actually occurred 
(about the time of the cause) and which were distinct existences from 
the proposed cause X. The proviso that the circumstances consist of 
quasi-events which are distinct existences from X is required in order 
to prevent the circumstances, Z, containing the occurrence of X itself 
and so to prevent one obtaining the conditional 'If Z occurred. and X 
had not occurred then Y would not have occurred'. Surely inconsist-
ent antecedents in conditionals should be avoided. 
For the moment I shall assume that one need only consider 
quasi-events that occur no earlier than and no later than X; that is, 
the quasi-events occupy time-intervals contained in that occupied by 
X. In particular, if X causes Y which causes Z, then .X causes Z - at 
least in the vast majority of cases - but if one were to suppose as 
part of the circumstances, that Y occurred then X would not be neces-
sary in the circumstances for Z. 
I. order to make the Necessity Thesis more precise I stipulate 
that the conditional: 
In the circumstances <occurring in T; distinct 
existences from Q1 ... Qm> if p then q 
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is to be interpreted as the conditional 'If p & r & s then q' 
where: 
r is 'RI 	Rn occur' and R1 ... Rn are the quasi- 
events which actually occurred in the time-interval T 
and which were distinct existences from Ql 	Qm ; 
and where: 	 i r 
s is 'No quasi-event occurred in T other than those  1 
contained in R1 & 	& Rn & Ql & 	& in 
Thus the circumstances in the interval T are supposed to be exactly 
as they actually were, except that it is not specified whether Q l 
Qm occurred or not. 	Accordingly, I propose a more precise version 
of the Necessity Thesis, namely Nec 2: 'X causes Y' is to be analysed 
as: 
X and Y are distinct existences and both occur 
and 
In the circumstances <occurring no earlier or later 
than X; distinct existences from X> if X does not 
occur Y does not occur. 
Note 1: 	Nec 2 is similar to Lyon's condition 1. 34 
Note 2: 	I shall modify Nec 2 in subsequent sections until I 
eventually obtain Nec 5. 35 
Note 3: 	For convenience, I use the tenseless unmodalised form 
of the conditional. 
Note 4: Any state of affairs which is part of all the normal states-
of-affairs and which occurs in T is also assumed to be, 
part of the circumstances. 
Lyon, A., "Causality", British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, Vol.18 (1967), p.8. 
See p. 105.. 
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Note 5: 	If two quasi-events A1 and A2 symmetrically overdetermlne 
B,36 as in Mackie's example of the lightning striking the barn at the 
same time as the tramp throws down a burning cigarette butt, neither 
A1 nor A2 is necessary in the circumstances for B. This initially 
• seems to support the Necessity Thesis, since one is reluctant to call 
either A1 or A2 a cause. However, one is also reluctant to deny that 
A1 and A2  are causes of B. Consequently, such examples of symmetric 
overdetermination present some difficulty for the Necessity Thesis. 
—3.2 	I shall now make the first step in my criticism of Lewis' 
account of causation. 
Consider the following hypothetical example. A new isotope of 
strontium is discovered with the remarkable property that if a nucleus 
of this isotope is simultaneously hit with three or four neutrons it 
emits an a-ray. Otherwise it does not. It is very rare that the nucleus 
is hit at all. On one 'occasion three neutrons hit the nucleus. I 
suggest that one would say that hitting the nucleus with three neutrons 
caused the a-ray to be emitted- Now in the supposed circumstances, if 
it is not the case that the nucleus is hit with three neutrons, then 
presumably the nucleus is hit by at most two neutrons, sine it is 
rare for the nucleus to be hit at all. Hence no a-ray is emitted. 
However, on the obvious interpretation of Lewis' account it would seem 
that a world in which four neutrons hit the nucleus is as like the 
actual one as a world in which two neutrons hit the nucleus, and is 
more like the actual one than a world in which no neutrons hit the 
nucleus. 
A defender cf Lewis' analysis might argue that hitting the 
nucleus with three neutrons is the same event as hitting the nucleus 
with three or four neutrons. More plausibly, the defender of Lewis ' 
36. See Note on p. 61. 
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analysis might argue that hitting the nucleus with three neutrons is 
not a cause, since we have a case of overdetermination where the 
actual cause is hitting the nucleus with three or four neutrons. Per-
haps Lewis' analysis can be defended in this way, but it seems to me 
that one would say 'Hitting the nucleus with three neutrons caused it 
to it an a-ray'. I suggest, therefore, that in order to defend 
Lewis' account, one would have to claim that the world in which no 
neutrons hit the nucleus is more like the actual one than the world 
in which four neutrons hit the nucleus. 
But now it seems that Lewis' account is rather imprecise. 
What are Lewis' rules for judging the cimilarity of worlds? There 
should be some rules: for surely the similarity of two worlds is super-
venient on what happens in those two worlds. If not, the similarity 
of two worlds would seem to be contingent and so, presumably, there 
are possible superworlds corresponding to possible similarity relations 
between possible worlds. I shall argue later 37 that Lewis is commit-
ted to some rather peculiar rules for judging the similarity of worlds. 
Section Four: 	The Sufficiency Thesis  
Does admitting that X causes Y commit one to accepting that 
X was sufficient in the circumstances for Y? Mackie concludes: 
The general notion of a cause is of • 
something which is both necessary and 
sufficient in the circumstances for its 
effect,but where the cause and the effect 
have both actually occurred we do not 38 require that the cause should be sufficient ... 
In this section I shall examine some arguments, which I do not consid-
er decisive, against the necessity of the Sufficienny Thesis. I shall 
also discuss the appropriate analysis of the Sufficiency Thesis. 
See pp. 89-91. " 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the 'Universe, p.49. 
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4.1 	I first examine the proposed counter-examples to the 
necessity of the Sufficiency Thesis. 
Example One: 	Mackie's Chocolate Machine L 
The machine L contains a mechanism such that unless a Shilling 
is put in no chocolate bar comes out, but if a shilling is 
put in, the chocolate bar coming out is a random event - say 
the chocolate bar comes out on fifty percent of occasions. 39 
The shilling being put in is not then sufficient in the circum-
stances for the chocolate bar to came out, for in similar circumstances 
the bar sometimes comes out yet sometimes does not. Now Mackie claims 
that if a shilling is put in and a chocolate bar comes out then the 
shilling being put in caused the chocolate bar to come out. If he 
is correct about this causal statement, then he has a strong argument 
against the necessity of the Sufficiency Thesis. However, I suggest 
that the claim that the shilling's going in caused the bar's coming 
out only seems plausible because one tends to confuse the chocolate 
machine L with another chocolate machine which is sometimes in a 
mysterious unobservable state S; the machine being in S, together 
with the shilling being put in is sufficient for the production of a 
chocolate bar, so that in the circumstances putting a shilling in is 
sufficient. My claim is supported tc some extent by Macki 's account 
of chocolate machine M, which sometimes produces chocolate bars with-
out the shilling being put in. Mackie assimilates this example to 
cases of causal overdetermination. 40 But surely this assimilation is 
only plausible if there is a mysterious unobservable state which, 
when it occurs, is by itself sufficient to produce a chocolate Var. 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, pp 41-3. 
Ibid., pp. 42-3. 
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Example Two: 	"Tom's saying what he did caused Bill to 
hit Ton. . 41 
Mackie suggests that even if Bill is free not to hit Tom, the sentence 
might be considered true. But if Bill is free not to hit Tom, Tom's 
saying what he did is not sufficient in the circumstances for Bill 
to hit him. As in the previous example, one tends to assume that 
there is an unobservable state S - in this case a mental one - and 
that if S is part of the circumstances, Tom's saying what he did is 
sufficient for Bill to hit Tom. It is not obvious that someone could 
both deny the existence of the state S and assert that Tom's saying 
what he did caused Bill to hit him. 
Example Three: 	Mackie says that "There being a radon atom here 
now is a causal consequence of there having been 
a radium atom here a little earlier." 42 
Would one say that the presence of the radium atom caused the presence 
of the radon atom? 	If so, then here is another counter-example to 
the necessity of the Sufficiency Thesis. 
This example is less confusing since in this case one does not 
tend to assume the existence of unobservable states. If one asked 
the question 'What, if anything, did the presence of the radium nucleus 
cause?' one would not,'I think, answer 'The presence of the radon 
nucleus'. 	But if one asked 'What, if anything, caused the presence 
of the radon nucleus?', one might reply 'The presence of the radium 
nucleus'. I am not sure how this difference should be interpreted. 
One possible interpretation is that there are two pre-philosophical 
notions; a cause considered as something necessary and a cause consid-
ered as something sufficient. In a context where it is known that X 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.43. 
Ibid., p.48. 
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occurs and one is speculating about what other events occur (using 
one's beliefs about what can cause what) if one asks 'What will X 
cause?" or What did X cause?', one is concerned with causes which are 
(weakly) sufficient in the circumstances for their effects, since the 
truth of the answer 'Y' depends only on the (weak) sufficiency of X 
for Y and the occurrence of X. Conversely, if one asks 'What caused 
X?' and the answer is 'Z', the truth of the answer depends only on 
the occurrence of X and the necessity in the circumstances of Z for X, 
so one is interested in causes that are necessary in the circumstances 
for their effects. However in the context in which the person being 
asked 'What caused X?' had observed what happened but the person ask-
ing the question had not, the person being asked would tend to seek 
some event or condition which occurred and which was causally the most 
important feature; ideally it would be both necessary and (strongly) 
sufficient for X (in the circumstances), but otherwise it would be 
either necessary or sufficient for X. In the case of symmetric over-
determination there is no single causally most important feature, so 
one does not know whether to give all or none of the features as the 
cause. 
There is another argument against the necessity of the Suf-
ficiency Thesis, which is due to Martin. He claims that if the Suf-
ficiency Thesis is accented as a necessary condition for A to cause P, 
then evidence E supports the claim that A was the cause of P only to 
the same degree that it supports the claim that A was sufficient for 
4 P. 3  For example, suppose a chocolate bar machine otherwise like 
L is in fact deterministic. Although I do not know what the mechan-
ism is, I believe there is a mechanism, and that an explanation 
43. Martin, R., "The Sufficiency Thesis", Philosophical Studies, 
vol. 23 (1972), p.210. 
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could, in principle, be given for the machine's erratic behaviour. 
In that case I have little evidence that the shilling is sufficient 
for the chocolate to come out. Yet I would confidently assert that 
putting the Shilling is was a cause of the chocolate coming out. 
An objection to Martin's argument is that, until I have seen 
the chocolate come out, I would not confidently assert that the 
shilling going in will cause the chocolate to come out. But after I 
have seen the chocolate come out I could argue as follows: 
Since I believe the machine is deterministic, there is 
some sufficient condition for the chocolate bar to come 
out. The only noticeable change is that the shilling goes 
in. So, especially if I have used the machine on several 	41 
occasions, I have good evidence that there was not the 
sufficient condition before I put the Shilling in, that 
there was the sufficient condition afterwards, and hence 
that putting the shilling in is sufficient in the circum-
stances (of which I am ignorant). 
The above discussion of the proposed arguments against the 
Sufficiency Thesis, and the uncertainty of one's intuitions in the 
(charitably interpreted) symmetric overdetermination case, show, I 
suggest, that the notion of a cause is more complicated than is claimed 
by adherents either of the Necessity Thesis or of the Sufficiency 
Thesis. I sugest that what is considered to be a cause depends on 
the context - not merely because the causal field depends on the 
context. 
If both the Necessity Thesis and the Sufficiency Thesis are 
satisfied, X causes Y. 
If neither the Necessity .Thesis nor the Sufficiency Thesis 
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is satisfied, X does not cause Y. 
In contexts where an event X is know, to occur and one therefore 
infers that some earlier event X also occurs, then for X to 
cause Y the (weak) Sufficiency Thesis is sufficient. 
In contexts where an event Y is known to occur and one therefore 
infers that some earlier event X also occurs, then for X to 
cause Y the Necessity Thesis is sufficient. 
In contexts where one asks an observer 'What caused Y?' or 
'What did X cause?' when the observer had seen what had, occurred 
then the observer, if he cannot find a quasi-event satisfying 
both the Necessity and the Sufficiency Thesis, may give as a cause 
a quasi-event which satisfies the Necessity Thesis alone or 
(perhaps) the Sufficiency Thesis alone. 
Thus I do not decide between the two theses. 	I continue to modify 
both the NecessityThesis and the Sufficiency Thesis, to meet various 
objections. 
By analogy with Nec 2, I propose, as a preliminary version 
of the Sufficiency Thesis 
Suff 1: 'X causes Y' is analysed as: 
X and Y occur and are distinct existences 
and 
In circumstances <occurring no earlier or later than X; 
distinct existences from X> if Y does not occur X does 
not occur. 
Note One: Modifications are made to Buff 1 until I finally obtain 
Buff 5. 44 
Note Two: Buff .7. is a version of the Sufficiency Thesis which 
involves strong sufficiency. Yet in the above discussion I mention 
44. See Note Five on p. 108. 
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weak sufficiency. This apparent. discrepancy is removed when I 
discuss probabilistic versions of the Sufficiency Thesis. Suff 2, 
which is similar in form to a weak sufficiency thesis, is stronger 
in one respect than Suff 2*, which is similar in form to a strong 
sufficienty thesis. I argue in favour of Suff 2.
45 
Note Three: The Lewis-type analysis analogous to Suff 1 would in-
volve the Lewis-conditional 'If -0(e) then -0(c)'. 
4.2 	An objection to the analysis Suff 1 is that, even in thecir- 
cumstances,A might not determine B. Anscombe has argued that causes do 
not in general determine their effects. 46 Consider the example of 
the photographic plate which for two months is in a drawer next to 
a minute quantity of uranium (of such a size that there is a 99% 
chance that the uranium emits enough radiation in the two months to 
spoil the photographic plate). 	If the plate is spoilt one would say 
that the uranium spoilt it; in other words, the presence of the 
uranium caused the plate to become useless. The presence of the 
uranium is necessary in the circumstances but it is not absolutely 
sufficient in the circumstances; it is only nearly sufficient in the 
probabilistic sense that there is a high probability of the plate 
being spoilt. Therefore I suggest that Suff 1 should be replaced by 
Suff 2: 'X causes Y' is analysed as: 
(1) X and Y occur and are distinct Existences 
and (2) In circumstances <occurring neither earlier nor 
later than X; distinct existences from X> if X occurs 
Y is likely to occur. 
:Note One: 	This is a.factual conditional rather than a counterfactual 
See p. 83. 
Anscombe, G.E.M., "Causality and Determination", reprinted in 
Causation and Conditionals, ed. Sosa, E., pp. 63-81. 
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conditional.In the analysis of 'X caused Y one would have 'In circum-
stances ... if X occurred as it did] then Y was highly likely to 
occur'. This is not a trivial conditional even if one knows that Y 
occurs, since Y could have occurred even if it were highly improbable. 
Note Two: 	I shall not consider what kind of probability is mentioned 
in the phrase 'Y is highly likely to occur' .until I discuss the 
account to be given of the conditionals used in the analysis of 
causation. 47 
Likewise, one seems to require a probabilistic variant of the 
analysis in terms of Lewis-conditionais. Instead of the Lewis-condi-
tional 'If the photographic plate were not going to become useless, 
the uranium would not be near it', one might have the variant 'There 
is some world w1 in which the plate does not become useless and the 
uranium is not near it in the vast majority of those worlds which are at 
lea:st aS like the actual world as w 1 and in which the plate does not 
become useless'. Here w1 has to be chosen so that there are enough 
worlds at least as like the actual world as w 1 for the phrase 'the 
vast majority' to be applicable. 
Notice that the corresponding probabilistic variant of the 
Necessity Thesis does not provide an acceptable analysis of causation. 
Suppose there is a chocolate machine N which, unlike Mackie's machines 
L and M,is deterministic, but which is nonetheless erratic. When a 
shilling is put in N a chocolate bar comes out; very occasionally 
(depending on unobserved features such as the position of rusty cogs), 
N produces a free chocolate bar. Thus one could say that the probabi-
lity of a shilling having been put in, given that a chocolate bar 
comes out, is very high. Nonetheless, one should not say that the 
47. See Note Two on p. 123. 
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shilling caused the chocolate bar to come out but rather, that it is 
highly probable that the cause was the shilling being put in. 
An alternative to Suff 2 would be the following analysis 
Suff 2 of 'X causes Y' as: 
X and Y occur and are distinct existences 
and 
In circumstances <occurring no earlier or later than X; 
. independent of X> if Y does not occur X is highly 
unlikely to have occurred. 
Suff 2 concerns prediction; Suff 2*concerns retrodiction. 
Now X anl Y are quasi-events so they differ from some norm. Thus one 
can assume it is not the case that X and Y are very highly probable. 
In that case, if it is rational to predict that Y occurs on the evi-
dence that X occurs, it would also be rational to retrodict that X 
does not occur on the evidence that Y does not occur. This is illu-
strated by the following argument involving probabilities: 
By Baye's Rule 
Prob(XIV) x Prob(V) = Prob(YiX) x Prob(X) 
Prob(Y) is not too near I (say Prob(Y) is less than 90%) 
the ratio, Prob(X) : Prob(V) is not greater than 10 : 1. 
if Prob(YIX) is very high (say 99%), Prob (YIX) is very low (1%) 
and so Prob(X1 71) is fairly low (at most 10%) 
Prob(XlV) is fairly high (at least 90%). 
Hence, if the prediction is very likely to succeed, the retrodiction 
is fairly "likely to succeed. The converse does not hold since if X 
is extremely unlikely anyway, it is safe to retrodict X, regardless 
of what Y is. Since,in general, 'A causes B' licenses both prediction 
and retrodiction, I prefer the analysis Buff 2 to Buff 2*. 
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It also follows that even the probabilistic modification of the 
Lewis-type account of sufficiency.is inadequate. 	Perhaps one could 
use the following Lewis-type analysis. 
'c causes e' is analysed as: 
c and e occur and are distinct existences; 
There is a worldwl in which 0(c) and 0(e) are both false; 
There is a world w2 no more like the actual world than 
such that in w2 , 0(C) and 0(e) are both true; 
and 
0(e) is true in the vast majority of worlds w such that 
w is at least as like the actual one as w 2 and 0(c) is true in w. 
Note: 	Necessity, Sufficiency, and the Paradigms of Causation  
The following two claims are initially plausible: 
If a causal situation in which X causes Y resembles those produc-
ing paradigms in which an agent brings X about in order to bring 
Y about, then the Sufficiency Thesis holds; 
If a causal situation in which X causes Y resembles those produc-
ing paradigms (the "preventing paradigms") in which an agent 
could have prevented Y by preventing X, then the Necessity Thesis 
holds. 
But these claims represent an oversimplified view. Consider first 
Mackie's indeterministic chocolate machine L. A shilling is necessary 
but not sufficient in the circumstances for a chocolate bar. Nonethe-
less, if a shilling has been put in and a chocolate bar comes out, 
the situation closely resembles a "producing" producing paradigm; the 
shilling was put in in order that the chocolate bar should come out. 
Now consider the case of Mackie's chocolate machine M. A shilling is 
sufficient but not necessary in the circumstances for a chocolate bar. 
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In this case one does not have a "preventing" paradigm for one might 
	!' 
not have succeeded in preventing the chocolate bar coming out by pre-
venting the shilling going in. But an agent can ensure that a chocolate 
bar comes out by putting a shilling in, so the situation resembles a 
"producing" producing paradigm. Hence, an emphasis on the "producing" 
producing paradigms, in which an agent produces the cause in order to 
produce the effect, does not distinguish between the two theses. But 
if one requires resemblance to the "preventing" paradigms, then one 
has some grounds for requiring the necessity of the Necessity Thesis. 
Section Five: 	The Problem of Collateral Effects  
In this section I modify Nec 2 to meet counter-examples based 
on collateral effect situations. I also modify Suff2. 
5.1 	Mackie gives the following example of the problem of collateral 
effects. 48 Labour's defeat at the election pleases James but saddens 
John. Even assuming that John is saddened after James is pleased, 
James's being pleased does not cause John's being saddened. Yet one 
might claim that if James had not been pleased, John would not have 
been saddened. More generally, if C is a cause of A which is absolute-
ly (not just probabilistically) sufficient in the circumstances for A 
and if C also causes B, then if A is earlier than B, A should, using 
Nee 2, cause B. This conclusion is supported by a valid argument for 
Lewis-conditionals. 
If A had not occurred C would not have occured, 
If C had not occurred A would not have occurred, 
If C had not occurred B would not have occurred, 
.% if A had not occurred B would not have occurred. 
This is an instance of the valid inference-pattern: 
48. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.33. 
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if 4) then IP ; 
if 4) then 4) ; 
if tP then X ; 
if 4). then X • 49 
On the proposed version of Mackie's analysis (Nee 2), the problem 
does not arise in every case of collateral effects. In particular, 
suppose that all quasi-events occur which are distinct from A and 
which actually occur about the same time as A, and suppose that A does 
not occur. In that case C would not occur. But there would usually 
be an intermediate cause between C and B which-is simultaneous with A 
and so is assumed to occur. Hence B would still occur. However, an 
analysis should be proof against conceivable hypothetical counter-
examples. There are hypothetical examples which reintroduce the pro-
blem of collateral effects. For many people would claim that it is 
conceivable that, what Russell calls mnemic causation, should occur. 
That is, C causes B, there is a temporal gap between C and B, yet there 
are no intermediary causes connecting C and B in a causal chain. 
I do not want my defence of causal anti-realism to depend on whether 
mnemic causation is conceivable or not. 	Here I shall assume that 
mnemic causation is conceivable. 	Elsewhere50 I shall show how 
to modify my account to rule out mnemic causation. So I assume 
that John learns of Labour's defeat at the same time as James, 
that John is not saddened at the time but becomes sad an hour later 
and that there is no chain of causes or mechanism of any kind - 
mental or physical - connecting John's learning the news and John's 
becoming sad; 	the learning of the news directly makes John sad 
an hour later. In that case one does not suppose the occurrence 
of any intermediary cause and so, if James had not been pleased, 
Labour would not have been defeated and so John would not be sad. 
49. Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, p.33. 	50. Note on p. 101. 
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Mackie's solution to the problem is to analyse 'X is necessary-
in-the-circumstances for and causally prior to Y' as follows: 
Consider a world like the actual one up 
to the time of the proposed cause X, 
suppose X does not occur and let the 
world run on; if Y does not occur X was 
necessary-in-the-circumstances for and 
causally prior to Y. 51 
Making the appropriate modification to Nec 252 one has: 
-/Me 3 	'X causes Y' is analysed as:- 
X and Y both occur and are distinct existences: 
In circumstances <no later than X; distinct 
existences from X> if X does not occur then Y 
does not occur. 
There is an objection to Nec 3 which I shall now discuss. 
Objection. 53 An amoeba called Jojimsplitsinto two ameobae Jo and Jim. 
Let C be the quasi-event that Jojim splits at time t o (into some pair 
of amoebae). 
Let A be the quasi-event that Jo is present at some time after t o . 
Let B be the quasi-event that Jim is present at some time after t o . 
Then A and B are distinct existences and, even in the circumstances 
in which Jojim splits, A is necessary for B. For if Jo is not present 
and Jojim splits then Jojim splits into two amoebae which are not the 
same as Jo and Jim, so Jim is not present either. Yet A does not cause 
B. 
Reply: 	This is not, I claim,a problem of collateral effects, but 
rather one to do with distinct existences. A modification needed to 
handle the case of Joanne giving birth resulting in Harry becoming a 
father54also shows that the distinct existences requirement is not 
satisfied in the Jojim example. The required modification is that Y 
Mackie, J.L. The Cement of the Universe, p.51. 
See p. 73. 
Due to Edgar Sleinis. 	54. 	See p. 44. 
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be distinct from the conjunction of X_and earlier quasi-events. 	i 
Using this modification, one has 
Nec 3 'X causes Y' is analysed as: 
X and Y both occur and Y is a distinct existence 
from the conjunction of X and all quasi-events 
occurring before X, and 
In circumstances <no later than X; distinct 
existences from X>, if X does not occur then Y 
does not occur. 
—5.2 	Collateral effects also present a difficulty for the Sufficiency 
Thesis. 	Suppose a vending machine contains chocolate bars and 
packets of peanuts. At random the machine sometimes goes into a short- 
lived state S which inevitably results some time later in the production 
of a packet of peanuts without any changes in the meantime. Unless 
the machine is in state S one cannot push the shilling into the slot. 
If the machine is in state S and a shilling is put into the slot the 
chocolate bar soon comes out (sooner than the free peanuts). Produc-
ing the chocolate bar would now, using the analysis Buff 1 or Buff 2, 
be sufficient-in-the-circumstances for producing the peanuts. But the 
chocolate bar coming out does not cause the peanuts to come out. Thus 
one has a counter-example to the sufficiency of the Sufficiency Thesis, 
Buff 2. I propose instead SUff 3: 
'X causes Y ° is to be analysed as: 
X and Y both occur and Y is a distinct existence 
from the conjunction. of X and all quasi-events 
occurring before X, and 
In circumstances coccurring no later than X; 
distiuct existences from X?, if X occurs Y is 
highly likely to occur. 
content, for now, if I can give an analysis of causation that works 
56 
! properly under determinism" 	so it is, perhaps, not a fair criticism 
to point out that his analysis fails in cases in which Determinism is 
89. 
5.3 	I shall now consider Lewis' proposed solution to the problem 
of collateral effects, which he calls the problem of epiphenomena. 
Lewis denies the truth of the counterfactuals which are commonly thought 
to raise difficulties. Suppose c causes both e and f, and suppose 
that e is earlier than f but e does not cause f. Lewis claims that 
if event e had not occurred, c would still have occurred but would have 
failed to cause - e; he says "If e had been absent, it is not that c 
would have been absent ... Rather, c would have occurred just as it 
did but would have failed to cause e." 55 Lewis justifies this asser-
tion on the grounds that c would have been determined by earlier events, 
sc: the absence of c would also involve a departure from a law of 
Nature. There is therefore less difference between the actual and 
possible world if one law is broken and one event changed than if one 
law is broken and two events are changed. 	Lewis says "I shall. be  
not assumed. Consider the following example. 	A radiocative nucleus 
N1 decays, spontaneously, into a nucleus N 2 (event c) emitting an 
a-ray which is then present in the vicinity of N 2 for a short period 
(event e). It is inevitable that within ten minutes N 2 decays into 
N3 , emitting a .-ray (event f). In this case, event e does not cause 
event f. On Lewis' account, in order to modify the actual world least 
so as to ensure that e does not occur, one states that N1 decays into 
N2 , and hence into N3 , emitting the --ray; but N 1 decays into N2 with-
out an a-ray being in the vicinity of the nucleus N 2 . This involves 
breaking some law . of Nature. However, one might simply modify the 
Lewis, D., "Causation", Journal of Philosophy, vol.70(1973), 
p.566. 
Ibid., p.559. 
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world so that the spontaneous event of N1 's . decay did not occur. Thus 
one preserves one law at the cost of changing two events. Now in the 
case of causal dependenceone has the Lewis-conditional 'If -0(c) then 
in this case it seems that the least change to the actual 
world is obtained by preserving the law and changing one event, rather 
than by departing from the law and having e still occur. Thus in this 
example Lewis' solution involves a rate-of-exchange in which a law 
is worth more than one event, but is worth less than two events. This 
is somewhat bizarre. 
However, there is another objection to Lewis' account. Assume 
that ther2 are, which is conceivable, determining laws such that the 
past determines the future and vice versa. Then in a straightforward 
case of causal dependence the Lewis-conditional 'if -0(e) then -0(e)' 
involves the claim that some world in which 0( ) and 0(e) are both 
false is more like the actual world than any world in which 0(c) is 
false but 0(e) is true. But by preserving the law in order to make e 
not occur, one either breaks the law that if e occurs some effect f 
of e also occurs, or one changes some infinite sequence of future 
events. 
On the one hand it seems that breaking past instances' of laws 
is considered to make a greater difference than breaking future in-
stances. On the other hand, a law is worth infinitely many events; 
why not, then, in the case of epiphenomena, change c and the whble 
infinite causal chain leading up to c, rather than break the law that 
if e does not occur, c does not occur? In either case it is clear 
that changes in the past must be considered to make a greater differ-
ence to possible worlds than changes in the future. Rather than 
assuming this principle, it seems better to simply stipulate, as in 
t 
- 
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Hackle's solution, that the past is not to be changed. In that case 
we have a convergence between the proposed modifications to the 
accounts of Mackie and Lewis. On Lewis' account we require 0(c), OW 
and the Lewis-conditional 'If events actually occurring no later than 
e (other than c) still occur and -0(c), then -0(e)'. 
. 5.4 	Thus I claim that, whether one is using a Mackie-type Necessity 
Thesis, a Mackie-type Sufficiency Thesis, or a Lewis-type account, 
the history before the causal situation needs to be considered. Hence, 
at least in some cases, the sentence 'X causes Y' is made true not 
just by what happens in the time interval between X and Y, bat also 
by events preceding X. In other words, it is conceivable that there 
be two otherwise identical situations of which one is causal but the . 
other is not, which differ only in the history before the events being 
considered- This conclusion is,perhaps, incompatible with commonly 
accepted pre-philosophical theories of causation involving, say, 
causal powers, but this incompatibility is not surprising because 
such theories are versions of Causal Realism. 
Section Six: The problems ofUnderdetermination and Overdetermination  
6.1 	The problem of underde termination is that sometimes a quasi- 
event A causes some part of another quasi-event B but A is causally 
irrelevant to the remainder of B. In such cases A is not said to cause 
B. 
Example One: 	One would not say that the fire causes the horizontally 
moving smoke. The fire causes the smoke but the wind makes the smoke 
move horizontally. 
Example Two: 	One would not say that cyclone Alice caused the heavy 
Cr! 
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rainfall throughout Queensland for the year, - if cyclone Alice were 
only responsible for the heavy rainfall in the north of the state and 
if other factors caused the heavy rainfall further south. 
The problem of underdetermination is not merely a difficulty for 
the advocate of the sufficiency of the Necessity Thesis. If cyclone 
Alice were to occur in December and there had been heavy rainfall in 
the south. of Queensland in January and February then cyclone Alice might 
be both necessary and sufficient in the circumstances for the heavy 
rainfall throughout Queensland for that year. 
My solution to the problem of underdetermination is to require 
that X be necessary (sufficient) in the circumstances for every, 
regular part of Y. 57 
Note: 	Someone might insist that the sentence 'The fire causes the 
horizontally moving smoke' is true. In that case the sentence should 
be paraphrased as 'The fire causes the smoke and the smoke moves 
horizontally'. 
6.2 An analysis of causation must distinguish between those cases of 
overdetermination of C by A and B in which one says that A caused C, 
and those cases in which one does not. Cases of overdetermination 
will be classified into simple and alternative overdetermination, and 
alternative overdetermination will be classified into symmetric and 
asymmetric cases. I shall also distinguish between temporal asNjm-
metrics and non-temporal asymmetries. Thus there is a classification 
of cases of overdetermination into the following four kinds: 
(1) Simple Overdetermination 
For example, consider the causal sentence 'Pouring a litre of 
57. See p.43 for the definition of a regular part. 
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paraffin on the bonfire caused it to burn'. This would be considered 
true even if half a litre would have been enough. Cases of simple 
overdetermination can be treated in the manner in which I treated 
'Jane's eating the open jar of fishpaste caused her feeling ill', 
where the speaker does not wish to commit himself about the precise 
cause but is willing only to indicate an area in which the cause is to 
be found. Thus one could paraphrase 'Pouring a litre of paraffin on 
the bonfire caused it to burn' as: 
There is some positive quantity x 
no greater than a litre such that 
the quasi-event described by 'At least 
quantity x of paraffin was poured onto 
the bonfire' caused the bonfire to burn. 
An alternative solution to the problem of simple overdetermin-
ation proposed by Mackie is to treat the proposed cause as a unit. 
Thus Mackie, in describing the case of a chestnut hit by a hammer, 
says "... we either plug in the hammer blow as a whole or leave it 
out as a whole". 58 Now one might be tempted to claim that, relative 
to the causal field being considered, one does not distinguish between, 
say, a. litre and half a litre of paraffin. But this is not correct. 
For if one asked the question 'What caused the bonfire to burn?' one 
might - consider the following reply to be relevant 	'The pouring 
of a litre of paraffin on it did the trick, and it really needed a 
whole litre'. 	Perhaps one could defend Mackie's solution by claim- 
ing that some quasi-events admit of degrees. If a quasi-event 
differs from all the norms in a qualitatively similar but quantitative-
ly different way from quasi-event B, A and B. might be considered 
different degrees of the same quasi-event. Such a defence, involving 
the notion of the degree of a quasi-event, is unnecessary and I shall 
58. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.44. 
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net investigate it in greater detail. 
(2) Symmetric Alternative Overdetermination  
Mackie gives the following examples: 
A man is shot dead by a firing squad, at 
least two bullets entering his heart at once, 
either of which would have been immediately 
fatal; 
Lightning strikes a barn in which straw is 
stored, and a tramp throws a burning cigarette 
butt into the straw at the same place and 
at the same time; the straw catches fire. 59 
In such cases there is no way of deciding which quasi-event 
should count as the cause, sc perhaps one should call neither the 
cause. 	(Although as I said in Section Three, one is also reluctant 
to deny that either is the cause.) 	If one does adopt the Necessity 
Thesis one would say that in such cases the genuine cause is the 
quasi-event obtained by taking the disjunction of the two proposed 
causes. 
(3) Temporal Asymmetries  
Consider the following example. Someone with tuberculosis takes 
a drug and goes to live in a hot dry climate. Either would be suf-
ficient to cure him. .The drug cures him in two weeks but the change 
of climate would have taken six months to cure him. In this case, 
even though taking the drug is not necessary in the circumstances 
for the cure, it is nonetheless the cause of the cure. 
Such cases can be handled using the method Mackie proposes for 
all cases of asymmetric overdetermination. In the above example, one 
can claim that the drug is necessary for a ez,t2 ,e within a month. As 
in the case of 'Jane's eating fishpaste in the pantry caused her 
59. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of. the Universe, p.44. 
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feeling ill', there are various possible paraphrases of 'Taking the 
drug cured the man'; 
Paraphrase One: 	Taking the drug caused the quasi-event described 
by 'The man recovered health'. 
Paraphrase Two: 	Taking the drug caused the quasi-event described 
by 'The man recovered health in two weeks'. 
Paraphrase Three: 	The disjunction of Paraphrases One and -Two. 
Using the analysis Nec 3, 60 Paraphrases. Two and Three would be 
true. I suggest that Paraphrase Three is the most accurate; one does 
not state whether the time taken for the man to recover health. is part 
of the description of the effect or not. 
6.3 (4) 	Non-temporal Asymmetries 
There are various examples of non-temporal asymmetries in which 
both A and B occur and either by itself would ordinarily cause C to 
occur at the same time; one says A causes C, but B does not. I first 
discuss the difficulties these examples raise for the necessity of 
the Necessity Thesis. 61 
Example One:  
... conditions (perhaps unusual excitement) 
plus constitutional inadequacies are present . 
at 4.0 p.m. that guarantee a stroke at 4.55 p.m. 
and consequent deathat 5.0 p.m.; but an entirely 
unrelated heart attack at 4.50 p.m. is still 
.correctly called the cause of death,,, which, as 
it happens, does occur at 5.0 p.m. 64 
In this example I assume that the ."guarantee" is not absolute, and 
that there is no stroke - perhaps the heart-attack prevents the 
See p.88. 
I ignore the problem of overdetermination in the case of 
the Sufficiency Thesis, because the context in which the 
•problem arises is that in which the question 'What caused Y?' 
is asked. 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.44. 
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stroke. Another example is a slight modification to Mackie's example 
Example Two: 
Smith is sent to shoot the president as he comes 
out of a certain building at 2.00 p.m. Smith is 
watched by Brown who, if he failed to see Smith in 
place at 1.50 p.m., would himself shoot the president 
at 2.00 p.m. However, Smith is in place and shoots 
the president. 
In this case the president would have been shot anyway (at the same 
time). For one is to assume from a knowledge of Smith's character, 
that if he proceeds according to plan until 1.50 p.m. he will shoot 
the president, but if Smith does not proceed according to plan until 
1.50 p.m., Brown still has time to shoot the president at 2.00 p.m. 
In this second example, one could replace Smith by a mechanical device 
such as a time-bomb. Brown, then, checks that the time-bomb has not 
been discovered. Although in this example it might be essential that 
Brown be considered an agent, the cause that actually occurs is a 
transeunt cause. 
I suggest that all cases of non-temporal asymmetries have in 
common the breaking at some point of one of the two potential causal 
:chains. The stroke does not occur, and the failure of Smith. to be 
in place does not occur. Thus in both cases a rival causal chain is 
broken. 
One might think that temporal asymmetries are also of this kind. 
For example, a detailed description of the potential cure by a change 
in climate might, perhaps, presuppose that the person still suffers 
from tuberculosis after one month. In actual eases this may be so, 
although it is debatable. However, assuming that mnemic causation 
is conceivable, there are hypothetical examples in which the temporal 
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asymmetry involves no break in a causal chain, because there is no 
causal chain. For example, suppose a magic ritual would, without 
any intermediate changes, suddenly cure the person six months later. 
(The continued sickness of the person is not here presupposed because 
should someone be cured and yet again contract tuberculosis, the 
ritual still cures him.) In that case one would nonetheless say that 	; 
1 
the drug, not the ritual, cured the sick person. 
Mackie suggests that the solution to the problem of non-temporal 
asymmetries is that the cause was "necessary in the circumstances for 
the result as it came about. ,63  While I think Mackie is basically 
right, I reject his clarification of this solution in terms of the 
distinction between facts and events as effects. It seems Mackie 
would claim that the result of the heart-attack is the fact that the 
person died of heart-attack and that because the event of the person 
dying of heart-attack is thessame event as the person dying, one has 
a case of event-causation in Which the heart-attack causes the.death. 
My 'grounds for claiming that this is Hackle's position are that in 
a more complicated example ((v), discussed below) Mackie describ's 
the result as the fact that the traveller died of thirst. It is clear 
that in the present example the person did not die of a stroke he 
did not have one. But one should not describe the death as death by 
heart-attack until one has decided that the heart-attack caused the 
death. However, there seem to be two suitable descriptions. Perhaps 
- as I think Mackie intends - one is to describe the death as death 
as a result of the post -heart-attack condition (which occurs at 4.55 
p.m.), thus putting into the description undisputed causes later in 
the chain. Alternatively, one might describe the death as death 
which is not the result of a stroke. The former description does 
63. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.46. 
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not cover the conceivable case in which the heart-attack mnemically 
causes death ten minutes later without any intermediary change. 
However, the use of the latter description presents a new problem 
in the case of symmetric overdetermination. In Example cii) 64. the 
lightning-stroke is necessary in the circumstances for the straw to 
burn 	not as a result of the throwing down of a cigarette butt. 
For even without the lightning stroke the straw would have burnt as 
a result of the throwing down of the cigarette butt. Thus in the 
description of the effect it would have to be stipulated that the 
alternative cause does not occur, rather than that the alternative 
causal relation does not occur. 	So, in Example One above 65, the 
relevant description of the death would have to be 'death without a 
stroke occurring earlier' rather than 'death Dot caused by a stroke'. IThe correct paraphrase of 'The heart-attack caused the death' would 
then be 'The heart-attack caused the quasi-event described by 'death 
occurred and no stroke occurred earlier' '. But in this case one 
has an example of underdetermination so the causal sentence would 
be false. Thus there are difficulties with Hackle's sblution. 
6.4 	Lewis proposed to Solve the problems of asymmetric overdeter- 
mination by considering causal chains. Suppose c l causes e and that c 2 
also occurs and does not cause e but would have caused e if c I had 
been absent. Say c 1 is the event of the heart attack, c 2 the pre-
stroke conditions, and e the death. Lewis then suggests that there 
is an intermediate event d such that e depends on d and d depends in 
turn on c 1 6 	I am assuming the coherence of mnemic causation, 
so it is conceivable that the heart attack directly causes the death 
	
64. 	See p. 94. 	65. See p. 95. 
66. 	Lewis, D., "Causation", Journal of Philosophy, vol.70(1973), 
p.567. 
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without intermediary changes. However, a variant of Lewis' solution 
does succeed. 
A first attempt at a suitable analysis might be to require that 
the circumstances include all quasi-events occurring earlier than Y, 
or no later than X. But it then follows that if X causes Z which 
causes Y, X is no longer necessary in the circumstances for Y. So I 
propose instead the following account: 
Nec 4 	Y is said to be causally dependent on X if 
Y is a distinct existence from the conjunction 
of X and all quasi-events occuring before X, and, 
If Z is any regular part of Y then in circumstances 
<occurring no later than X or occurring earlier than 
Y; distinct existences from X and Y> if X does not 
occur Z does not occur. 
,Then 'X causes Y 1 is analysed as 
There is a finite chain of quasi-events 
X=X1 , X2 , ..., Xn = Y such that Xr+1 is 
causally dependent on X. 
I shall not provide a causal chain account for the Sufficiency Thesis 
Since it is possible that the probability of the occurrence of X r.41 
given the occurrence of Xr , r = 1 ... (n-1), is high, but the probab-
ility of Xn given the occurrence of X, is low. 
Using Nec 4, if the heart attack is followed by death without 
intermediary changes death is causally dependent on the heart attack, 
for one is supposing that the stroke does not occur. Similarly, in 
the example of Smith shooting the president; in the circumstances in 
which Brown does not shoot the president it is necessary that Smith 
shoots the president. Finally, consider again Mackie's example (v): 
A man sets out on a trip across the desert, 
He has two enemies. One of them puts a 
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deadly poison in his reserve can of 
drinking water. The other (not knowing this) 
makes a hole in the bottom of the can. The 
poisoned water all leaks out before the 
traveller needs to resort to this can; 
the traveller dies of thirst. 67 
In this example there is some doubt about the cause of death. One 
might judge, like Mackie, that the cause is the puncturing of the 
can, or one might judge that the poisoning of the water and the punct-
uring of the can overdetermine the traveller's death. It is instruct-
ive to see the way in which the analysis Nee 4, reflects this doubt. 
On the one hand, one might divide the facts into the following quasi-
events - or absence of quasi-events: 
The poison is put into the can 
The can is punctured 
No poison is drunk 
There is no water in the can 
The man dies 
One then argues that E depends causally on D, for the circumstances 
include C. D depends causally on B- So B causes E. On the other 
hand, one might divide the facts into the following quasi-events: 
The poison is put into the can 
The can is punctured 
ZT: No poison is drunk 
D*: There is no proper drinking water 
E: The man dies 
In this case, E depends causally on D* which. is overdetermined by A 
and B. So A and B overdetermine E. 
Notice that D and D* are not-distinct existences so one cannot 
combine the two ways of looking at the situation. Notice also that 
even if -6 is not a quasi-event but it is part of every normal state-
of-affairs it is still part of the circumstances. 
67. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.44. 
101. 
Note: The account is easily modified to exclude mnemic causation 
and action-at-a-distance if one so wishes. One simply stipulates 
-that if Y depends causally on X, X and Y must be in spatio-temporally 
adjacent or overlapping regions. 
Section Seven: 	Simultaneous Causation 
• 7.1 	It is perhaps debatable whether simultaneous causation is con- 
ceivable. If it is not, then it is easy to stipulate in an,analysis 
of 'X causes Y' that X is earlier than Y. So, in order to make my 
account adequate in both cases, I shall assume that simultaneous 
causation is conceivable. The analyses Nec 4 ans Suff 3 permit 
simultaneous causation. Suff 3 is obviously inadequate as a suffi-
cient condition if X and Y are simultaneous, for Y would be part of 
the circumstances and so any two simultaneous events would cause each 
other. Hencc Buff 3 is modified to obtain Stiff 4: 
'X causes Y' is analysed as: 
X and Y occur and Y is a distinct existence 
from the conjunction of X and all quasi-events 
occurring earlier than X 
and 
In circumstances <no later than X; distinct 
existences from X and Y>, if X occurs Y is highly 
likely to occur. 
The difficulty with both Nec 4 and Suff 4 is that they allow 
cases of mutual simultaneous causation. In this section I provide an 
extra necessary condition for X to cause Y, in the case of simultan-
eous causation. I discuss Nec 4, but this extra condition could also 
be used with Buff 4. 
Consider the following examples: 
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Example One:  
If I view as a cause a ball which impresses 
a hollow as it lies on a stuffed cushion, the 
cause is simultaneous with the effect. 68 
Example Two: 
From the fact that a bar of iron is now glowing 
we can certainly infer ... that it is now at 
a temperature of 1000 0 or over. Yet we should 
not say that its high temperature was caused by 
the glowing: we say that the high temperature 
causes the glowing, not vice versa. 
These examples seem to be actual causes of simultaneous causation. 
Now someone might object that in fact there are no cases of 
simultaneous causation, but that if one told a sufficiently detailed 
story about, say the motion of molecules it would be seen that the 
cause always precedes its effect. 	However, it is incontestable that 
the above are examples of causation. 	What is disputed is whether 
in these examples cause and effect are simultaneous. 	Now even if 
the cause and the effect are not simultaneous, this lack of simul-
taneity is not directly observed but is inferred from some theory 
about microscopic or sub-microscopic events. This theory was dis-
covered a posteriori so it is conceivable that the theory is false, 
and so it is also conceivable that cause and effect are simultaneous. 
Thus, even if the examples are not actual cases of simultaneous 
causation, they can be used to show that there are coherent hypo-
thetical cases of simultaneous causation. 
Suppose Y depends causally on X and X and Y are simultaneous; 
in that case, using the analysis Nec 4 one has: 
	
58. 	Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, B248. 
69. 	Gasking, D., "Causation and Recipes", Mind, vol.64(Oct.1955) 
p.480. 
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In circumstances <occurring no later than :K; 
distinct existences from X and Y> if X does not 
occur Y does not occur.  
Suppose not only that in circumstances <occurring no later than X; 
distinct existences from X and Y> if X does not occur Y does not 
occur but that also in these circumstances if Y does not occur X does 
not occur. Then, according to Nec 4, X and Y cause each other, but 
causation is generally considered to be an . anti-symmetric relation. 
Now in the two examples of simultaneous causation given above 
one can argue that this symmetry does not arise. Consider the example 
of the ball and the depression in the cushion. The circumstances 
include the past motion of the ball and the past state of the cushion. 
Presumably the ball is about to drop onto the cushion and, presumably, 
the cushion has no depression. Then if there is no ball on the 
cushion, presumably there is no depression. But if there is no 
depression one of two anomalies might have occurred: the ball might 
have stopped, suspended just above the cushion; or the ball might be 
on the cushion without causing a depression. The inability to decide 
which anomaly has occurred prevents one correctly asserting the 
conditional 'In the circumstances, if there had been no depression 
there would be no ball on the cushion'. At any rate, if one gives 
a meta-inference account or a rationality-judgment account of condi-
tionals, the choice between two anomalies prevents the conditional 
being true. 
Again, consider Example Two (the iron glowing at 1000 0 ). One 
is to assume as part of the circumstances that a process has been 
going on, which is sufficient in the (earlier) circumstances for the 
iron to reach 1000 0 . There will be several such processes: these 
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could be called 'heating processes', but that is to use a causally-
tied description. So I shall simply refer to them as H-processes 
where an H-process is by definition one of processes P1 	Pk' 
where it happens that P1 ... Pk are all the processes which heat iron. 
Now, if on the one hand the iron is not hot and there is no glow, a 
departure 70 from one non-accidental generalisation has occurred (name-
ly, that the 11-process makes the iron hot), but if the iron is not hot 
and there is a glow there have been two departures from non-accidental 
generalisations (for it is also a non-accidental generalisation that 
hot iron glows). Hence, in the circumstances, if the iron is not 
hot it does not glow. On the other hand, in the circumstaaces, if 
the iron does not glow then either there is a departure from the non-
accidental generalisation that hot iron glows or there is a departure 
from the non-accidental generalisation that the H-process makes the 
iron hot. 	So, , as in the Example One, the choice between two anom- 
alies prevents the correct assertion of the conditional 'If the iron 
had not glowed, it would not have been hot'. 
7.2 	There are, however, several objections to Nec 4 'based on 
other examples of simultaneous causation. 
Objection  One: 71 In the above two examples it was assumed that 
the proposed cause itself had a determining cause. But suppose that 
on 50% of occasions balls stopped moving, and suppose that on .50% 
of occasions the H-processes fail to make the iron hot. Then one 
would have grounds for choosing between one anomaly rather than the 
other. So in the circumstances if the depression does not occur, 
A non-accidental generalisation is not necessarily 
universal, hence by a departure from it I mean an exception 
to the corresponding universal generalisation. 
This objection is due to Michael Tooley. 
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the ball is not on the cushion. Again, in the circumstances, if the 
iron does not glow, then it is not hot. 
Reply: 	In such cases the analysis Alec 4 fails. 	It is therefore 
replaced by a more complicated account of causal dependence which is 
based on the requirement that if in fact Y does not cause X and if one 
had removed some cause of X earlier than X, but one had independently 
. ensured that Y occurred, then X would not have occurred. 	In other 
words, some quasi-event is necessary in the circumstances for X, even ' 
• 
if the occurrence of Y is part of the circumstances. My justification 
for this kind of account is that the aim of my conditional analysis is 
to state in what respects cases of causation are like their manipul-
ability paradigms. In the case of the ball and the cushion, one could 
not ensure that there is a ball by merely producing a depression in 
the cushion. 	To avoid description in terms of agents one simply stipu- 
lates that the circumstances be adjusted by removing some cause of X. 
Here I. assume that Nec 4 gives an adequate account of causation if X 
is earlier than Y, consequently there is no circularity in mentioning 
the cases of causation in which the cause is earlier than its effect 
in the analysis of simultaneous causation. Accordingly one obtains the 
analysis Nec 5 by making the following proviso: 
Suppose that if X and Y are simultaneous and, using Nec 4, it would 
seem that X and Y depend causally on each other, then an extra condi-
tion (EC) is required if Y is to be causally dependent on X, namely: 
There is at least one quasi-event Z earlier than 
X on which (using Nec 4) X depends causally. 
and 
If Z is any quasi-event earlier than X on which 
(using Nec 4) X depends causally, then: 
in circumstances <occurring no later than X; 
distinct existences from X, Y and Z> 
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if Z does not occur but Y occurs then X does not 
occur. 
In the modified hot iron glowing example one considers circum-
stances in which the iron is not subject to the H-pf.ocess. I suggest 
that the relevant non-accidental generalisations are: 
Some H-process has occurred whenever iron is hot; 
If iron is hot it glows; . 
If iron glows then it is hot; 
but not 
Some H-process has occurred whenever iron glows. 
If one supposes that the iron is hot and glows, then there are depart-
ures from (1) and (4). If one supposes that the iron is hot but doe -1 
not glow, then there are departures from (1) and (2), Since (4) is 
not a non-accidental generalisation, in the special circumstances where 
there has been no H-process the iron being hot is sufficient for it to 
glow. 
If no H-process has been used and one supposes the iron glows 
yet is not hot, then there are departures from (3) and (4). But if 
the iron glows and is hot there are departures from (1) and (4). In 
this case one cannot choose between the two anomalies, so one should 
not say that in the special circumstances the glow is sufficient for 
the iron to be hot. Hence by Nec 5 the heating of the iron causes 
the glowing. 
	
Note One: 	It might seem peculiar that (1) and (3) but not (4) are 
non-accidental generalisations where (1) and (3) jointly entail (4). 
This peculiarity will be discussed in greater detail subsequently; 
here I merely point out that both the modal operators 1, 1 and L2 
defined by: 
L1 	P are Q) = Df (All but perhaps one P is a Q) 
L2 (All P are 0 = Df (It is highly probable that a P is a Q) 
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have the property that if p and q jointly entail r, then Lp and Lq 
need not jointly entail Lr. 
Note Two: 	It suffices to argue that the generalisation .(4) has a 
lower degree of fundcmentality than the generalisation (1). (General-
•sation (4) could still be deemed non-accidental.) 72 
Note Three: Because I am providing here an-account of causation in 
terms of the notion of non-accidental generalisations, it is interest-
ing - though not crucially important - to discover why one does not 
say that the generalisation 'An H-process has occurred whenever iron 
glows' is a law of Nature, or, more precisely, a non-accidental gener- 
alisation. The explanation, I suppose, for . treating the generalisation 
'An H-process has occurred whenever iron is hot' as a non-accidental 
generalistion is that it is an instance of the general principle that 
an H-process has occurred whenever an object is hot. But the general-
isation 'An H-process has occurred whenever iron glows' is not an 
instance of a more general principle. This remark is of course based 
on Gasking's discussion, who says: 
When we have a general manipulative technique 
which results in a certain sort of event A, 
we speak of producing A by this technique ... 
When in certain cases application of the 
general technique for producing A results in 
B we speak of producing B by producing A ... 
And in such a case we speak of A causing B, 
but not vice versa. 73 
Note Four: My own intuitions about cau.sation exclude cases of 
mutual causation, so in the perfectly symmetric case where neither 
Nec 4 nor EC enables one to distinguish cause from effect, I say that 
neither X causes Y nor Y causes X. 
See p.114for an account of degrees of fundamentality. 
Gasking, D., "Causation and Recipes", Mind, vol.64 (Oct.1955), 
p. 483. 
108. 
Note Five: 	To obtain a version of the Sufficiency Thesis which 
handles cases of simultaneous causation, one could add the extra 
condition EC to Buff 4,. thus obtaining Suff 5. 
Objection Two: 	in perfectly symmetric cases one would say 'Either X 
caused Y or Y caused X; I do not know which', rather than 'Neither X 
nor Y caused the other'. 	For example, in a world where iron being 
hot and iron glowing always occurred together but the conjunctive 
quasi-event that the iron is hot and glowing had no cause, one would • 
say that either the heat caused the glow or the glow caused the heat. 
Reply: 	One might be tempted to say that if events of kinds C and 
E are cm:related but are otherwise spontaneous; then the C cause the E 
or vice versa; but this, I suggest, is not a matter of English usage 
so much as a piece of pre-philosophical Metaphysics. 	Suppose there 
is some actual situation where spontaneous events are correlated; 
say it is discovered that whenever a radium atom decays then some 
nearby radioactive lead atom also decays and vice versa. If, in that 
case, a reliable person claimed that he knew which was the cause and 
which was the effect, one might entertain the hypothesis that there 
is an irreducible element of causal priority "in the objects" which 
this person intuits. But the claim that one causes the other but no 
one knows which obviously seems to be based on a belief in Causal 
Realism. 
Objection Three: 	The account given of causation is now extremely 
complex. Various ad hoc rules are introduced in order to meet ob-
jections. Consequently the account is not plausible. 
Reply: My aim is to give an account of those respects in which all 
cases of causation are like the paradigms based on manipulability. 
That the account is complex is to be expected; a similar account for 
j 
4 
5 
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tables would also be complex. A sound objection to the account would 
be made if the features were so complex that it was inconceivable 
that a human being could base the judgment of similarity with the 
paradigms on these features. This degree of complexity has surely 
not been reached. Furthermore, the account does not involve ad hoc 
rules. Rather, in most cases it suffices to consider the features of 
causal situations such that one can prevent the effect by preventing 
the cause or produce the effect by producing the cause. But in some 
cases of simultaneous causation in which X causes Y, one has - to con-
sider the features of the causal situation such that if one takes all 
steps possible before the cause X in order to prevent X but otheruise 
ensures that Y occurs, then the cause does not occur. The accounts 
Nec 5 and Buff 5 are based on these features. 
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PART • TWO 
Section Eight: Non-accidental Generalisations  
8.1 	In Section Nine I shall argue that the conditionals required 
for the analysis of causation are meta-inference conditionals based 
on the correct non-accidental generalisations. In this section I 
compare non-accidental generalisations with laws ofhature. Laws of 
Nature are usually contrasted with accidental universal statements, 
the difference being that in some sense laws are necessary universal 
statements For instance, Nagel says: 
No one seriously disputes the claim that a 
distinction something like the one baptised 
by the labels 'accidental' and 'nomic' 
universality is recognized in common speech 
and in practical actions. The question in 
dispute is whether the prima facie differences 
... require the acceptance of the "necessity" 
associated with universals of law as something 
"ultimate" or whether nomic universality can 
be explicated in terms of notions that are 
less opaque. 74 
Thus a law of Nature is of the schematic form Lp where L is the 
modal operator 'of nomic necessity' and p is a universal generalisation 
such as 'All P are Q'. 
For two reasons 'I want to avoid considering laws of Nature in 
my account of the conditionals used in causation. 
- Reason One: I am not convinced that all the generalisations which 
license the counterfactuals used in the analysis of causation are nomic 
universal generalisations (laws of Nature). For, I claim, some non-
physical entity, such as the human mind or soul, might directly -cause 
some physical event - this would be a case of immanent causation. 
. Accordingly, suppose that Libertarianism is 'correct, and suppose also 
74. 	Nagel, E., The Structure of Science, p.53. 
that when a free choice is made something happens in the brain which 
is an exception to those generalisations that are usually considered 
to be laws. Then the "laws" are not universal generalisations, but 
nonetheless they license counterfactuals and are consequently not 
accidental. Nor can the universal nature of the "laws" be ensured by 
making them probabilistic. 	It is possible that the only exceptions 
to the "laws" occur when someone makes a free choice in the libertar-
ian sense of a free choice and so, apart from exceptions due to im- 
_ 	. 
manent causation, the non-probabilistic "laws" are universal, 
Reason Two: One sometimes supposes . a hypothetical situation in which 
there are exceptions to what are, perhaps, universal generalisations. 
For example, suppose that a thousand years ago a stone, for no reason, 
remained ten feet above the earth for two minutes and then fell. Sup-
pose also that (now) a stone is thrown upwards. 	Surely, within the 
scope of these suppositions, one should assert that the stone falls to 
the earth. Yet one has supposed that the "law" that heavy unsupported 
objects fall to the earth has been broken and so the "law" is not a 
nomic universal generalisation. From what, then, does one infer that 
the stone falls to the earth? There are two answers someone might 
give. 
Answer One: One uses induction. On most occasions in the past unsup- 
ported heavy objects fell to the earth, so on this occasion 
also the stone falls to the earth. . 
Answer Two: One still assumes that it is a non-accidental but not 
necessarily universal generalisation that unsupported heavy 
objects fall. to the earth, and from that assumption one infers 
that the stone falls to the earth. 
It is not within the scope of my thesis to provide an account 
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of induction. (By 'induction' I do not mean any non-deductive infer-
ence but simply ordinary induction, of which the paradigm is 'All the 
crows I have seen have been black so the next one I see will be 
black'.) 	I shall merely claim, without argument, that to use induc- 
tion commits one to the belief that the regularity being projected is 
not accidental and so can be treated as a non-accidental generalisa-
tion. But is this generalisation a probabilistic law? I suggest it 
is not. If asked what would happen if, •a thousand years ago, a stone' 
remained ten feet above the earth, one does not suppose a new universe 
with new laws. Rather, one uses the actual "laws" to infer from the 
supposed circumstances that the stone which is now thrown upwards, 
falls back to the earth. But one cannot make reliable inferences from 
self-contradictory premises. The solution to this difficulty is to 
accept Answer Two, namely, that the law is converted into a non-
accidental generalisation from which it is inferred non-deductively 
that the stone which is now thrown upwards will fall to the earth. 
In particular, I consider that Nagel's meta-inference account of 
counterfactuals needs to be modified. He says: 
A counterfactual can be interpreted as an • 
implicit metalinguistic statement ... 
asserting that the indicative form of its 
consequent clause follows logically from 
the indicative form of its antecedent clause, 
when the latter is conjoined with some law 
and 9g requisite initial conditions for the 
law. j 
However, one would accept as correct the counterfactual 'If a thousand 
years ago a stone had, for no reason, stayed two minutes above the 
. earth, and if (now) a stone were thrown upwards then this stone would 
fall to earth', in which the conjunction of the antecedent clause with 
the law that all heavy unsupported objects fall to the earth is self- 
75. 	Nagel, E., op.cit., p.72. 
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contradictory. 
8.2 The Logic of Non-accidental *Generalisations 
Typically a law, that is a nomic universal generalisation, is 
of the form L( (x 1)(x2)...(xn)F(x1 ,x2 ,...xn) ) that is 'Necessarily for 
all xl for all x2 , ... for all xn, F(x...,xn)' where F(xl ,... xn) is 
a formula with free variables xl ...xn , no bound variables, and no 
proper names, and L is the modal operator 'of nomic necessity'. One 
could write L( (x 1)...(xn)F(x1 ,...,xn) ) as LUF(xl ,...,xn) where LU 
is the combination of modal operator and as many universal quantifiers 
as are required. 
For a non-accidental generalisation, instead of the operator LU 
one has the operator NA where NAF(x xn) 	an abbreviation for 
'It is not an accident that for almost all x ..., and for almost all 
If one supposes that a sentence p is true and p 
does not entail any "departure" from the non-accidental generalisations, i 
one can use the rule of inference: 
NAF(xl , 	xn) 
F(al , ..., an); 
where al ,...,an are either names of individuals or unique referring 
expressions. 
If one can then deduce q from the conjunction of p and F(al,...,an), 
one can assert the meta-inference conditional 'If p then q'. In 
this situation there is no departure from Nagel's account, in which 
one deduces q from p and the laws of Nature. 
However, when p does entail "departures" from the non-accidental 
generalisations, another form of inference is required. One might 
attempt to use Probability Theory to provide the inferences. But, as 
Illavealre"yargued )is not to be considered a 
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probabilistic statement. For example, suppose F(x,y) is: 
If x and y are two objects.theY attract each other 
with a force proportional to the product of their 
masses and inversely proportional to the square of 
their distance apart'; 
NAF(x,y) is not to be interpreted as: 
If x and y are two objects it is highly likely that they 
attract each other with a force proportional to the 
product of their masses and inversely proportional to 
the square of their distance apart.' 
However, one might want to rank non-accidental generalisations - some 
are more fundamental than others. So one might assign some numerical 
strength to NAF(xl,...,xn) and thus obtain 'Deg(NAF(x l ,...,xn) ) = z' 
as an abbreviation for: 
The non-accidental generalisation NAF(xl, 	xn) has a 
degree z of fundamentality. 
In the example discussed in reply to Objection One in Section 
Seven, 76 I considered four generalisations, corresponding to the 
conditionals: 
if a piece of iron is hot, it has been subjected to 
an H-process. 
If a piece of iron is hot, it glows. 
If a piece of iron glows, it is hot. 
If a piece of iron glows, :It has been subjected to 
an H-process. 
I suggested that (4) was not a non-accidental generalisation. But 
perhaps it would be more correct to say that (4) is of a lower degree 
of fundamentality than (1), so when exceptions to (1) and (4) are 
contrasted with exceptions to '(1) and (2) one has -merely to compare 
76. See pp. 104-106. 
--- 
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the degrees of fundamentality of (2) and (4). 	Now (4) is derived 
been no H-process but the iron glowed then it would not be hot'. In 
this way, by considering the degrees of fundamentality of the non-
accidental generalisations, one can formulate a method of non-deductive 
inference from a sentence p and the non-accidental generalisations 
even when p entails some "departure" from the non-accidental general-
isations. In situations where no methods of non-deductive inference 
are permitted from p and the non-accidental generalisations other than 
that indicated in this section, I call the meta-inference conditional 
a restricted meta-inference conditional. Pestricted meta-inference 
conditionals provide, I suggest, the appropriate modification of 
Nagel's account for situations in which one is to suppose "exceptions" 
to the laws of Nature. 
Note: 	I do not propose to give an analysis of the notion of funda- 
mentality. 	There is however a mark of the degree of fundamentality 
afa non-accidental generalisation, namely the support of that general-
isation. 77 A non-accidental generalisationwhiCheither has very many. 
instances or is derivable from another non-accidental generalisatibn 
with very many instances is said to have a large support and may 
usually be assumed to have a high degree of fundamentality. If a 
non-accidental generalisation (Nagi) is derived from several non-
accidental generalisations Nag 2 ,...,Nagn , with many instances, Nagi 
derives some support from Nag2 ,...,Nagn but not as much as if it 
were derivable from Nag 2 , say, alone. 
77. The notion of support is discussed in greater detail on 
pp. 166-168. 
1. 
from (1) and (3). So, if (2) and (3) have the same degree of 
fundamentality, one might expect (4) to have a lower degree of funda-
mentality than (2). Thus one obtains the counterfactual 'If there had 	7 
A 
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Section Nine: 
	
	The Conditionals Used in the Conditional Analysis 
of Causation  
In Section Eight I sketched an account of meta-inference condi-
tionals based on non-deductive inferences based on the degrees of 
fundamentality of non-accidental generalisations. In this section 
I argue that such a meta-inference account of conditionals is appro-
priate for the conditionals used in the analysis of causation. 
It has been proposed by, for instance, Mackie that one should • _ 	. 
not consider causal statements to be true or false, but as they are 
usually considered to be true or false it seems best to avoid giving 
an account of the conditionals used in the analysis of causation in 
terms of condensed argument or supposition/assertion conditionals. 
(If one were to deny that causal sentences had truth values, one 
would interpret my account of causation as one which gives necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a causal sentence to be commonly said 
to be true.) Hence I consider only rationality-judgment conditionals 
and meta-inference conditionals. 	The apparent advantage of the 
former is that one might hope to give an account involving laws of 
Nature rather than an account involving non-accidental generalisations. 
For antecedent beliefs are modified by new evidence; a (hypothetical) 
rational man who is assumed to have, as antecedent beliefs, the 
correct beliefs about laws of Nature, would modify these (correct) 
beliefs if he were asked to suppose, as new evidence, some situation 
inconsistent with the laws of Nature. 
I now argue that the conditionals required for the analysis of 
causation are the restricted meta-inference conditionals discusied 
in Section Eight. I assume that the conditionals of the form 'If p 
then q' used in the analysis of causation are rationality -judgment 
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conditionals and I then show that qualifications have to be made which 
eventually render the rationality-judgment conditional indistinguish-
able from a restricted .meta-inference conditional. Thus I assume 
that person P with antecedent beliefs 13 is given new evidence p and 
then judges that it is rational to believe q. I show that the follow-
ing qualifications must be made. 
P's antecedent beliefs contain beliefs about the non-accidental 
generalisations. 
P's antecedent beliefs about the non-accidental generalisations 
are not necessarily those which P would rationally believe on all the 
past evidence. Rather, P's antecedent beliefs must contain all the 
correct non-accidental generalisations (that is, those which actually 
occur). 
Suppose there were new evidence p such that P should alter his 
(correct) beliefs about the non-accidental generalisations. In order 
that the analysis of causation in terms of rationality-judgment condi-
tionals should succeed, it would then have to be stipulated that P's 
antecedent beliefs about the non-accidental generalisations are not 
altered. 
When P makes his judgment of rationality there is no room for 
any kind of non-deductive inference other than those used in restrict-
ed meta-inference conditionals. Furthermore, if there were room for 
other kinds of non-deductive inference, it would have to be stipu-
lated that these other kinds of non-deductive inference are not used 
when P makes his judgmen'uf' rationality. 
Step One: Suppose a powerful electro-magnet (which needs to be. 
switched on for two minutes before it operates) is switched on and two 
minutes later a nearby compass needle moves. A second before the 
compass needle moved there was a slight earth tremor. Someone 
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ignorant of the laws of electricity and magnetism might rationally 
deny that switching the electromagnet on caused the compass needle 
to move. This example shows that for the conditionals used in the 
analysis of causation to be rationality-judgment conditionals, P must 
not be ignorant of any relevant noa-accidental generalisations. 
Step Two: 	Suppose that P's antecedent beliefs were based on many 
earlier observations. In that case it is conceivable that there could 
beaccidentatuniversal generalisations which P 'rationally but incor-
rectly believes to be non-accidental. For example, suppose that the 
law of gravitational attraction is a probabilistic law: the force 
between two massive objects fluctuates at random corresponding to a 
small but detectable variation in the universal gravitational "con-
stant", G. Suppose, however, that there is excellent evidence that 
no such fluctuations occur. 	Nonetheless, given a probabilistic law 
for the variation of G it is possible, though extremely unlikely, 
that by chance, in the whole (finite) universe G has been constant 
at all times, but at each moment it was highly unlikely that it would 
remain constant. Hence it is conceivable that G fluctuates, yet it 
is rational to believe that G is constant. 	Now if the conditionals 
used in the analysis of causation are licensed by what one rationally 
believed were laws or non-accidental generalisations, then the 
analysans and analysandum might have different truth-values. For 
example, if it is slaw that G fluctuates at random, but by accident 
G has been constant, then it would be false that firing the rocket 
precisely in direction D precisely with velocity v caused it to land 
on the Moon. For the chance of the rocket landing on the Moon. would 
be much the sane even if the direction varied somewhat from D, or 
the velocity from v; it is purely an accident that the rocket 
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landed on the Noon. 	But the proposed analysandum 'Assuming the 
laws of Nature are as they are rationally believed to be, if the 
rocket had not been fired precisely in direction D precisely with 
velocity v, the rocket would not have landed on the Moon' would be 
true. Hence the antecedent beliefs B should contain the non-acci-
dental generalisations which actually occur, not merely those in which 
it would be rational to believe on earlier evidence. 
Again, one might argue that it is conceivable that there is a 
law such that if either a physical event of type P 1 or a physical 	;. .0 t 
event of type P 2 occurs, then there would be a pain. But, by chance, 	t 4, • 1 
physical events of type P 2 have only occurred once and will never recur. 
In that case one might argue that the unique event of type P 2 caused 
a pain. But it would not be rational to believe in such a law unless 
it could not be derived from other laws. However, I have doubts 
about the coherence of such examples based on unique causation and 
therefore I rely on the first argument in Step Two to show that the 
conditionals used in the analysis of causation are based on the actual 
laws or non-accidental generalisations and not merely on general-
alisations which it is rational to believe are not accidental. 
Step Three: Assume that, as in my version of the Conditional Analysis, 
the conditionals used in the analysis of causation are of the form, 
'In the circumstances, if p then q'. It follows that P is asked to 
suppose as new evidence not only p but also the circumstances. 	In 
the account I have given (Nec 5 and Suff 5), the circumstances include 
all past quasi-events, so it is unavoidable that the new evidence, 
which P is asked to suppose, contains all that happens before the cause. 
So the circumstances might contain evidence which would make it 
rational for P to modify his (correct) beliefs about the laws of 
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Nature (or non-accidental generalisations). For example, if the 
universal gravitational constant fluctuates at random, the past 
history might contain evidence which seems overwhelmingthat G does 
not fluctuate, and P would accordingly modify his (correct) antece-
dent belief that G fluctuates at random. Thus one would have to sti-
pluate that P's (correct) beliefs about non-accidental generalisations 
are not altered by new evidence. But one of the characteristic diff-
erences between rationality-iudgment conditionals and meta-inference 
. 	- conditionals (noted in Chapter One, Section Three 78  ) Is tnat in 
rationality-judgment conditionals the antecedent beliefs can be 
modifi0 by new evidence. 
Note: If one could give some account of when a factor is prima facie 
causally relevant, one could restrict the circumstances to prima 
facie causally relevant factors. •Even with this modification there 
could nonetheless be circumstances containing evidence which should 
alter the (correct) antecedent beliefs about the non-accidental 
generalisations. For example, suppose that there are a hundred iso- 
lated valleys in Asia where a certain species of bamboo grows. Every' 
twenty years all the bamboo plants flower and die. The bamboos flower 
first in a. valley in Sikkim, they flower last in a valley in Manchuria. 
The valleys have been isolated for a million years. Suppose that 
there is an emergent law that when one bamboo plant flowers all others 
of that species flower within three months. Suppose also Chat there 
are laws that the flowering time of the bamboo plants in Sikkim 
varies at random from ten to thirty years, and that the bamboo plants 
in,Sikkim are always the first to flower. So it is merely an 
accident that the bamboo plants flower every twenty years. In this 
78. See Note Two on p.50. 
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case the flowering of the bamboo plants in Sikkim causes the flowering 
r, 	of the bamboo plants in Manchuria. But one would rationally assume 
that the coincidence of the flowering time is due to all the bamboo 
plants having a single ancestor a million years ago; that is, there 
is a collateral effects situation. Therefore one would consider the 
flowering times of all the ancestors of the bamboo plants in the two 
valleys for the past million years to be prima facie causally relevant 
and hence part of the circumstances. It follows that, even if P only. 
supposes the prima facie relevant circumstances, P has sufficient 
evidence to modify his (correct) antecedent belief in the emergent 
law. Thus P would deny the :-.orrect) conditional 'In the circum-
stances, if the bamboos in Sikkim had not flowered the bamboos in 
Manchuria would not have flowered lin the same year]'. 
Step. Four: 	I now argue that there is no room in the rationality- 
judgment conditional for any inference other than deduction and the 
non-deductive inferences used in the restricted meta-inference 
conditionals. Suppose one tried to use ordinary induction. For 
example, it has happened that whenever a certain species of insect 
has bitten a certain species of vine, the vine ceases to twine anti-
clockwise and thereafter twines clockwise. If P has evidence that 
there have been such changes in the direction of twining and if there 
was room for induction, P would conclude that the biting of the 
insect causes' the change in direction of the vine. Yet it might be 
a mere accident that the biting of insects is correlated with changes 
in the direction of the vine. So if there were room for inductive 
inferences, one would have to rule out the use of induction anyway, 
and thus one would have an argument for considering only restricted 
meta-inference conditionals. However, there is no room for such a 
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use of induction, for P believes all the non-accidental general-
isations and so he is able to infer that the biting of the insect is 
causally irrelevant to the twining of the vine. 
Suppose next that psycho -physical parallelism is correct; that 
there are psychic laws governing the relation between mental events, 
and physical laws governing the relation between physical events, but 
no psycho-physical laws governing their interaction. Suppose, however, 
that there is a harmony between mental and physical events. It might . 
then be argued that in such a world it would be rational to assume 
that there are psycho-physical laws. If one did make that assumption 
one would consider that a physical event was necessary in the circum-
stances for the pain, which would be false. So once again, if there 
is room for rationality-judgments other than those based on the non-
deductive inference from non-accidental generalisations discussed in 
Section Eight, then one has to exclude such rationality-judgments 
when giving an analysis of causation. However, even in this case, 
one can argue that there is no room for the (incorrect) assumption 
that there are psycho-physical laws. For P is not to modify his 
beliefs about the fundamentality of the psychic and the physical laws; 
yet if there are also psycho-physical laws, surely either the psychic 
or the physical laws cease to be as fundamental. 
This argument in four steps shows that the conditionals re-
quired fol: my analysis of causation are indistinguishable from , 
restricted meta-inference conditionals. A typical conditional occur-
ring in the anlaysis of causation (Nee 5) would be: 
From the correct non-accidental generalisations and 
the assumpt:on that all quasi-events occur which 
actually occur earlier than Y and which are distinct 
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existences fromX and Y, and from the non-occurrence 
of X, one can infer (using deduction and the 
inferences discussed in Section Eight) that Y does 
not occur. 
Note One: 	In the above conditional it is important that the non• 
accidental generalisations be referred to by the phrase 'the correct 
non-accidental generalisations' rather than explicitly listed. For 
if one supposed that the non-accidental generalisations were other 
than they actually are, then the inference would have to be made 
from the hypothetical non-accidental generalisations (in the analysis 
of a hypothetical case of cause and effect). For the same reason, 
the circumstances are referred to using the clause 'which actually 
occur' rather than explicitly listed. 
Note Two: The conditionals 'If p, then q is highly likely' used in 
the Sufficiency Thesis can, I claim, also be treated as restricted 
meta-inference conditionals using, if necessary, probabilistic non-
accidental generalisations. The kind of probability involved might 
be either statistical or physical depending on whether the non-acci-
dental generalisation is of the form: 
It is not an accident that a proportion a of 
quasi-events of kind K are followed by quasi-events 
of kind J 
or of the form: 
An event of kind K has a propensity a to be followed 
by an event of kind J. 
In each case a is near 1, say 99%. 
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—Section Ten: The FeatUreS'On which Causation is Supervenient 
The inferences discussed in Section Eight are, I claim, per-
formed according to fixed rules, so whether the inference can be 
made depends only on the premises and the conclusion. Hence on this 
account of causation the features on which causation (relative to some 
given causal field) is supervenient are some or all of: 
The occurrence and distinct existences of X and Y 
The correct non-accidental generalisations and 
their degrees of fundamentality 
'(3) The quasi-events occurring no later than Y 
I claim that given the causal field, whether X and Y are distinct 
existences is supervenient on which quasi-events X and Y are. So 
the features on which X causing Y is supervenient are contained in 
the non-accidental generalisations, their degrees of fundamentality, 
and the history of the world no later than X and Y. 
Note One: 	The supervenience of the relation of being distinct 
existences is shown by the impossibility of conceiving of two pairs 
of events, identical in all respects except that the events of one 
pair but not of the other are distinct existences. 
Note Two: 	Although this account Of causation is in terms of non- 
- accidental generalisations it is compatible with the claim that there 
is no irreducible non-accidental generality "in the objects", Thus 
I claim that the Conditional Analysis is compatible with the Regular-
ity Account which I shall develop in the next chapter. 
Note Three: 	The Conditional Analysis is also compatible with the 
claim that all non-accidental generalisations are, in fact, universal 
and hence laws of Nature. It is only within the antecedents of 
counterfactuals that one has to suppose that laws of Nature are 
broken (and hence not laws). 
CHAPTER THREE 
CAUSATION AND REGULARITIES 
Introduction  
This chapter is in two parts. 	In Part One I discuss 
what kind of regularity account one might expect to obtain and I reply 
in general terms to some objections which might be raised to any 
regularity account of causation. In Section One I discuss to what 
extent the Conditional Analysis might be used to support some kind 
of regularity account. In Section Two I consider what kind of regu-
larity should be used in the Regularity Account. In Section Three 
I discuss the future-dependence of causation, to which a regularity 
theorist is committed, and I argue that the Regularity Account does 
not satisfy the Analysis-criterion, but merely the Reduction-Criterion. 
In Section Four I discuss whether accidental regularities raise in-
superable difficulties for a regularity account of causation. 
Part Two is based on Chapter Three of Mackie's The Cement 
of the Universe. . In Section Five I give a brief exposition of 
Hackie's account. I then propose, in Section Six, a reduction of 
causation to regularities, based on Mackie's account. Using the 
method of counter-examples, in Sections Seven to Ten I successively 
modify the reduction in order to cope with a wide range of proposed 
counter-examples. 
As in Chapter Two, I ignore the possibility of backwards 
causation. 
My aim in providing a regularity reduction of causation 
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is to examine to what a metaphysician is committed if, in the tradition 
of Hume, he claims that causation "in the objects" is nothing but 
the occurrence of various regularities, or that causation is super-
venient on regularities. Only by considering a wide range of pro-
posed counter-examples can one discover the extent of the commitment 
of a regularity theorist. 
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PART ONE 
Section  One: 	The Conditional Analysis and Regularities  
One approach to a regularity account of causation would be 
to claim as part of a metaphysical hypothesis that non-accidental 
generalisations are systematically correlated with non-accidental 
regularities. 	One would then seek those features of non-accidental 
regularities on which their non-accidental character is supervenient. , 	. 
Such an approach would involve the following: 
A discussion of examples (actual or hypothetical) in which the 
*non-accidental generalisation has no instance (or very few instances, 
and so, perhaps, does not count as a regularity. This situation would 
occur if there were examples of unique causation. 
A discussion of (actual or hypothetical) examples in which there 
are regularities which are not correlated with non-accidental general-
isations. These I call accidental regularities. 
A discussion of some notion, such as the support of a regularity, 
which is used to provide an account of the degree of fundamentality 
of a non-accidental generalisation. 
Although I do not adopt this approach, my discussion of unique 
causation, 2 accidental regularities,
3 and the support of a regular-
ity, 4  could be adapted to the defence of a regularity account along 
these lines. Roughly, I argue that the notion of the support of a 
regularity enables one to permit some regularities with only one 
By a regularity I mean a (universal or almost universal) 
generalisation with many instances. I later stipulate that 
in some cases a regularity may have only one instance. 
See pp. 165,166. 
See p.165 and pp.168,169. 	4. See pp. 166-168. 
; 
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instance (or with even no instances), and that, using this notion, 
one can distinguish (some) accidental from non-accidental regularities. 
The remaining examples of unique causation and accidental regularities 
can, I suggest, reasonably be rejected; this rejection is part of 
the regularity theorist's metaphysical hypothesis. Hence one could 
obtain an account of causation which satisfies the reduction-criterion 
but not the analysis-criterion. 	In this account, 'X causes Y' is 
supervenient on all the regularities and all the quasi-events occur-
ring before the later of X and Y. 
The approach I do adopt is to give an account of causation 
directly in terms of regularities, without considering the quasi-events 
occurring before the cause and effect (except as part of the distinct 
existences requirement). Such an approach has two advantages. The 
first is that if some successful objection is made to the Conditional 
Analysis the success of the Regularity Account is not jeopardised. 
The second advantage is that causal chains are not required, so the 
account is quite satisfactory even if one is considering the occur-
rence of point-events (rather than quasi-events, the location of 
which is a finite region of space-time). 
Section Two:  The Kind of Regularity being Considered 
2.1 	T. claim that it is preferable to give a regularity account 
in terms of all the actual regularities, not merely those which are, 
at some time, observed or Which are inferred from observations. Con-
sider the following example. 	Suppose that there is an object with 
the mass of a whole galaxy but which is in size no greater than :a 
pin-head. Suppose also that in this object events of kinds K and J 
occur, which never have been nor ever will be observed and the occur-
rence of which could not be inferred from observations. Finally, 
I 
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suppose that events of kind K are regularly followed by events of 
kind J. 	Surely there is some causal connection between the K and 
the c7 (cause and effect or collateral effects). It would seem exces-
sively ad hoc to deny the existence of such unobserved regularities 
as part of one's metaphysical hypothesis; therefore, the account 
should be based on the actual regularities. . In addition, one might 
argue that there would be causation even if there were no observers 
(presumably, the regularity theorist is not committed to Phenomenal-
ism). 
2.2 	I now argue in favour of permitting time-dependent regularities 
when analysing causation, from which it follows that the account of 
regularities given in Chapter One was oversimplified. 5 Consider the 
following hypothetical examples. 
Example One: 	After 1700 A.D., and before 1100 A.D., whenever .a 
certain kind of physical event (a P-event) has occurred in the brain, 
the person has felt pain. But no one ever felt pain between 1100 A.D. 
and 1700 A.D. 	Here I assume that it is coherent to speak of a'person 
showing pain-behaviour (including the utterance of 'I am in pain') 
without being in pain. Furthermore, in the year 1990 a form of acu-
puncture will be discovered enabling people to easily control the 
occurrence of P-events. Pain will then be produced or prevented by 
producing or preventing P-events. I also assume that all methogs 
for controlling pain work by preventing the occurrence of P-events. 
In this case, it seems that after 1700 or before 1100 A.D. 
every P-event caused a pain. Yet the only available regularity for 
a regularity account is time-dependent. 
Example Two: 	For half an hour every fourteen hours rubbing 
5. 	See P. 45. 
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cinnibar on an opal is followed by the cinnibar turning into gold. 
This discovery is used to manufacture gold from cinnibar. It is to 
be assumed that there is no condition which happens to cccur only in 
the half hour periods. In this case, surely one would say that rub-
bing the cinnibar on theopal caused it to turn into gold. Yet the 
only available regularity is time-dependent. 
Now if these examples are coherent, the correlations might be 
described as time-dependent regularities. Yet, on the account of 
regularities given in Chapter One, there could be no time-dependent 
regularities. The question of what one calls these time-dependent 
correlatThns is not however important. What is important lo whether 
they are to be considered as regularities for the purpose of the 
Regularity Account. If they are not considered to be regularities, 
then the regularity theorist would be committed to denying that there 
is any causal relation. 	This seems odd. 	It would not be excess- 
ively ad hoc simply to deny as part of one's metaphysical hypothesis, 
that time-dependent regularities do occur; nonetheless, it seems 
better to avoid an unnecessary metaphysical hypothesis, using if 
required time-dependent regularities in the account of causation. 
As in Chapter One, I stipulate that quasi-events are to be 
described in such a way - that any change made in their position in 
space-time would result in the description of some possible quasi-
event. However I now permit time-dependent regularities. 	Foe 
instance I permit regularities which are restricted to the union of 
some suitable, simply described, sequence of temporal intervals. 
Note: 	In this case, some rule is required such as the rule that 
the more complicated is the sequence of temporal intervals the larger 
is the number of instances of the correlation which is required for 
it to be considered a regularity. 
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2.3 	In Section 2.2 I 
the use of regularities 
might be suggested that 
stricted regularities. 
have permitted, in the account of causation, 
which are spatio-temporally restricted. It 
one should always use spatio-temporally re-
There is, however, no obvious advantage in so 
doing, and I now point out some difficulties with three restrictions 
that might be proposed. 
Proposal One: 	The regularities are to be spatially restricted to 
events occurring at or near the earth's surface. 
Discussion: The obvious difficulty with this proposal is that one 
should not deny that there could be causal relations between events 
which are quite unlike those which occtr on the Earth (see the example 
in Section 2.1). 
Proposal Two: 	The regularities are to be temporally restricted to 
those occurring no later than the cause and the effect. 
Discussion: The difficulty with this proposal is that in some cases 
the regularity theorist is committed to the future-dependence of 
causation (discussed more fully in Section Three). For example, 
suppose that there are two simultaneous initial events A 
lowed by a third event C. Suppose also that, throughout 
of the universe, events like A are regularly followed by 
and B fol-
the history 
events like 
C and events like C are regularly preceded by events like A. Suppose 
also that events like, C are not regularly preceded by events like B 
and that events like B are not regularly followed by events lice C. 
Then, surely, A causes C but B does not cause C (nor do A and B over-
determine C). So, in this case, the truth of 'A causes C' is, on 
the Regularity Account, dependent on events occurring after A and C. 
The regularity theorist could avoid the future-dependence of causation 
only at the cost of either the denial that there are initial events 
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or the denial that there is a causal relation between initial events. 
In either case Proposal Two commits the regularity theorist to the 
inclusion in his metaphysical hypothesis of an unnecessary and ad hoc 
stipulation. 
Proposal Three: 	The regularities are to be restricted to those 
holding earlier than the utterance (or thought) of 'X causes Y T . 
Discussion: 	The difficulty with this proposal is that it makes the 
truth of causal sentences depend on their utterance at some time or 
other. But it would beunnecessary and ad hoc if the regularity theor-
ist were to exclude causal relations which have not been and which 
will not be discovered. 
2.4 	Finally, I claim that the regularities need not correspond to 
universal generalisations; it suffices that there are few exceptions 
(other than, perhaps, those due to imanent causation). The purpose 
of this proviso is to avoid unnecessary commitments on the part of 
the regularity theorist. However, for the sake of simplicity, I 
usually assume that the regularities do correspond to universal 
generalisations. 
Section Three: 	The Future-dependence of Causation  
In this section, first I examine the commitment of the regu-
larity theorist to the future-dependence of causation. Then I.show 
that the Regularity Account can be expected to satisfy only the 
Reduction-criterion, not the Analysis-criterion. 
3.1 The Future-dependence of Causation  
The regularity theorist is committed to the thesis that the 
truth of some causal sentences depends on the occurrence of events 
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later than both the cause and effect. 6 Consider the following two 
arguments. 
Argument One: 	If an initial event X causes an event Y, the required 
regularity (events like X are followed by events like Y) depends on 
events occurring later than both X and Y. An example of this situation 
was discussed in Section 2.3. 
Argument Two: 	Suppose that a certain regularity holds up to, say, 
the year 2,000 A.D. 	Whether or not it is accidental might depend on • 
events occurring after the year 2,000 A.D. An example of this situation 
is as follows. Suppose that this universe is spatially finite and that 
it came into existence 10,000,000,000 years ago and will cease to exist 
in the year 2,000 A.D. Suppose that throughout this universe (suffici-
ently) heated water always boils. Presumably, the regularity theorist 
would consider this to be a non-accidental regularity and would say 
that heating water causes it to boil. Now consider another universe 
exactly like the first for 10,000,000,000 years but which continues 
to exist for another 10,000,000,000 years after the year 2,000 A.D. 
In the second universe the regularity 'Sufficiently heated water boils' 
only holds up to the year 2,000 A.D. After 2,000 A.D. there is an 
extremely low, but positive (say one in 1,000,000,000), frequency of 
cases in which heated water boils, and there is an extremely high 
frequency of cases in which heated water freezes. In the second 
universe one would say that there was a non-accidental time -deper,Ident 
regularity that heated water boils for the first 10,000,000,000 years. 
Consider yet a third universe which is exactly like the first and 
second universes up to the year 2,000 A.D. but which continues inde-
finitely after the year 2,000 A.D. In the third universe (as in the 
second) after the year 2,000 A.D. there is an extremely low, but 
positive (one in 1,000,000,000), frequency of cases in which heated 
6. 	This point is due to W.D. Joske. 
J-34.. 
water boils. Relative to the knowledge that there is a one in 
1,000,000,000 frequency of cases in which heated water boils, It is 
highly probable that eventually there is 
years throughout which, by chance, heated 
that in the third universe one should not 
accidental time-dependent regularity that 
some interval of 10,000,000,000 
water boils. I suggest 
say that there is a non-
heated water boils for the 
first 10,000,000,000 years. Rather, one would say that it was an 
accident that for 10,000,000,000 years 
parison of these three universes shows 
accidental or not might depend on what 
heated water boils. The cam-
that whether a regularity is 
happens in the distant future. 
Therefore, the truth of 'Heating the water caused it to boil 
year 1978)' depends on what happens billions of years hence. 
(in the 
3.2 -- 
that the future-dependende of causation is Counter-intuitive. 
this subsection I reply to this objection. 
First I define hypothetical and categorical future-dependence 
as follows. 
Definition: A sentence p apparently about events X and Y (for example, 
'X causes Y') is said to be hypothetically future-
dependent if there is some true sentence q which is 
about events later than X and Y, such that the counter- 
Note: 
factual 'If -q, -p' is correct. 
I do not assume that the above counterfactual is necessarily 
  
one of the kinds discussed in Chapters One and Two. 
Someone might object to the Regularity Account on the grounds 
In 
A sentence p is said to be categorically future-depend-
ent if the truth or falsity is not fixed (determined) 
at the time of the events which p is apparently about. 
Definition:  
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Note:  A sentence may be both hypothetically and categorically 
future-dependent. 
Example One:  If it is now fixed that no atom bomb will be used 
again in warfare, then the sentence 'The last atom bomb ever to be 
used in warfare was dropped on Nagasaki' is hypothetically but not 
categorically future-dependent. 
Example Two: 	Suppose that backwards causation is coherent and that 
a later event X causes an earlier event Y. The occurrence of Y - like 
any other event - is fixed no later than the time of its occurrence. 
Hence the sentence 'Y occurs' is not categorically future-dependent. 
However, the sentence 'Y occurs' is hypothetically future-dependent 
for X causes Y and so the counterfactual 'If X will not occur, Y does 
not occur' is correct. 
Example Three: 	Suppose that the occurrence of some event X is abso- 
lutely sufficient in the circumstances for the occurrence of some 
event of kind K - not merely probabilistically sufficient. Suppose 
that one treats the sentence 'X will cause some event of kind K' as • 
'a sentence about X rather than about events of kind K. The counter-
factual 'If no event of kind K will occur then X will not cause an 
event of kind K' is correct (the occurrence of the effect is a. neces-
sary condition for there to be a causal relation). Hence the sentence 
'X will cause an event of kind K" is .hypothetically future-dependent. 
But this sentence is not categorically future-dependent because the 
occurrence of X is absolutely sufficient in the circumstances for the 
occurrence of some event of kind K. 
I now claim that only the categorical, future-dependence of 
causation would be sufficiently counter-intuitive to warrant the 
rejection of the Regularity Account. First notice that on any version 
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of the Regularity Account the truth of 'X causes Y' depends on there 
being a regularity 'Events like X are followed by events like Y', and 
hence depends on events which are not in the spatio -temporal vicinity 
of X and Y. I suggest that the hypothetical future-dependence of the 
sentence 'X causes Y' is merely one aspect of this dependence of causal 
sentences on events not occurring in the spatio-temporal vicinity of 
the cause and effect. Therefore, the hypothetical future-dependence 
of the sentence 'X causes Y' is no more peculiar than the dependence 
of that sentence on events occurring earlier than X and Y,, or. on events 
occurring some distance away from X and Y. It follows that theintuition 
that causation is not future-dependent, unless it is accompanied by an 
intuition that causation is only dependent on events in the spatio-
temporal vicinity of the cause and effect, is an intuition that causation 
is not categorically future-dependent. 
It remains to show that the future-dependence of causation is 
not categorical. 	If One could assume that Determinism is correct 
one could argue as follows: 
If, on the Regularity Account, X causes Y then there 
is a regularity such as 'All (quasi-)events qualitatively 
identical to X are followed by Cquasi-)events qualitat- 
ively identical to Y'. This regularity is fixed at the 
time of X, since all events are fixed at the time of X. 
Notice that the regularity theorist is .assuming a hypothesis stated 
for the sake of simplicity in causal terms: Strictly speaking, the 
regularity theorist is assuming that the regularity reduction of 
Determinism is correct. 
However, the regularity theorist need only assume that it is 
fixed (either eternally or by the initial state of the universe) that 
all those regularities which, on the Regularity Account, are non- 
accidental have enough instances to be deemed regularities. For it 
is a consequence of the Regularity Account itself that the general-
isations which correspond to those regularities deemed non-accidental 
are non-accidental generalisations (that is, roughly speaking, laws 
of Nature) and hence are eternally fixed. So the occurrence of a 
regularity is fixed as soon as it is fixed that the generalisation 
has enough instances. Again, this account involves the notion of 
fixity which is a causal notion. Thus the account should be replaced . 
by its rather complicated regularity reduction. 
Note One: 	I later permit regularities with only one instance pro- 
vided they are supported by regularities with many instances. 7  The 
supporting regularities need only concern sub-microscopic events. 
Consequently, the regularity theorist only has to claim that it is 
eternally fixed that the universe exists long enough for every "funda-
mental law", relating sub-microscopic instances, to have many instances. 
Note Two: The dependence of causation on events occurring outside 
the spatio-temporal vicinity of cause and effect is compatible with 
there being marks of causation which can be observed in the vicinity 
of the cause and the effect (for example, one could use the Ducasse 
criterion). The regularity theorist might give an explanation of 
the reliability of the Ducasse criterion as follows. Rational animals 
could only have evolved from animals of fairly low intelligence which 
nonetheless display purposive behaviour. It is plausible that such 
animals could not display purposive behaviour unless they could spot 
causal situations. Hence rational creatures could only evolve in an 
environment where the Ducasse criterion - or a similar criterion= 
was fairly reliable. 
7. 	See p. 166. 
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3.3 The Criterion which the Regularity Account Satisfies  
The reply in Section 3.2 to the objection that the future-
dependence of causation is counter-intuitive was based on the claim 
that it is fixed that the universe exists for a sufficient length of 
time. I now use this observation to show that the Regularity Account 
does not satisfy the Analysis-criterion. 8 The metaphysical theory 
that there are irreducibly nomic universal generalisations is, I sug-
gest, a coherent one. On that theory there could be two universes in 
each of which an initial event X is followed by another event Y and 
in each of which the universe then ceases to exist. In one of these 
universes it is nomicany necessary that X is followed by 1; in the 
other it is not. So in one of the universes X causes Y, in the other 
universe xdoes not cause Y. But the regularity theorist cannot dis-
tinguish between the two universes. Hence there are two conceivable 
situations in which the reductianda differ in truth-values but the 
regularity reductians have the same truth-value. Therefore, the 
Regularity Account does not satisfy the Analysis-criterion. 
Section Four: Accidental Regularities  
Accidental regularities are widely held to raise special dif-
ficulties for a regularity account of causation. Thus Mackie says: 
"The problem ... of distinguishing causal from accidental regularities 
is the great difficulty for any regularity theory of causation." 9 
It seems appropriate to discuss in fairly general terms two objections 
based on the possibility of accidental regularities, before consider-
ing the details of the Regularity Account of causation. 
8. A similar argument could be based on in principle undiscover-
able accidental regularities, see p.140. 
9: Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.196. 
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4.1 	One objection is that if a regularity account is correct there 
is no real, that is mind-independent, difference between non-accidental 
and accidental regularities; laws o. 	are cosmic accidents. 
I do not consider this objection to be .a weighty one; if one has a 
metaphysical hypothesis on which there is no irreducibly causal ele-
ment "in the objects" then it is not surprising that causation does 
not appear in an account of the mind-independent difference between 
causal and accidental regularities. There is, of course, a difference • 
between those regularities which one calls causal or non-accidental 
and those which one calls accidental, but this difference need not be 
described in causal terms. 
Related to this objection is a weightier one to which I now 
reply, namely the objection that the regularity theorisi. is not able 
to give an account of the differences between accidental and non-
accidental regularities, without resorting to nomic necessity or some 
similar notion. I consider three kinds of accidental regularity; in 
each case I show how, if at all, the regularity theorist distinguishes 
them from non-accidental regularities. 
4.2 	Spurious Accidental Regularities  
Some regularities are not accidental but might nonetheless 
loosely be called accidental. For example, Taylor considers a thous-
and specially decorated matches all of which light when struck. 10 
Now suppose someone, who wanted to disprove a regularity theory, en-
sured that all the matches ignited when struck. In that case the 
regularity is not accidental but an example of the collateral effects 
of an agent's activity. The agent could be replaced by a machine, in 
which case the regularity becomes a standard case of collateral effects. 
10. Taylor, R., Action and Purpose, pp. 24, 25. 
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Another example of a spurious accidental regularity which is, in 
fact, an example of collateral effects is the correlation between the 
rising of the star Sirius above the horizon and the flooding of the 
Nile. This regularity is explicable in terms of the time taken for 
the flood to move down the Nile and the regularity of the wet season 
in Ethiopia. 
The regularity-theorist has to show how collateral effect 
situations are distinguished from situations of cause and effect. 
This will be discussed in Sections 7.4 and 10.4. 
4-3 	Accidental Regularities that could not even in Principle  
be Discovered  
Consider again the example of the three universes (Section 3.1 
The realist about nomic necessity could consider a fourth universe 
which, like the first, ceases to exist after 10,000,000,000 years 
but in which it is a law that there is a very low but positive probabi-
lity that heated water boils. By chance, in this universe heated 
water always boils. In this case the regularity_ 'Whenever water is 
sufficiently heated it boils' is accidental, but it could not, even 
in principle, be discovered to be accidental. 
The regularity theorist can, I claim, simply deny that there 
are any such in principle undiscoverable accidental regularities. 
For it is only by supposing that there are laws of Nature of a probabi-
listic kind that one can ensure the coherence of the description of 
a universe in which there are in principle undiscoverable accidental 
regularities. The regularity theorist would deny that there is any 
difference between the fourth universe and the first universe. 
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4.4 In Principle Discoverable Accidental Regularities 	t _ 	_ 
Consider the following example of Mackie's: 
"Suppose that we manufacture a number of 
atomic bombs 	each of which will explode 
if and only if a nuclear disintegrat -)_on of 
a certain kind A occurs spontaneously before 
a nuclear disintegration of some other kind 
B occurs within the same core ... It is a 
matter of pure chance which [bombs] do [explode] 
it just happens that a red spot has been 
painted on all and only the bombs that in 
fact explode." 1 1 
The regularity theorist's account would be weakened if his 
metaphysical hypothesis contained the ad hoc assertion that accidental 
regularities like the one in this example do not occur. For, given 
some random device used only moderately often, it is quite likely 
that one of the many features present in some cases but not in others 
is in fact correlated with one of the results of using the random 
device. For example, consider an experiment designed to test for 
precognitionwhich is used only ten times and in which there is a 
random number generator. It is quite likely that some fairly simple 
feature of the environment happens to be correlated with a particular 
Output of the random number generator, say the occurrence of some 
particular frequencies in the vibrations of the air and the floor 
of the laboratory. 	In this case the objection to the Regularity 
Account is that there is a difference, which is in principle discover-
able, between accidental and non-accidental regularities, but this 
difference cannot be described without resorting to the notion of 
nomic necessity (or a related notion). I now consider four replies 
to this -objection, of which only the last two are satisfactory. 
Reply One: 	The regularity-theorist could insist that regularities 
should have very many instances. 	So, although it is conceivable 
11. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p. 198. 
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that there be accidental regularities, the chance of their occurring 
Is extremely small. 	The regularity theorist would then claim that 
in fact there are no such accidental regularities. Thus, in the above 
example, if the machine is used 1,000 times, the chance of an acci-
dental correlation with simple features of the environment is extremely 
small. 
There are two objections to this reply. The first is that 
there could still be cases of accidental overdetermining regularities.. 
For instance, consider Taylor's example of the decorated matches; 
the accidental regularity that all decorated matches light seems to 
support the claim that the decoration and the dryness overdetermine 
the matches lighting. 	Such accidental regularities could easily occur 
since most matches are dry and consequently light when struck. This 
objection can be handled in various ways; one might require that if 
there is a regularity 'All Ys are preceded by Xs' then 'All Ys are 
preceded by Xs or Zs' is deemed not to be a regularity. (This is a 
consequence of the selection rule stated below in Section Eight 12. ) 
The second objection is that the universe is very large (perhaps 
infinite) so accidental regularities with many instances probably occur 
somewhere. 	For this reason I find the first reply unsatisfactory. 
Reply Two: 	The second reply is that, as part of one's metaphysical 
hypothesis, one can assert that Determinism is correct, and also that 
there is a single initial event. 	In this way, it might be argued, 
all accidental regularities are cases of collateral effects. 
This reply is also unsatisfactory. Determinism is itself a 
causal notion and therefore the regularity theorist should not seek 
to distinguish between accidental and non-accidental (causal) regu- 
12. See p.164. 
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larities in terms of a causal notion. Suppose that events of kind A 
have always been followed by events of kind B. Does the occurrence of 
an A determine the occurrence of a B? Not if the regularity is 
accidental. So until the regularity theorist has distinguished acci-
dental from non-accidental regularities, he cannot give an account of 
the notion of Determinism. 
Reply Three:  I suggest that there are rather general statistical 
regularities of the kind 'Quasi-events of kind K are statistically 
independent of quasi-events of kind J'. (An account of statistical 
independence will be given later.13 ) 	A statistical regularity of 
this kind with very many instances outweighs an ordinary rsgularity 
with few fewer instances. Thus there is a statistical regularity 
that nuclear processes are not influenced by macroscopic events of 
a rather vaguely defined kind, which includes putting spots of paint 
on bombs. 
Reply Four: (considered in greater detail later
14) There are 
fundamental regularities characterised by their simplicity when stated 
in scientific realist terms (that is, involving sub-microscopic events). 
A regularityis accidental unless it is derived from fundamental 
regularities. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of accidental 
regularities in this section. On the one hand, the regularity theor-
ist can give a satisfactory account of the distinction between in 
principle discoverable accidental regularities and non-accidental regu-
larities. 	On the other hand, there is no need for the regularity 
theorist to distinguish between non-accidental regularities and 
accidental regularities that are not even in principle discoverable. 
13. 	See p.168. 	14. 	See p.169. 
.t 
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PART TWO 
Section Five: 	A Brief Exposition of Mackie's Discussion of  
Causal Regularities in Chapter Three of The  
Cement of the Universe. 
Because my regularity account of causation is based on Mackie's 
account of causal regularities, I now briefly expound Mackie's account. 
5.1 	Before discussing to what extent one can give a regularity 
account of causation, Mackie expounds Mill's account of complex 
regularities. 
In Chapter Three of The Cement of the Universe, Mackie uses 
the terms 'necessary condition' and 'sufficient condition' in an 
extensional sense, as follows: 
'X is a necessary condition for Y' means 'Whenever an 
event of type Y occurs, an event of type .X also occurs'; 
an event of type X occurs, an event of type Y also occurs ' . 5  
Given any type of event or situation P one can seek factors, that is 
types of events or situations A, B, C etc. such that whenever all of 
A, B, C etc. occur then a P follows, butnone of the A, B, C etc. are 
redundant. Thus if the occurrence of an A and a B and a C etc. is 
denoted by 'ABC...' and A, B, C etc. are factors for P, then ABC—. 
is sufficient for P and earlier than P. Perhaps there are other suf-
ficient conditions for a P, such as DGH... and JKL.... If it happens 
that P are always preceded by ABC... or by DGH... or by JKL... or 
etc...., then one obtains the complex regularity: 
An (ABC... or DGH... or JKL... or...) is necessary and suf-
ficient for P and followed by a P. 
15. 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.62. 
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For the sake of simplicity Mackie considers the example of a regu-
larity: 
• An (ABC or DGH or JKL) is necessary and sufficient for a 
P and is followed by a P. 
ABC is then a minimal sufficient condition in the sense that no part 
of ABC is also sufficient for P. A is, in general, an insufficient 
but non-redundant part of ABC which is, in turn, an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition for a P. Mackie calls A an inus condition for 
16 	 . P. 	Some of the factors might be the absence of events; fur ex- 
ample, not taking an antidote could be an inus condition for death. 
If C is a type of event, let (C7' denote the absence of a C. 	The 
typical complex regularity is: 
All ABC or DGIT or JE are followed by some P and all P 
are preceded by some ABC or DGH or MT:. 
As in Chapter Two, Mackie. notes that factors are relative to a causal 
field. Now, (ABC or DdiTor JKY) is in disjunctive normal form. In 
general, any regularity between P and a truth-functional compound of 
the occurrence of earlier factors can be put into the form considered 
by Mackie. 
Mackie defends the use of complex regularities; here he 
follows Mill rather than Hume. His argument is that one often does 
not know the complete regularity. 	In that case if it is required 
that all P are preceded by Q for Q to be a cause of P, then one could 
not know the cause of P. Yet in many cases one claims to know some 
causes of a given phenomena - at least in a weak sense of 'know'. If 
the cause "in the objects" of the P is an inus condition for the.P, 
then one does indeed know some of the causes of the P. Mackie 
16. 	/bid., p.62. 
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argues that knowledge of some inus conditions, even when combined 
with ignorance of other inns conditions, provides one with the theore-
tical knowledge which a knowledge of causes should provide. Thus 
Mackie says: 
Knowing that something of the form 
(AX or Y) - where A is known, but X 
and Y are not - is both necessary and 
sufficient for P in F, we may well have 
reason to believe that X, whatever it 
may be, is often present; if so, we can 
infer from an observed occurrence of 17 A that P is fairly likely to follow. 
For example; X might be the failure to take an antidote and A might 
be the event that the poison is taken- Even if one does not know what 
antidotes there are, one could still predict that if the poison is 
taken the person is likely to die. 	Similarly, if causes are inus 
conditions, one can infer causes from effects, the absence of causes 
from the absence of effects, and the absence of effects from the ab-
sence of causes. All such inferences involve judgments that cther 
factors are unlikely to occur - without necessarily knowing precisely 
what these other factors are. Such judgments are based on the consi-
deration that factors which are likely to occur are, in general, 
likely to be discovered using the Method of Differences. Mackie dis-
cusses Mill's methods at some length. 18 He argues that the assump- 
tion that there is a complex regularity - together with various ob-
servations - enables one, using Mill's methods, to discover at least 
some inus conditions (the more frequently occurring ones). Moreover, 
knowledge of inus conditions has the practical use which one expects 
knowledge of causes to have. For if A is an inus condition for P 
and one produces an A, one can hope that the other parts B, C eta. 
of the minimal sufficient condition for P are present, and so one 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.67. 
Ibid., pp. 68-74. 
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can also hope that a P will occur. Similarly, by preventing an A 
one has done eomething to prevent. a P, even though there might be•
other minimal sufficient conditions for P. 
5.2 	Thus in the first part of Chapter Three Mackie has argued that 
a regularity theory based on complex regularities has considerable 
merit. He then argues, however, that singular causal statements dif-
fer in meaning from the assertion that some sequence is an instance 
of a regularity. 19 Mackie's argument is that one can make judgments 
about scausation (especially in mental examples) without being commit-
ted to any generalisation. Here I think one should distinguish be- 
. tween being committed to the occurrence of some regularity and being 
able to provide the regularity. 	I claim that causal statements are 
universalisable, that is, if someone asserts that X causes Y he is 
committed to there being some kinds of event K and J and such that 
All K cause J in circumstances like those in which 
X causes Y. 
K, J and the description of the circumstances do. 
not involve causal notions. 
and (3) K and J are not described in such a way as to 
severely limit the possible number of occurrences 
of K and J. 
The universalisability of causation can. be  compared to universali-
sation in Ethics.. Although I could judge that it is wrong to say 
what I did without being able to give a more general rule, I am 
committed to the existence of some (non-ethical) feature such that 
in any situation containing these features one person is wrong to 
say what I sail to another person, Thus I do not find Mackie's argu-
ment entirely convincing. However, I have argued (see Section 3.3) 
19. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.77. 
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that no regularity account could satisfy the analysis-criterion; 
accordingly I agree with Mackie when he goes on to say: 
The crucial and outstanding question 
is to what extent such complex regularities 
as we have described constitute causation 
as it is in the objects. 20 
Here Mackie seems to be considering what he calls the factual analysis 
of causation in terms of regularities. Mackie argues that regularities 
are not the whole of what constitutes cauSation "in the objects". 
His argument is that if types of event A and B are collateral effects 
of type of event C, and the A are always followed by the B, then A 
is an inus condition for B, but the A do not cause the B. Mackie's 
example (based on Broad's example of people going to work) is that 
in which A is the sounding of factory hooters in Manchester and B is 
the event that London workers leave their work. C is the event that 
it is 5 o'clock in England. 21 A are regularly followed by B, but 
the A do not •ause the B. Mackie considers Mill's proposed solution 
to this problem, namely that one knows of conditions in which A would 
not be followed by B and so the regularity 'All A are followed by 
B' is not counterfactually unconditional. The argument which Mackie 
uses against Mill is as follows: 
If A and B are collateral effects of C, there are complex regulari-
ties: 
(1) All (CX or Y) are followed by A and all A are preceded 
• by CX or Y 
and 	(2) All (CZ or W) are followed by B and all B are preceded 
by (CZ or W). 
In this case X, Y, Z and W could be very complex factors and in fact 
Y and W might never ectually occur. Mackie then argues that all AY 
are preceded by C and all CZ are followed by B, hence all AYZ are 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.80. 
Ibid., p.81. 
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followed by B. Furthermore, the regularity 'All A -Y-Z are followed 
by B' is counterfactually unconditional. So, even leaving aside the 
problem of providing a regularity account of what it is to be counter-
factually unconditional, Mill's solution seems to fail because in 
cases of collateral effects A is not causally sufficient for B. 
Mackie concludes that one requires the notion of causal priority 
even if one is considering, not the meaning of causation, but what 
causation is "in the objects". Here I disagree with Mackie - one 
of my aims in providing a regularity account is to avoid any appeal 
to causal priority. 
Section Six: A Reduction based on Mackie's Account of Causal  
Regularities 
In spite of Mackie's denial that the Regularity Account is 
a complete account of causation. "in the objects", 22 I develop an 
account in which causes are reduced to inus conditions (or to factors 
which are at least inus conditions). I begin with some notation. 
6.1 	Notation 
Quasi-events are denoted by capital letters. 
(No distinction is made between the use of A, B, C etc. 
and X, Y, Z etc.) 
If X is a quasi-event, X and -X both denote the absence of X. 
But -X is only used where the absence of X is itself a quasi-event. 
For example, if someone failed to take an antidote which no one knew 
was an antidote, the failure to . take it would not be a quasi-event, 
but merely the absence of one. But if the antidote were routinely 
taken as a precaution, the failure to take the antidote would be 
considered a quasi-event. 
22, 	Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.86. 
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Square brackets are used to convert a reference 'X' to a 
particular quasi-event to a predicate [X] interpreted as 'qualitat-
ively identical to X'. 
Capital letters in italics denote kinds of quasi-events. 
Usually, no mention is made of the causal field to which both 
causation and regularities are relative. 
The regularity23 : 
All [AB-6] or [DC14-] or [JE] are followed by [1], and 
all [P] are preceded by [ABC] or [Ddra] or [JE]: 
is written as: 
Reg: [ABC] v [Ddff] v [Jk17] ÷÷ [P]. 
This notation is also used if IF] is simultaneous with the latest 
of [A], [B], etc. 
Suppose that X, Y and Z but neither a [VI] nor a [V] occur on 
some occasion and there is a regularity: 
Reg: [XZ7A] V [v] 	[y] . 
In this case. X would be considered both necessary and sufficient in 
the circumstances for Y (ZW is the circumstances). In order to state 
the Necessity Thesis in terms of regularities I require other arrows 
in addition to '÷÷'. 
Reg: [XZW] v 	÷ [Y] 
is interpreted as: 
All [Y] are preceded by (or simultaneous with) [XZTJF] or ... 
Again, 
Reg: [Xiq] v 
is interpreted as: 
The vast majority of [Xi1-71.1 or ... 
are followed by (or simultaneous with) [Y]. 
23. I refer to regularities by the corresponding generalisations. 
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If both  
Reg: 	[X7,14] v ... 4-- [v] 
and 
Reg: 	[X0] v .* - 
. occur then I write: 
Reg: 	[X0] v .. 	[Y ] . 
(8) 	I also require, when giving an account of causation in terms 
of regularities, what I call particular presentations of regularities 
(PPRs). A PPR is a particular sequence of quasi-events considered 
as an instance of a regularity. For example, there is said to occur 
(or exist) the PPR, 
Pres: A, P; [Al v [B] 	[P] 
if and only if: 
(1) There is a regularity 
Reg: 	[A] v [B] 	[p] 
and 	(2) A and P but not B occur. _ 
In the same situation, there would also be the PPR, 
Pres: A v B, P; [A v B] 
In general, the regularity of the PPR is always put either in the 
form: 
] arrow [ 
where the contents of both square brackets occur (and are listed 
to the right of 'Pres') or in .the form: 
[ 	] arrow [ 	], 
where the contents of the first and third square-brackets occur 
(and are listed to the right of 'Pres'), but the contents of the 
secondbracket do not occur. Any arrow may be used in the notatiOn 
for PPRs. 
.Note Thus the square brackets are not only used to convert the 
152. 
reference X to the qualitative identity predicate [X], but square 
brackets are also used to group together disjuncts in the regularity 
when describing the PPR. 
6.2 	Some Preliminary  Remarks on the Regularity Account  
There are cases of symmetric overdetermination in which the 
regularity is, say, 
Reg: [ABC ] v [Ddg] v [JE] ±4 [P] 
and A, B, D, G and P but neither C, H, J nor K occur. In that case, 
if one holds to the necessity of the Necessity Thesis, A does not 
cause P, yet [A] is an inus condition for [P]. In such cases there 
is not the PPR: 
Pres: ABC, P; [ABM v [Ddg v 	[P], 
-e. sinceDGh v JKL occurs. But there is the PPR: 
Pres: ABC v Ddg, P; [ABC v Deg] v [Jia] 	[P]. 
hence I require in the 'A causes P' that the PPR be considered not 
merely the regularity. Notice that this requirement is harmless if 
one accepts the sufficiency of the Sufficiency Thesis. For if there • 
is the PPR: 
Pres: ABC v Ddg, P; [ABC v Deg] v [JKIT] 	[P] 
there is also the PPR: 
Pres: ABC, P; [ABC] 	[P] 
There is no need to -rntion the absence of a quasi-event unless 
that absence is itself a quasi-event. On the one hand, if u is not 
a quasi-event, it is not a cause. 	On the other hang., if there is a 
regularity Reg [ABC) v 	[P], then either C occurs in very, 
few cases, in which case there is also the regularity 
Reg [AB] v 	[P], or C is itself a quasi-event and - C could 
be rewritten as '-C'. 
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Conjunctions of quasi-events are quasi-events, so by (2), [A] 
is an inus condition for [P] if and only if there is some X such 
that there is a regularity: Reg: [AX] 	÷÷ [P]. 
Moreover, the disjunction of two quasi-events is a quasi-
event unless it is part of every normal state-of-affairs. But in 
the latter case it should not be mentioned in the regularity. So if 
[A] is an inus condition for [P] there is a regularity: 
Reg: [AX] V [y] 	[p] 24  
Where there is a regularity 
Reg: [AX] 	[P] 
or Reg: [A] v [y] ÷- [P] 
or Reg: 	[A] +-s- [P], 
[A] is not, stril:tly speaking, an inus condition for [P]. [A] is 
what Mackie calls 'at least an inus condition.' for [P]. The account 
of causation is in terms of what are at least inus conditions. More-
over if the Necessity Thesis is deemed sufficient, one would consider 
regularities such as: 
Reg: [AX] V [y] 
where [A] is not part of a sufyicient condition for [P] but rather 
is part of an as sufficient as possible condition for [P]. For 
example, in the case of Mackie's chocolate machine L, putting the 
shilling in is an insufficient hut necessary part of a condition 
which, although not sufficient for obtaining the chocolate bar,, is 
as sufficient as possible. 
The regularity, 
Reg: [AX] v [y] ±÷ [11 
can be written, 
24. Mackie himself uses this convenient form. 
See The Cement of the Universe, p.71. 
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Reg: [(AX v Z)(AX v -2)] v [y] ±-y [11, 
for any Z, yet, presumably, [AX v Z] is not an inus condition for 
M. Some restriction is required on the kind of part which A may be 
of the "unnecessary but sufficient" condition AX. 	As Kim points 
out, 25 if one simply requires that the regularity be put into dis-
junctive normal form, then one seems to make causal relations depend 
on the description of the (quasi-)events. For instance, in Section 
7.1 I give an example in which a quasi-event D could be described as 
a disjunction, namely -C v A. 26 I suggest that either A is to be 
the same as AX or A and X are both to be regular parts of AX. 27 
6.3 	Taking these five remarks into consideration, I propose the 
following formulation of "Mackie's Regularity Account". 
Reg_l: 	There are three cases: 
Case One: 	If both the Necessity Thesis and the Sufficiency Thesis 
are necessary, then 'A causes B' is reduced to: 
(1) B is a distinct existence from the conjunction 
of A and all earlier quasi-events. 
and (2) One of the following PPRs occurs: 
Pres: C, B; [C] 	[B] 
Pres: C, B; [C] v [D] 	[B], 
For some quasi-events C and D, where either A is the same 
as C or, for some X, AX is the same as C and both Lk and X 
are regular parts of C. 
Case Two: If the Necessity Thesis is both necessary and sufficient 
Kim, J. "Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation", 
Journal of Philosophy, vol.68(July 1971), pp. 433-435. 
See p.157. 
For the definition of a regular part of a quasi-event, 
see p. 43. 
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then 'A causes B' is reduced to: 
B is a distinct existence from the conjunction of A 
and all earlier quasi-events. 
One of the following PPRs occurs: 
Pres: 	C, B; [C] 	[B] 
Pres: 	C, B; [C] v [D] ÷ [B], 
for some quasi-events C and D, where either A is the same 
as C or, for some X, AX is the same as C and both A and X 
are regular parts of C. 
and (3) There is no PPR 
Pres: C*, B; [C*] v [D*] 	[B] 
such that C is a part of C* (regular or otherwise) and such 
that [C*] are followed by (or simultaneous with) [B] in a 
significantly greater proportion of cases than [C] are 
followed by (or simultaneous with) [B]. 
Case Three: 	If the Sufficiency Thesis is both necessary and suf- 
ficient, then 'A causes B' is reduced to 
B is a distinct existence from the conjunction of A. 
and all earlier quasi-events. 
There is a PPR, 
Pres: C, B; [C] 	[B] 
where either A is the same as C or, for some X, AX is the 
same as C and both A and X are regular parts of C. 	• 
and 	(3) There is no PPR 
Pres: C*, B; [C*] 	[B] 
such that C* is a part of C (regular or otherwise) and such 
that [B] are preceded by (or simultaneous with) [C*] in a 
significantly greater proportion of cases than [B] are pre-
ceded by (or simultaneous with) [C]. 
Note One: 	The distinct existences requirement is that B is a 
distinct existence from the conjunction of A and all earlier quasi-
events. This requirement is necessary because of the example of 
Joanne giving birth and Harry becoming a father 28 and the example 
of the amoeba Jojim dividing into two amoebae Jo and Jim. 29 
Note Two: 	Condition (3) is required in Case Two, to ensure that 
the complete cause C is as sufficient as possible. Likewise, condi-
tion (3) is required in Case Three to ensure that the complete cause • 
C is as necessary as possible. Suppose there is a PPR, 
Pres: C, B; [C] v [D] 	[B], 
nnd very rarely, by accident, when a rc] occurs and [E] also occurs, 
but on no other occasion has an [E] occurred. If on the occasion in 
question E occurred, then one would also have the PPRs 
Pres: C v E, B; [C v E] v [D] 	[B], 
and 	Pres: CE, B; [CE] v [D] 	[B]. 
Yet E is causally irrelevant to B. The above PPRs are excluded by 
Condition (3) in Case Two and Case Three. 
Note Three: I concentrate on the simplest case (Case One), where 
the Necessity Thesis and the Sufficiency Thesis are both required. 
Note Four: 	The occurrence of the regularity Reg: [A] 	[C] is 
not an automatic consequence of the occurrence of Reg: [A] 	[B] 
and Reg: [B] — [C]. So I stipulafx that if A to B to C is to be 
called a causal chain then A causes C, that is, where causation is 
not transitive one should not speak of causal chains. 
Sea p.44. 
See p.87. 
157. 
Section Seven: 	Some Objections to "Hackle's Regularity Account" 
now discuss some objections to the account Reg 1 that might 
be raised. 
7.1 	Objection One: (Due to Kim) 
Assume AB is a minimal sufficient 
condition for P; we can then show 
for almost any event C, that C is 
an inus condition for P ... For ••• 30 C(F v A)B is also minimal sufficient. 
For example, let C be the quasi-event that Harry took the righthand 
turn, let D be the quasi-event that Harry took the lefthand turn 
and/or Harry failed to take his road-map , let A be the quasi-event 
that Harry failed to take his road-map, let B be the quasi-event 
that the signposts had been tampered with and let P be the quasi-
event that 'Tarry is late. Suppose that, for some W, there is the 
PPR, 
Pres: AB, F; 	[AB] v [W] 	[F], 
then, presumably A and B cause P. 
Now suppose that C occurred, but that C is causally irrelevant 
to P. Suppose also that it is part of every normal state-of-affairs 
that Harry either takes the righthand or the lefthand turn. Then D 
is equivalent to C v A, so there is a PPR, 
Pres: BCD, P; [BCD] v [14] 	[ID], 
yet C is not a cause of P. 
Reply: , The quasi-event BD is not a regular part of BCD, for if N 
is some normal state of affairs N x BD is not defined. 31 This reply 
is, roughly speaking, anticipated by Kim; disjunctive quasi-events 
are excluded. Notice, however, that the quasi-event BD is not 
Kim, J., "Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation", Journal 
of Philosophy, vo168(July 1971), p. 433. 
See p.43 for the definition of a regular part of a quasi-
event. 
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excluded on purely format grounds. It would not affect my reply if 
D were described as 'Harry did not take a right-road' where the word 
'right-road is used of righthand turns and road-maps. Thus this 
reply does not make causation language-dependent. (I have already 
assumed, of course, that causation is relative to some field.) 
7.2 	Objection Two: 
In the case of symmetr ic overdetermination, 32 one has a PPR. 
Pres: C v D, P; [C v D] v [E] 	[P], 
where C and D overdetermine P. So, on the Regularity Account, C v D 
Should cause P. 	Yet one does not ordinarily speak of disjunctive 
state-of-affairs as causes. For example, suppose throwing down a 
cigarette butt and a lightning strike are individually sufficient for 
the straw to burn and both events occur. Then one would not say that 
the cause  of the straw burning was the fact that the cigarette end 
was thrown down and/or the lightning struck. 
Reply: It would be easy to alter Reg 1 so that the reductians is 
false if, in the reductiandum, the proposed cause is disjunctive. 
For in all three cases, condition (2) could be altered so that there 
must be some X (perhaps A itself) such that AX is the same as C and 
both A and X are regular parts of C. 33 
One could then argue that C v D cannot be the same as (C v D)X, 
where C v D and X are regular parts of C v D, since C v D is nal: a 
regular part of itself. For if N is a norm N x (C v D) is not, in 
general, defined. 	In the example of the straw burning there is no 
unique determinate s.- ate-of-affairs obtained by altering the norm to 
ensure that lightning strikes and/or the cigarette butt is dropped. 
As in Chapter Two, examples of symmetric overdetermination 
are to be "charitably" interpreted - see the note on p.61. 
See pp. 154, 155. 
159. 
However, if one denies that C and D are causes of P, then surely P 
has some cause and C v D is the most suitable candidate for a cause 
of P. So either one should reject the necessity of the Necessity 
Thesis or one should admit that C v D is the cause of P. 	If C v D 
causes P, then it is not the notion of cause that has been, used in 
an unfamiliar way; rather, it is the unfamiliar notion of a disjunct-
ive state-of-affairs which makes the causal sentence seem peculiar. 
7.3 	Ob'ection Three: 
If there is a PPR, 
Pres: C, P; [C] v [D] 	[P], 
there is also a PPR, 
Pres: C vD, P; [C V D] ±- [N. 
Yet where D does not occur, surely C v D does not cause P. 
For example, if the lightning-strike caused the straw to burn and no 
cigarette butt was thrown down, one would not say that the disjunct-. 
ive state-of-affairs (that the lightning strikes and/or a cigarette 
butt is thrown. down) caused the straw to burn. 
kTly. : Some rule is required to select the suitable PPR out of all 
those that occur. This selection rule - to be stated in Section 
Eight - is based on the principle that in the PPR, 
Pres: C, P; 	[C] v [D] 	[P], 
the "minimal sufficient condition" C should contain as many relevant 
quasi-events as possible. In other words the relevant circumstances 
should be considered. In particular, C contains C v D but C v D does 
not contain C, so the PPR, 
- Pres: C, P; [C] v [D] 	[P] 
if preferred to the PPR, 
Pa-es: C v D, P; [C v D] 	[P].. 
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7.4 Objection Four: The Problem of Collateral Effects (Part One). 
The problem,as stated by Mackie, 34 is that if C causes both 
A and B and A is earlier than B one has regularities 
Reg: [CX] v [Y] -4-4- A and Reg: [CZ] v [W] 	[B] and hence the regular- 
ity Reg: [la] 	[B]. Yet A is not a cause of B. Mackie gives the 
example in which C is the quasi-event that is it five o'clock, A is 
the quasi-event that Manchester factory-hooters sound and B is the 
' quasi-event that Londoners stop work. Mackie assumes that one does not 
simply have the regularities Reg: [C] 4-).- [A] and Reg: [C.] ÷± [B] but 
that the regularities are of the form Reg: ICX] v [Y] 	[A] and 
Reg: [CZ] v [W] 	[B], where on the occasion in question A, B, C, X 
and Z occur but Y and W do not. 
Later (in Section Ten) I discuss the special case in which 
there is the regularity Reg: [C] 4-÷ [A]. 	Notice - also that Mackie's 
argument leads only to the conclusion that A is sufficient-in-the 
circumstances for B. 	For one does not have Reg: [AYZ] 	[B] but 
only Reg: [AYZ] 	[B]. Also the absence of a quasi-event need not be 
mentioned in the statement of regularities unless the absence of a 
quasi-event is itself a quasi-event. A restatement of the problem 
is as follows: 
If A and •B are conateral effects of C, one has the PPRs, 
Pres: CX, A; [CN] v [Y] 	[A] 
and 	Pres: CZ, B; [CZ] v [VI] 	[B] 
If there is a quasi-event -Y, there is the derived PPR, 
Pres: (Y)AZ v CZ, B; [(Y)AZ v CZ] v [W] 	[B] 
If Y is mergly the absence of a quasi-event, there is the derived .PPR, 
Pres: AZ v CZ, B; [AZ v CZ] v [W] 	[B]. 
In either case, on the account Reg 1, there should be a disjunctive 
34. Mackie, ,LL., The Cement of the Universe, pp. 83,84. 
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cause, (—Y)AZ v CZ or AZ v CZ of P. Yet A and C do not overdetermine B. 
Thus the problem for the regularity theorist is how to distinguish 
collateral effect situations from cases of symmetric overdetermination. 
Reply: 	The selection rule of Section Eight shows that one is to 
prefer the PPR 
Pres: CZ, B; [CZ] v [W] 	[B] 
to the PPR 
Pres: (—Y)AZ v CZ, B; [(—Y)AZ v CZ] v [14] 	[B] 
or 	Pres: AZ v CZ, B; [AZ v CZ] v [14] 	[B], 
because CZ contains (—Y)AZ v CZ and AZ v CZ but not vice versa. 
1 
[ i 
7.5 	Objection Five: 	A Problem with Causal Chains 	 t 
i 
Suppose that C Causes A, which, in turn, causes B and that C 
causes B. Then there are the PPRs 
Pres: 	CX, A; [Cx] v [Y] 	[A] 
Pres: 	AZ, B, [AZ] v [141 	[B] 
and 	Pres: 	CXZ, B; 	[CXZ] v [YZ v 14] ±— [B]. 
In addition, there is the derived PPR, 
Pres: 	CXZ v AZ, B; 	[CXZ v AZ] v [YZ v W] 	[B]. 
Yet C and A do not overdetermitie B, so CX v A is not a cause of B. 
Reply: 	Notice that this problem. is formally similar to the problem , 
of collateral effects. This suggests that a solution in terms of 
causal priority, such as Mackie provides, would not be required 'for 
the problem of collateral effects, since considerations of causal 
priority would not seem relevant to the problem with causal chains. 
The solution is to use the selection rule to be stated in. Section 
Eight; CXZ v A2 is part of CXZ but not vice. versa. 
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7.6 Objection Six: The Problems of Overdetermination. 
If one accepts the necessity of the Necessity Thesis the 
reduction Reg 1 is successful in the case of symmetric overdetermin- - 
aticn. Cases of temporal asymmetries may be handled (as in Chapter 
Two) by a careful choice of the paraphrase of causal sentences into 
sentences which explicitly mention quasi-events. 
The interesting case is that of non-temporal asymmetries. 
For in such cases A and B overdetermine C and there is the PPR, _ 
Pres: AX v BY, P; [AX v BY] v [W] 	[P]. 
Yet A but not B is said to cause C. 
Discussion: 	In cases of non-temporal asymmetries Ulere are two 
possible causal chains one of which is broken. Suppose that A causes 
P (directly or indirectly) but that the causal chain B to D to P is 
broken at D, that is, D failed to occur, but if D had occurred D would 
have been sufficient for P. In that case onc has the PPR, 
Pres: 	AX, P; [AX] v [DZ v U] 	[P], 
and the regularity, 
Reg: 	[BT] v [Vj 	ID], 
Also, one may assume that the circumstances Z occur so that if D 
occurred D would have been necessary and sufficient in the circum-
stance for P. 
Furthermore, since there would be a causal chain B to D to P 
if D occurred, there is the regularity, 
Reg: 	[AX] v [BTZ] v [VZ] v [U] 	[P]. 
On the one hand, suppose that D fails to occur because T fails to 
occur. There is the PPR, 
Pres: AX, P; [AX] v [BTZ v VZ v U] 	IF] 
which - as in the discussion of Objection Three - is preferred to the 
t, 
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PPR, 
Pres: 	AX v BTZ, P; [AX v BTZ] v [VZ v U] 	[P]. 
On the other hand, suppose that D fails to occur even though B and T 
occur and are almost sufficient for D. In this anomalous situation 
there is not the PPR, 
Pres: 	AX, P; [AX] v [BTZ v VZ v U] 47' [P], 
because BTZ occurs. 
The solution to the problem is to use the selection rule of 
Section Eight and to prefer the PPR, 
Pres: 	AX, P; [AX] v [DBTZ v VZ v U] 	[11 
to the PPR, 
Pres: 	AX v BTZ, P; [AX v BTZ] v [VZ v U] 	[P], 
AX contains AX v BTZ, but not vice versa. 	 F- 
Section Eight: A Selection Rule  
As has been shown in the replies to Objections Three tc Six, 
one has to select a PPR in which the "minimal sufficient condition" 
that actually occurs contains as many relevant quasi-events as 
possible. I now make some definitions as a preliminary to stating 
the selection rule. 
Definition: 	The PPR, 
Pres: C, P; [C] v [D] 	111 
is said to dominate the PPR, 
Pres: A, P; [A] v [B] 	[P] 
if and only if 
D and P are distinct existences; 
C is no earlier than A; 
C is earlier that P. ,. or, if A and P are simultaneous, 
C is no later than P. 
C contains A. 
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Definition: A PPR is said to be complete if there is no other PPR 
which dominates it. 
Exam: 	Suppose that there is a causal chain A to B to P. Then 
there are PPRs, 
Pres: AX, B; [AX] v [Y] 	[B] 
Pres: BZ, P; [BZ] v [W]4---[P] 	- 
Pres: AXZ, P; [AXZ] v [YZ v W] 	[P] 
Pres: ABXZ, P; [ABXZ] v [Yz v w] 
PPR (4) dominates PPR (3), so PPR (3) is not complete. 
The Selection Rule  
. The selection rule states that only complete PPRs are to be 
35. used in the reduction of causation. With this proviso, Reg 1 	is 
converted into Reg 2. 
Note One: 	Condition (1) in the definition of dominance is required 
to prevent one arguing that, if A and P are simultaneous, the PPR, 
Pres: A(-B),P; [A(-B)] v [BP] +- [13 ], 
dominates the PPR, 
Pres: A, P: [A] v [B] 	[P]. 
Note Two: Conditions (2) and (3) in the definition of dominance are 
used to restrict the circumstances being considered to quasi-events 
occurring about the time of the cause and the effect. 
•,t 
Note  Three: 	Completeness is a property of PPRs not of regularities. 
This complication is unavoidable. For suppose that C*, D* and P* are 
qualitatively identical to C, D and P respectively. Suppose that, 
there are PPRs, 
(1) Pres: C vD, P; [C v D] v [E] 	[P] 
35. See pp. 154, 155. 
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and 	Prc, s: C* v D*, P*; [C* v Dfl v [E] 	[P*] 
Suppose also that C, D, P, C* and P* but not D* occur. Then PPR(1) 
is complete but PPR(2) is not complete. 
Moreover, if the Necessity Thesis is necessary C does not cause 
P (this is a case of overdetermination) but C* does cause P*. So 
the relevant property is one of the PPRs and not a property of the 
regularities which in both cases are the same, namely 
Reg: 	[C] v [D] v [E] 	[P] 
Note Four: 	The selection rule has been chosen for two reasons. 
First, it provides a solution to the problems mentioned in Section 
Seven. Second, it provides a way of incorporating into the regulari-
ty those circumstances which are considered relevant; the use of the 
selection rule in this chapter roughly corresponds to the consideration 
of the circumstances in Chapter Two. 
Section Nine: Further Objections and an Extra Selection Rule 
Even with the above selection rule there are some difficulties 
with the Regularity Account of causation. 
9.1 	Objection Seven: 	Accidental Regularities  
The selection rule does not enable one to distinguish between 
discoverable accidental regularities and non-accidental regularities 36 
9.2 Objection Eight: Unique Causation  
It is conceivable that a certain type of bomb (an N-bomb) is only 
ever exploded once and is detonated using an A-bomb. There are regu-
larities between nuclear events from which the assertion that every 
explosion of an N-bomb is preceded by an explosion of an A-bomb could 
be derived. 	It would seem to be an ad hoc assertion if the 
36. See p. 141. 
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regularity theorist claimed as part of his hypothesis that such 
examples of unique causation do not occur. 
• 9.3 The Support of a Regularity_ 
In using the selection rule of Section Eight I have already made 
the account of 'X causes 17' involve several regularities rather than 
a single regularity, because the completeness of a PPR depends on 
other regularities. I now consider the way in which one regularity 
supports or counteracts another. This will enable me to give an account 
of the distinction between accidental and non-accidental regularities. 
My aim is not merely to find marks of the distinction between acci-
dental and non-accidental regularities, but also to give an account 
of the distinction "in the objects". 
9.4 Consider the example of unique causation mentioned in Objection 
Nine. Quasi-event C (the explosion of the A-bomb) causes quasi-event 
E (the explosion of the N-bomb). I suggest that there is a regular- 
ity Reg: [C v W] 	[E] with only one instance. (Perhaps this involves 
a stipulative redefinition of the term 'regularity'.) The regularity 
Reg: [C v W] 	[El deserves to be called a regularity because it is 
supported by the regularity between nuclear events, or by several such 
regularities. Accordingly, I propose an extra selection rule: 
Only regularities which have a very large number of 
instances or which are supported by regularities with 
a very large number of instances are to be treated as 
non-accidental regularities. 
This extra selection rule is based on the principle that the marks 
of the distinction between accidental and non-accidental generalisa-
tions - (discussed in Chapter Two) 37 constitute the only difference 
37. See p.115. 
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"in the objects" between the corresponding regularities. 
Does use of this extra selection rule commit one to Scientific 
Realism? I suggest that it does not. The instrumentalist claims 
that the theoretical entities of Physics are useful fictions, one 
of the functions of which might be to give an account of which regu-
larities are accidental. However, there is A slight peculiarity 
about the instrumentalist using this extra selection rule. For sup-
pose that there are two rival, equally useful, scientific theories. 
The first theory eAtails that when an A-bomb explodes inside an 
N-bomb the N-bomb explodes. The second theory entails that N-bombs 
sometimes explode spontaneously yet the explosion of an A-bomb is 
quite irrelevant. 	The scientific realist would say that he merely 
did not know whether the explosion of the A-bomb caused the N-bomb 
to explode. 	The instrumentalist would be committed to denying that 
the causal sentence 'The explosion of the A-bomb caused the N-bomb 
to explode', has a truth-value. 	I do not consider that this commit- 
ment of the instrumentalist is sufficiently peculiar for him to reject 
the extra selection rule. 
Note: Regularities Reg i , 	Regn supporta regularity Reg o if there 
is some fairly simple theory of which Reg' 	gl'  Re 	Regn are conse- 
quences and there is no simpler theory of which Reg o but not all of 
Reg , ..., Regn are consequences. By a regularity being a 
consequence l 
of the theory, I mean that the regularity is entailed by the laias of 
Nature (or non-accidental generalisations) proposed by the theory 
together with the correspondence rules of the theory. One account of 
the simplicity of theories, which seems suitable in this context; 
is Sober's. 18 On Sober's account the less the extra information 
required to answer questions (given the theory) the simpler is the 
38. Sober, E., Simplicity, Chapter One, pp. 1-37. 
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theory. 	In this case, the appropriate questions would be of the 
form: 'Will quasi-event P occur?' 
9.5 	Next I shall consider accidental regularities. In the example 
of the bombs with red and blue spots where only the bombs withred 
spots explode, 39 I suggested that the accidental regularity is out-
weighed by a statistical regularity stating the independence of nuclear 
processes and a wide variety of macroscopic events or conditions. 
Accordingly, I define a statistical regularity to be the occurrence 
of a large number of quasi-events qualitatively identical to Y, a 
proportion a of which are preceded by (or simultaneous with) quasi-
events qualitatively identical to X. I write this, 
Stat Reg: [X] 	(a)[Y]. 	The statistical regularity is said to be a 
basic statistical regularity if there is no statistical regularity 
Stat Reg: [X V W] 	(6)[Y], which is not too complicated and is such 
that f3 is significantly greater than. a. Similarly, one can consider 
basic statistical regularities between kinds of quasi-event, 
Stat Rag: K (a) J where K and J are kinds of quais-events. If 
Stat Reg: K (a) J is a basic statistical regularity between kinds 
of quasi-event and a is significantly less than 1, then 
Stat Reg: K 	(a) J tends to outweigh a regularity Reg: IX] 	[Y] 
where X is of kind K and I?of kind J. 	I suggest that if 
Reg: [X] 4- [Y] has only moderate support (that is, it has only at 
most moderately many instances and is not supported by regularities 
with more than a moderate number of instances) but Stat Reg: K (a)J 
has very many instances and a is significantly less than 1, then the 
regularity Reg: [X] 	[Y] should be deemed accidental. 
The Regularity Account, Reg 2, is now modified so that both these 
39. 	See p.141. 
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1 - extra selection rules are used. In this way Reg 3 is obtained. 
9.6 	An alternative account of the difference between accidental 
and non-accidental regularities can be provided. One first reduces 
the regularities into the terms of the current physical theory (involv-
ing sub-microscopic events). Presumably all macroscopic regularities 
then become extremely complicated. Those that are supported by simple 
regularities (involving sub-atomic events) are deemed non-accidental 
But one deems accidental those that are not. Notice that, in this 
case, one is not comparing two observationally equivalent hypothesis 
for simplicity. The hypothesis in which these accidental regularities 
are included has more observable consequences and - by accident - 
has been verified more Often than the hypothesis in which the acci-
dental regularities are not included. 	So in this case the hypothesis 
which is in other respects a better hypothesis is rejected as being 
too complicated. Thus one compares the simplicity of the hypothesis 
with some standard of simplicity. 	If, for instance, one follows 
Sober's account of simplicity, one would adapt it by comparing the 
additional information required to answer questions such as 'Will 
quasi-event P occur?' with some standard of a reasonable amount of 
additional information. 
• Section Ten: 	The Problems of  Simultaneous Causation and  
Collateral Effects (Part Two) 
The Reularity Account of causation, Reg 3 permits cases of 
simultaneous causation. However, as in Chapter Two, in proposed . 
exarnplc of simultaneous causation the account sometimes fails to 
distinguish cause from effect in cases in which cause and effect are 
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successfully distinguished pre-theoretically. There is also a special 
case of the problem of collateral effects. 	Thus there are two 
further objections to the Regularity Account. 
10.1 
	Objection Nine: 	Simultaneous Causation 
Consider the examples of the ball on the cushion and the hot iron 
glowing. 	In both these examples there are PPRs which, according to 
Reg 3, should result in mutual causation. 
Discussion: 	In Chapter Two (Section Seven) cases of simultaneous 
causation in which, by Nee 4, L and B should cause each other were 
handled by considering what would happen if an earlier necessary condi-
tion for A were removed but if F. were otherwise made to occur. 	If 
A would still occur then B causes A. 
The analogue for the Regularity Account would be to suggest the 
,following rule for those cases in which, on Reg 3, A and B should cause 
each other. 
Rule One If there is a PPR, 
Pres: C, A; [C] v [D] 	[A] 
and a regularity, 
Reg: 	[B-6] ÷ [A], 
then if, on Reg 3, A and B should cause each other, B causes A. 
For example, if the ball being on the cushion (quasi-Event B) causes 
a depression (quasi-event D), there are PPRs, 
Pres: B, D; [B] v [W] 	[D], 
and Pres: D, B; [D] v [Z] 	[B], 
for suitable W and Z. Why does one say that B causes D and not vice 
versa? Let C be the quasi-event that, a little earlier, the ball is 
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just above the cushion. Let E be the quasi-event that, a little 
earlier, the cushion is not depressed. 	There are PPRs, 
Pres: C, D; [C] v [-E] v [X] 	[D] 
and Pres: C, B; [C] v [-E] v [Y] 	[B]. 
There is also the regularity, 
Reg: [BT] 	[D], 
because wherever a ball gets onto a cushion in some other way there 
is a depression. But there is not the regularity 
Reg: 	[DC] 	[B], 
because often there are depressions in cushions without balls on them. 
10.2 	However, Rule One is not satisfactory; consider the hot iron 
glowing example. There are PPRs, 
Pres: 	HI, G; [HI] v X ÷÷ [C] 
and Pres: 	G, HI; [G] 	[HI]. 
If P is the quasi-event that an H-process has been used there are 
the PPRs 
Pres: PI, HI; 	[PI] -(-4- [HI] 
and Pros: PI, G; 	[PI] v X 4--> [G]. 
But there is neither the regularity 
Reg: 	[(P1-)HI] -,- [GI 
nor the regularity 
Reg: 	[(PI)G] 	[HI]. 
Yet HI causes G, not vice versa. 
In this case there are no instances of [(PI)HI], that is [PHI]; but 
there are instances of [(1)G], namely the cases in which X occurs. 
(X might be the quasi-event that the material is charcoal and that it 
is burning.) 	Rather than permit "regularities with no instances", 
I consider almost universal generalisations, replacing 'Reg' by 'AUG'. 
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The difference is merely that an almost universal generalisation is 
vacuously true if it has no instances. The above discussion of the 
hot iron glowing example now suggests the following rule: 
Rule Two: 	If, according to Reg 3, A and B should cause each 
other but there are PPRs 
Pres: C, A; [C] v [D] ÷ [A] 
and Pres: C, B; [C] v [E] [B] 
then If there is also 
AUG: 	[TA] -)- - .[B], 	but not 
AUG: 	[CB] 	[A], 
A causes B not vice versa. 
10.2 However, Rule Two is also unsatisfactory. For let H be the 
quasi-event that a substance is heated to 1000 0 , let S be the quasi-
event that the substance is sodium and Let D be the quasi-event that 
the characteristic yellow light of sodium is emitted. It would be 
rash if - as part of one's metaphysical hypothesis - one denied that 
Reg: [SH] 	[D] could occur. There are the PPRs. 
Pres: SH, D; 	[SH] 	[D] 
and 	Pre: D, SH; [D] 	[SH] 
let P be the quasi-event that an H-process has been used. Then there 
are PPRs 
Pres: SP, SH; [SP] 	[SH] 
and 	Presl . SP, D; [SP] 4.-±[D] 
but, in this example, 
both AUG: [(SP)D] 	[SH] 
and 	AUG: [(SP)SH] 	[D] 
are vacuously true. 	Yet heating a sodium compound causes it to emit 
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yellow light, not vice versa. 
The significant difference between the two almost universal 
generalisations is that the latter has greater support than the former. 
For there are two reg -Ilarities which support AUG: [(SP)D] 	[SH], 
namely, 
Reg: [D] 	[SP] 
and 	Reg: [D] 	[SH] 
(The first supports the vacuity of AUG: [(-ST)D] 	fSH]) 
There are also two regularities which support AUG: [(SP)SH] -4- [D], 
namely, 
Reg: 	[Sill 	[SP] 
and 	Beg: [SH] 	[D]. 
Now Reg: [D] 	[SH] and Reg: [Sill 	[D] have the same number of 
instances but Reg: [SH]4-[SP] is itself supported by Reg: [H] 	[P] 
which has far more instances than Reg: [D] 	[SP], since many other 
substances are heated. 
Note: This argument based on the support of an almost universal 
generalistation is similar td Gasking's argument in his discussion 
of the hot iron glowing example. 	There is ageneral method for 
heating objects and in the special case where the object is iron 
this general method produces a glow. 40 
Accordingly, I propose the following version of the Regularity 
Account. 
Reg. 4  
Step One: If, according to Reg 3, A causes B but B does not cause 
A, then A causes B. 
40. Gasking, D., "Causation and Recipes", Mind, vol.64 (Oct 1955), 
p. 479. 
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Otherwise 
Step Two: A causes B (and not vice versa) if for some C: 
(1) There are complete PPRs 
Pres: C, A; [C] v [X] 	(a)[A] 
Pres: C, B; [C] v [Y] 	(a)[B], 
where, in most cases, a = 1. 
and (2i) There is 
AUG: [a] 	[B] 
hut not 
AUG: [KB] 4 [Al 
or 	(2ii) There are 
both 	AUG: [CA] 4- [B] 
and 	AUG: ca-B] , [A] 
but the former has greater support than the latter. 
Otherwise neither A causes B nor B causes A. 
Ncte One: 	C need not be necessary in the circumstances for A and B. 
I suggest that it suffices that C increases the chance of A and B 
occurring. Hence a (in condition (1)) need not be equal to 1. 
Note Two: For a perfectly symmetrical case, consider the two yellow 
lines in the spectrum of sodium compounds. Neither causes the other. 
10.4 	Objection Ten. Collateral Effects (Part Two). 
There are special cases of collateral effects in which one has 
Reg: [C] ÷± [A] and Reg: [CX] v ' Y] 	[B]. These in fact, seem only 
to occur when C and A are simultaneous. 
Example: Let C be the quasi-eveat that the Sun, Moon and Earth are 
in a certain position relative to each other (which in fact results 
in a solar eclipse at Paris). Let A be the quasi-event that there is 
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a solar eclipse at Paris. Let B be the quasi-event that there is a 
spring-tide (say at Le Havre). Let Y be the quasi-eveat that Sun. 
Moon and Earth are in some position, relative to each other, which in 
fact results in a spring-tide but not in an eclipse. It is assumed 
that A and Y are described without any mention of solar eclipses or 
spring-tides. Then there are PPRs 
Pres: C, A; 	[C] -(-4. [A] 
and 	Pres: C, B; 	[C] v [Y]-<-)-[B]. 
Hence there is the PPR 
Pres: AC, B; [AC] v [Y] 	[B], 
yet A does not cause B; rather, C causes both A and B. 
Discussion: Reg 4 requires a slight modification, similar to that 
used to obtain Reg 4 from Reg 3. 	The modified account is: 
Reg _5: 	If the conditions for Reg 4 are satisfied A causes B, unless 
there is some quasi-event C such that: 
On Reg 4, C should cause both A and B. 
There is a regularity Reg: [C] 	[A]. 
In that case, one compares the generalisations: 
(1) AUG: [()AX] 	[13] 
and (2) AUG: [(AX)CX] -4- [B] 
Both these generalisations are vacuously true and they are supported 
by: 
• 	 (3) Reg: 	[AX] 	[B] 
	
and (4) Reg: [CX] 	[B], respectively. 
If regularity (3) has greater support than regularity (4), there is 
a causal chain C to A to B. Otherwise A and B are collateral effects 
of C. 
In the above example, the regularity that a suitable position. of 
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Sun, Moon and Earth is correlated with spring-tides has many more 
instances than the regularity that a suitable position of Sun, Moon 
and- Earth is correlated with eclipses. 
Note: Reg 5 seems very complicated. However, it is not based merely 
on an ad hoc reply to various objections, but on the consideration 
of the producing paradigms in the puzzle cases. 
Section Eleven: Conclusions  
(1) The Regularity Account (Reg 5) satisfies the Reduction-criterion, 
but not the Analysis-criterion. 
(2) Using this account 'X causes Y.' is supervenient on: 
Y being a distinct existence from the conjunction of X 
and all earlier quasi-events; 
Various regularities and, perhaps, statistical regulari-
ties which are fairly simple and which have large supports. 
(3) This version of the Regularity Account involves several regular-
ities for each causal sentence, not merely one. 
(4) Using the second of my two accounts of the distinction between 
accidental and non-accidental regularities 41 there is no need 
to consider, in the regularities, any kinds of quasi-event 
other than qualitative identity classes. 
(5) Presumably the relation of distinct existence and the simpli-
city of a regularity are themselves supervenient on the quai- 
events and the regularity respectively. (It is inconceivable 
that two possible universes differ only in the relation of 
distinct existence or only in the simplicity of a regularity;' 
there must be some other difference in the quasi-events related 
t 
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41. 	See p. 169. 
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or in the regularity.) Hence 'X causes Y' is, I claim, super- 
venient on X, Y, the quasi-events occurring before X and.Y, 
and the regularities. Thus the Regularity Account provides a 
vindication of Causal Anti-realism. 
(6) 	The regularity theorist is, I suggest, committed to including 
in his metaphysical hypothesis the following: 
The regularities which (according to the Regularity 
Account) are not accidental are such that the correspondihg' 
generalisations and the initial state of the universe 
(or, if the universe has no beginning,the occurrence of 
the quasi-events which occur before some time t o) 
jointly entail that those generalisations have suffici-
entlymany instances (or sufficiently great support) to be 
considered regularities. 42 
There is no distinction "in the objects" between non-
accidental regularities and in principle undiscoverable 
accidental regularities. 43 
This is the regularity reduction of the weaker of 
the two assumptions stated on p.136 in terms of fixity 
See p. 160. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BACKWARDS CAUSATION 
In Chapter Two and Chapter Three I ignored the possibility of 
backwards causation. But the methods used to distinguish cause and 
effect in cases of simultaneous causation might also, if one wished, 
provide an account of when backwards causation occurs. For example, 
consider Mackie's chocolate machine M, which always produces a choco-
late bar when a shilling is put in, but which sometimes also produces 
a free chocolate bar. Someone might argue that the chocolate bar com-
ing out was necessary in the circumstances for the shilling to be put 
in, and so, if backwards causation is possible, the chocolate bar com-
ing out causes the shilling to go in. This is of course absurd. In 
order to avoid such absurdities one might require that if Y is earlier 
than X, then Y is causally dependent on X if and only if: 
(1) X is necessary in the circumstances for Y; 
and 	(2) For any cause Z of X earlier than Y , if Z does 
not occur but Y does occur then, in the circumstances, 
X does not occur. 
So, if X is later than Y but X causes Y, Y must not be sufficient for 
X in the special circumstances in which all steps have been taken 
to prevent X that could have been taken before Y occurs. 
However, instead of developing the details of such an account, 
I shall argue for two theses which jointly show that no proposed 
case - of backwards causation is relevant to the problem of giving an 
account of causation. The first thesis is that, unless one uses some 
distinctively metaphysical premiss, one cannot show that backwards . 
causation is impossible. The second thesis is that there are no 
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coherent (hypothetical) examples of backwards causation which could 
not be rationally interpreted by a causal antirealist without using 
the notion of backwards causation. (Some of these examples a causal 
realist would, I suggest, interpret as cases of backwards causation.) 
In Section One I argue for the first thesis, namely that one 
cannot show that backwards causation is impossible. In Section Two 
I briefly expound Mackie's discussion of backwards causation in The 
Cement of the Universe (Chapter Seven, "The Direction of Causation"). 1 
In Section Three I make some remarks which are relevant to Section 
Four, where I consider a variety of proposed hypothetical examples of 
backwards causation and I argue that they bear plausible forwards causal 
interpretations. Throughout this chapter I consider producing, not 
explanatory, causation. 
Section One: 	The Possibility of Backwards Causation  
First, I examine three arguments against backwards causation, 
which are due to Black, Gale, and Swinburne respectively. In each 
case I do not merely object to the argument as it stands, but I a 
show how the kinds of consideration being discussed illustrate some 
peculiarity 7 but not the impossibility - of backwards causation. 
Then I argue that backwards causation is possible provided the meta-
physical theory that there is an irreducible element of causal prier-
ity "in the objects" is considered logically compatible with generally 
accepted truths. 	 • 
1.1 Some Preliminaryapoints of Clarification 
In discussing whether backwards causation is possible I assume 
that it is not, in any obvious and straightforward sense, part of the 
meaning of 'cause' that causes are no later than their effects. Thus 
I assume that even if the sentence 'No cause is later than its effects' 
1. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, pp. 162-192. 
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is analytic, it is not trivially analytic in the way that 'No bachelor 
is married' is trivially analytic. Hence I. consider arguments which 
purport to reveal hidden inconsistencies in the notion of backwards 
causation. In addition I do not consider the strict logical possi-
bility of backwards causation, but rather the logical compatibility 
of backwards causation with generally accepted truths. Moreover, 
just as I assume that it is not a trivial analytic truth that no cause 
is later than its effects, I also assume that it is not a trivial 
analytic truth that the causal "beginning" of a process is identical 
to the temporal beginning of that process. If there were cases of 
backwards causation which were cot mnemic, a backwards causal process 
would link cause and effect. 	Finally, I do not defend the absurd 
thesis that the past can be altered in any but a counterfactual sense 
of 'alter'. 	Using the counterfactual sense of 'alter' one says 
that the past (or the future) is altered by an event C if, but for the 
event C, the past (or the future) would have been (pr would be) differ-
ent. If a cause C is later than its effect E then C only alters the 
past in the counterfactual sense, just as if C is earlier than E, 
C only alters the future in the counterfactual sense. Hence, I sub-
mit, backwards causation does not entail altering the past in any but 
the counterfactual sense of 'alter'. 
Black's Argument 2 
Black presents a hypothetical case of "backwards causation!', 
which he considers to be typical of proposed examples; Houdini, if 
hypnotized, can always tell how a tossed penny will fall. Here 
Houdini's answer (event A) might be proposed as an effect of the result 
of the toss (event T) a minute later. To exclude obvious alternative 
descriptions of the situation in terms of forwards causation Black 
2. 	Black, M., "Why cannot an Effect Precede its Cause?",. 
Analysis, vol.16 (Jan 1956), pp. 49-58. 
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stipulates that A is not a (partial) cause of T, so that the occurrence 
of A in no way influences the occurrence of T. Black also stipulates 
that event T has a sufficient cause which is not a sufficient cause 
of A, so that T and A are not collateral effects of some earlier 
event X. In addition, he stipulates that the event A is not caused 
by any prior event. This third stipulation is designed to exclude the 
case in which A is caused by X and T is caused by Y, where X and Y 
are not causally connected. Some care needs to be taken in interpret-
ing this third stipulation. Perhaps a partial cause of Houdini's 
giving the right answer might be that he is hypnotized. Black, surely, 
only wants to deny that there could be a sufficient cause of A, 
earlier than A, which determines A. (If there were such a sufficient 
cause of A then that cause and T might overdetermine A and so, if the 
case were deemed symmetrical, T does not cause A. But, presumably, 
this peculiar case of overdetermination would still be considered a 
kind of backwards causation for the purpose of this discussion.) There- 
ore, I accept Black's stipulation as relevant, provided it is a 
stipulation against there being some earlier event X which is suffi-
cient in the circumstances for A. 
Black argues that T does not cause A because someone could 
wait for A to happen and could then prevent T. The obvious answer to 
Black's argument is to say that if backwards causation occurs, then 
one cannot intervene: 	it is fixed by some earlier event D that, no 
agent can intervene to prevent T. However this reply is not satis- 
factory in the case where it is a generally accepted truth that a person 
can intervene in such situations unless there is some kind of mechani-
cal obstruction p-eventing him. Thus Black's argument would seem to 
show that backwards causation is incompatible with generally accepted 
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truths. 
Accordingly, I shall consider in greater detail the claim that 
someone could intervene to prevent T, after A has occurred. There 
are three senses in which the phrase 'someone could intervene to 
prevent T' could be understood. 
One might merely claim that it was logically possible that some 
agent (God, for example) intervenes to prevent T, but one might not 
claim that in fact there is any agent who has the power to intervene. 
The mere logical possibility of preventing T after A occurs does not 
in any way threaten the claim that C causes A. Compare the case of 
forwards causation; event C causes a later event E but it is logicelly 
possible that, in the circumstances, C did not occur yet E still 
occurred (spontaneously). 	Indeed, unless there is this logical pos- 
sibility, C and E are not distinct existences. However, if one claims 
that no agent has the power to intervene . to prevent T, then one has 
denied a generally accepted truth about the powers of human beings; 
unless he is obstructed by some mechanism, a human being has the 
power to prevent a coin falling to the ground. 
Suppose that there is someone who is free to intervene to 
prevent T in. the libertarian sense of 'free', that is, suppose there 
is no transeunt cause of his failure to intervene. In this case, if 
he intervenes after A has occurred then T does not occur, so T does 
not cause A- Thus A has either occurred spontaneously or A has some 
other sufficient cause (earlier than A). But it is assumed that A has 
no sufficient cause earlier than A, so if the person intervenes A 
occurs spontaneously Thus either A would occur spontaneously anyway, 
in which case T does not cause A, or the person can intervene after 
A occurs to ensure that A occurs spontaneously. But the latter 
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alternative implies that the person has some god-like power of deter-
mining laws of nature (and what causes what) and it is generally 
agreed that human beings do not have such powers. Backwards causation 
in this case would be incompatible with generally accepted truths. 
(3) The sense of 'power' in which it is a generally accepted truth 
that people do have the power to intervene to prevent T is such that 
possession of a power to act is compatible with the action having a 
sufficient-in-the-circumstances transeunt cause. Suppose that, in 
situations in which backward causation occurs, Compatibilism is cor-
rect. Thus people have the power to intervene but there is some quasi-
event D which is sufficient, in the circumstances, for the absence 
of intervention. Let C be the quasi-event that no agent intervenes. 
Suppose also that the compatibilist claims that an agent's actions are 
• determined by earlier events, so D is earlier than C. Because inter- 
vention could occur any time after A, D must be no later than A. 
In particular, D is not T itself. Now suppose that D does not occur, 
then nothing prevents interference, so as in (2), T might not occur. 
If T caused A but D did not occur, T and hence A might not occur 
either. So D seems to be a necessary part of a sufficient condition 
for. A. The other necessary part is, presumably, T itself. Consequent-
ly, D and T are jointly sufficient for A. For instance, the quasi-
event D might be the state 	 affairs prior to A in all minds, and so 
D ensures that Tioudini is trying to guess the future and is in a.state 
in which he can know what will happen. D also ensures that no agent 
intervenes. Thus there are the following causal connections: 
(i) T is necessary for A; 
D and T are jointly sufficient for A 
(perhaps also D is necessary for A); 
D is sufficient for C; 
C is necessary for T. 
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To show that such a. system of causal connections is possible, I 
consider the following case of forwards causation: 
D* is the kitchen being on fire; 
T* is the presence of gas in the house; 
A* is the explosion of the house; 
C*. is the bursting of the gas cylinder in the kitchen. 
It is then plausible that D* and T* are indiVidually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for A*, that D* is sufficient for C*, and that C* 
is necessary for T*. 	Nonetheless it is plausible that T* . is.a cause 
of A*. 	It follows that Black's argument merely shows that for a case 
of backwards causation to be consistent with generally accepted truths, 
some form of Compatibilism should hold in the backwards causal situ-
ations. 
Note: 	If an agent performs at action A and A causes an earlier 
event C, then A cannot be free in the libertarian sense. For if A 
were free the agent could freely decide, when C has already occurred, 
not to perform A. (In a sense, the agent can intervene after C to 
prevent the proposed cause of C, namely A). I call this result The 
Corollary to Black's Argument. 
1.3 An Argument  of Gale's 3 
Gale argues that if an event L is later than an event E, and if 
L caused E then it would be logically impossible for an agent to have 
a trace of E (say a memory) when the agent brings L about. Yet A is 
logically possible for an agent to have a trace of E. Gale gives the 
example in which Jones on learning that Smith, sometime earlier, was 
in a dangerous situation, "retro-warns" Smith Cevent L). Smith, in 
the dangerous situation, has an experience (event E) in which he seems 
to hear the words which Jones subsequently utters. Suppose L causes E. 
3. 	Gale, R.N., "Why a Cause Cannot be Later than its Effect", 
Review of Metaphysics, pp. 230 -231. 
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Gale claims - that since E is earlier than L it is logically possible 
that Jones has a trace of E and hence that Jones knows that E occurs. 
But if Jones intentionally does L in order to bring E about, it is 
impossible for Jones to know that E occurred. 
Gale's argument (las he himself admitted in a letter to Brier 4 ) 
is based on the confusion - between 'p logically imples q' and p 
implies necessarily q'. 	For the sentence 
If Jones intentionally does L in order to' bring E about, 
it is impossible for Jones to know that E occured, 
must be interpreted as 
Jones intentionally does L in order to bring E about 
logically implies 'Jones does not know that E occurred',. 
and not interpreted as 
'Jones intentionally does L in order to bring E about' 
implies the logical necessity of 'Jones does not know 
that E occurred'. 
An additional defect in Gale's argument is that a person can 
sometimes know the occurrence of the intentional effect of his action. 
For example, if I go to the window with the intention of opening it, 
then in a suitably weak sense of 'know', I know that I shall open the 
window. (Presumably Jones' knowledge is knowledge only in some weak 
sense.) This defect is easily remedied; a person who knows the occur-
rence of E and whose knowledge is due to a trace of E (say a memory) 
cannot intentionally bring about E. And it is precisely knowledge 
due to a trace which Gale considers. 
I now present an argument which is valid but the conclusion 
of which is not as strong as Gale's. Suppose that E occurs and let 
L*4) be an abbreviation for '4) is true and the truth of (;) is fixed at 
4. Brier, B., Precognition caul the Philosophy of Science, p•3• 
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timet _'. 5 i 
Let e be: 'E occurs at time t I 
Let p be: 'At time t 2 Jones intentionally does L 
to bring about E at the time t1 ' 
Let q be: 'At time t 2 Jones knows that E occurs, 
as a result of a trace of E'. 
Consider the following premises: 
L*(e D p) 
It is logically necessary that q D e. 
L*(q D -p) 
Premiss (1) is based on the assumption that the only way in which E 
can occur, given the history up to E, is by Jones - retro-warning Smith 
and on the assumption that Jones could not retro-warn Smith unintent-
ionally. Although L*(e D p) is not a logical consequence of a back-
wards causal-situation in which Jones retro-warns Smith, it would be 
peculiar not to admit the Possibility of premiss(1) and yet 
to accept the possibility of backwards causation. Premiss (2) is 
obvious; 	knowledge that E occurs entails that E occurs. 	Premiss (3) 
is the premiss that it is impossible both to know that E occurs as a 
result of a trace and intentionally to bring E about. This impossi-
bility might be slightly weaker than logical impossibility, but it is 
surely strong enough to permit the premiss L*-'(p&q), which is equi-
valent to Premiss (3). 
5. 	It is plausible that L* has the properties of necessity 
in Fey's system T. It is also plausible that F*F*q5 is 
true; for all 4), where F* is the non-contingency operator 
defined. by: 	"F*yN = Df 	v L*-1). 	It follows that L* has the properties of necessity in Lewis' system S5. (See 
Montgomery, H.A., and Routley, F.R., "Contingency and Non-
Contingency bases in Normal Modal Logics", Logique 
et Analyse, vol.9 (1966), pp. 318-328. - 
; I 
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From (2), one has (4), L*(q D e) 
From (1) and (4), one has (5), 1,*(1 D p) 
From (3) and (5), one has 1,*(-0 
It follows that it is fixed at the time of the occurrence of E that 
Jones will not know that E occurred when he retro-warns Smith. (At 
least, any knowledge which Jones has is due to Jones' intention to 
retro-warn Smith, rather than to a trace of E.) This is indeed a 
somewhat peculiar result but it does not establish the impossibility . 
of backwards causation. For there could be some event D earlier 
than E, such that D and L are individually necessary and jointly suf-
ficient for E. D might also prevent Jones knowing that E occurs. For 
instance, D might be the state of some "Psi field"; only if the Psi 
field is in a certain state can retro-warning occur, and if the Psi 
field is in this state, certain memory traces are erased. 
1.4 An Argument of Swinburne's 6 
Swinburne's argument against the possibility of backwards causation 
is based on two premises. 
Premiss One: 
Premiss Two: 
If a statement is to be about a certain instant 
- then it must be logically possible for an observer, 
who is correctly positioned, either to verify or to 
falsify the statement more conclusively at that 
instant than at other instants. 
An action which affects the past produces changes in 
the evidence aboUt the past. Thus Swinburne assumes 
that if an action A at time t 2 causes an event B at 
time t„ then there is evidence at t that B has nOt 
  
occurred, but at t3 (after t 2 ) there is evidence that 
E l 
6. 	Swinburne, R., Space and Time, pp. 157-170. 
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B has occurred. 
Swinburne now argues 7 on the one hand, that if the evidence at 
t1 is better than the evidence at t 3' 
then by Premiss Two there are 
no grounds for believing that B occurred. But, on the other hand, if 
the evidence at t3 is better than the evidence at t 1, then 
either the evidence at t I could not be-improved (so as to be 
better than that at t 3), therefore by Premiss One the 
statement that B tccurred is not about instant t • _ 
or 	the evidence at t 1 was not typical and more evidence 
would have resulted in a different conclusion, namely 
that B had occurred. In this case, by Premiss Two, B 
occurred but action A did not cause B. 
Therefore, Swinburne argues, there could be no grounds for believing 
that A at t 2 caused B at t l . He then concludes: 
Since no evidence could ever - for 
reasons of logic - support a claim that 
a man affected the past it makes no sense 
to suppose that he could. 8 
Even if one does not accept the positivist-inspired principle Swinburne 
is using, the impossibility of there being grounds for believing in 
backwards causation would be an important result. 	Finally, Swinburne 
argues that if it is not possible, even in principle, for a person to 
affect the past, then there could be no cases of backwards causation 
in which an event affects the past. Swinburne here uses the premiss 
that if event C causes E a human being could in principle use C to 
produce E. 
I now discuss the following two objections to Swinburne's 
argument. 
Swinburne, R., op.cit., p.164. 
Swinburne, R., op.cit., p.167. 
4 
4 
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Objection One: When Swinburne discusses the case in which the evi-
dence at t3 is better than the evidence at t l , Swinburne introduces 
a false dichotomy; he assumes that either the evidence at t1 is not 
typical (and that more evidence would lead to a different conclusion) 
or the evidence at t 1 is the best possible evidence at tl . Thus 
Swinburne ignores the case in which the evidence at t 1 is not the best 
possible but better evidence at t 1 would lead to the same conclusion. 
Discussion: 	Swinburne's argument could be modified using an • 
extra premiss: 
Premiss Three: 	If an action A affects the past then the evidence 
available after the action A differs from the best 
possible evidence before the action A. 
By Premiss Three, if the actual evidence at t l was that B did not occur 
but better evidence would have shown that B occurred, then action A 
did not cause event B. 	(Action A is interpreted as affecting the 
condition or appreciation of the evidence.) 
Objection Two  (due to Brier 9 ): 	Swinburne assumes (Premiss Tuo10  ) 
that without a change in evidence there could be no grounds for suppos-
ing that an action affects the past. While he night perhaps be cor-
rect, surely he should argue for this point, which is not an. obvious 
one. Brier, for instance, suggests that a strong enough correlation 
between actions like A and events like B would provide grounds for 
supposing that A caused B. 
Discussion: A variant of Premiss Two might be supported by the Fore-
knowledge Principle, namely: 
If person P could know at time t 1 thar 
person Q will act at time t 2 (later than t l ) 
Brier, op.cit., p.55. 
Also, see Swinburne, R., op.cit., p.164. 
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in order to bring about an event-B, then 
Q is not free (in the libertarian sense) 
to refrain from acting. 
This principle can be given more plausibility if the proviso is made 
that P's knowledge. that Q will bring B about is based on evidence 
available at time t
1 
that B will occur, rather than based either on 
a knowledge of Q's intention or on a faculty of precognition. The 
Foreknowledge Principle can be used to support Premiss Two*, namely: 
If free action A at time t
2 
causes an event 
B at time t
1, 
then there is no evidence available 
at t
1 
that B has occurred which would be sufficient 
to support a knowledge claim that B occurred. 
But, if the phrase 'best possible' in Premiss Three is interpreted as 
'logically best possible', the Foreknowledge Principle could not be 
used to support Premiss Three. One might try to find some other sense 
of 'possible' for which both Premises One and Three would be plausible. 
Consider the following senses: 
Logically compatible with all past events; 
Logically compatible with laws of nature; 
Logically compatible with laws of Nature and all 
past events. 
'Using either (1) or (2), Premiss One retains its plausibility, but it 
is hard to see how Premiss Three could be derived from the Foreknowledge 
Principle. 	Using (3), Premiss Three might perhaps be derivable from 
the Foreknowledge Principle together with other plausible premises. 
Rut Premiss (1) is now implausible, for the laws of nature might be 
deterministic and so only that which actually occurs would be possible 
in the required sense. 
Suppose one were to accept the above modification of Swinburne's 
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argument. . Then one would have shown only that one could never, 
even in principle, know that someone had freely affected the past, 
in a libertarian sense of 'free'. For, surely, it is possible that 
person P could in principle at time t I know what person. Q will freely. 
do at a. later time t2 in any sense of 'freely' which is compatible 
with Q's free actions being determined by events occurring before tl . 
Thus Swinburne would have established the corollary to Black's 
argument, namely that in a libertarian sense of 'free' no agent can 
freely affect the past. 	Swinburne then argues that if C causes E 
an agent should be able in principle, to use C to bring E about. This 
argument is incorrect if the action of the .agent is required to be 
free in a libertarian sense. 	For the paradigms of causation are 
cases in which an agent acts to produce C and hence E; if such actions 
must be free in the libertarian sense, then the compatibilist is 
committed to the extremely peculiar - though perhaps consistent - claim 
that all the apparent paradigms of causation are illusory as paradigms 
although they might be like the purely imaginary paradigms. Rather, 
it seems that the compatibilist would assert that the paradigms of 
causation are cases in which the action is free only in the compatibi-
list sense. 
Therefore, although Premiss Two* exhibits a peculiarity of back-
wards caosation, Swinburne's argument against the possibility of back-
wards causation fails. 
1.5 The Possibility of  Backwards Causation  
I now sketch an. account of the ordinary notion of time which; if 
it is correct, can be used to argue that backwards causation is 
logically possible but that it is logically necessary that cases of 
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backwards causation are rare. 
I begin by considering three proto-temporal orderings, that is 
time-like orderings of events. 
A person is aware that some perceptual experiences are later 
than other perceptual experiences. Again, a person has what 
at least seem tobememories; the remembered experience is 
earlier than the conscious memory of that experience. It is 
perhaps contingent but presumably in all normal cases true 
that, for any given person, these orderings - of perceptual 
experience and remembered experience cohere into a single 
proto-temporal ordering. I call this the ordering of 
phenomenological time. 
If A causes'B then A is causally prior to B. 	A causal 
proto-temporal ordering is an ordering such that if A is 
causally prior to B, A is no later than B. 
Implicit in the theories of Physics is some account of the 
geometry of space-time. Typically there are one or two obvious 
proto-temporal orderings associated with this account of the 
geometry of space-time. For example, in the theory of Special 
Relativity there are two possible proto-temporal orderings 
(one is the reverse of the other) both of which are partial 
for events which are separated in a space-like manner cannot 
be temporally ordered (Except with respect to some particular 
frame of reference). 
Now I suggest that the ordinary notion of time presupposes a great 
deal of coherence between the phenomenological protc-temporal order-
ings and some caucal proto-temporal orderings, and perhaps a great 
deal of coherence between both these and some ordering associated 
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with the geometry of space-time. My only argument in support of 
this suggestion is that it provides a (transcendental) explanation 
for the intuition that there is a logical peculiarity about backwards 
causation. I suggest that this logical peculiarity is due to the 
logical necessity of a great deal of coherence between the phenomeno-
logical orderings and some causal ordering if. there is to be any temp-
oral ordering at all. 
However, if one is a realist about causal priority, one is com-
mitted to the contingency of this coherence between the causal and 
the other proto-temporal orderings. Now consider the situation in 
which there is, on one occasion only, a discrepancy between the causal 
and the other proto-temporal orderings. For example, suppose that 
there are many observers of events E and L and, in each case, the 
experiences of the observers are such that E seems to be before L. 
Yet L is causally prior to E. Furthermore, suppose that event A is 
causally prior to event B, that A is spatio-temporally near to E 
(perhaps they are contiguous) and that B is-spatio-temporally near to 
L. Since this is the only case in which there is a discrepancy be-
tween the proto-temporal orderings I suggest that one would not say 
that the ordinary temporal ordering had become incoherent. Further-
more, it would seem most peculiar if one claimed. that E is later than 
L, for in that case A is earlier than B, E is later than L, yet A is 
near E and B is near L with respect to the geometry of space-time as 
described in the physical theory. Thus one would interpret this 
situation as one of backwards causation. 
Hence if my account of the ordinary notion of time is correct, 
the realist about causal priority is committed to the possibility of 
backwards causation. But since realism about causal priority is 
logically compatible with generally accepted truths, it follows that 
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backwards causation is itself logically compatible with generally 
accepted truths. 
Note: 	In this argument I assume that the ordinary temporal ordering 
is based on the various proto-temporal orderings which I mention. 
If one holds that the ordinary notion of time is irreducible, a similar 
argument to the above holds. For there is no reason why an irreduc-
ible causal priority "in the objects" should agree with this irreduc-
ible temporal ordering. 
Section Doc.: Mackie's Account of Causal Priority  
2.1 	Mackie begins by presenting three arguments in support of a 
conceptual distinction between causal and temporal priority. 
Argument One11 : "We seem ready to accept causes which are simultan- 
eous with their effects." 
If one assumes, as I do, that there are coherent examples of 
simultaneous causation, Argument One shows that causes need not be 
earlier than their effects. 	In this chapter I am concerned with the 
possibility of backwards causation. Clearly, if one has an adequate 
account of simultaneous causation without involving an irreducible 
element of causal priority "in the objects", then Argument One has no 
relevance - to the possibility cf backwards causation. 
Argument Two: 	Mackie argues that backwards causation is condeivable 
and promises to describe "in some detail conceivable experimental 
results which, if they were obtained, would be coherently interpreted 
as evidence for backwards causation." 12 
This argument depends on the success of the promised hypothetical 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.16I. 
Ibid., p. 161. 
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example of backwards causation. 
Argument Three: 	Mackie argues13 that temporal and causal priority 
have different logical structures- Here Mackie seems to be arguing 
from the assumption that the temporal ordering of events is a total 
ordering, that is, any two events are temporally comparable. Mackie 
also seems to assume that the temporal ordering is compatible with a 
relation of betweenness derived from the topology of the line. From 
these assumptions it follows that "once a time-direction has been 
. given to any pair of events, it has been given to the system as a 
whole". 14 The ordering of causal priority is not a total ordering 
but merely a partial ordering, that is there can be events A and -B which 
are not comparable with respect to the ordering of causal priority. 
Mackie concludes that there is a conceptual distinction between temp-
oral and causal priority. 	Mackie 's argument fails because, I suggest, 
the two assumptions which he makes are false if the temporal ordering 
is that asSociated with the geometry of space-time. For, according 
to the theory of Special Relativity, if A and B are separated in a 
space-like manner, there are many frames of reference with respect to 
which A is earlier than B, and there will be some event C such that 
with respect to some of these frames C is later than B but with re- 
spect to others C is earlier than B. Mackie's argument is reminiscent 
of that which I propose in Section 1.5; both arguments are based on 
the logical possibility of discrepancies between different time-tike 
orderings. So it is significant that Mackie says 
An adherent of the latter view [that 
causal priority is temporal priority in 
disguise] would say that when it is 
settled that D is temporally prior Le 
E ... it follows at once that if they 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, pp. 162, 163. 
Ibid., p.162. 
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are causally related, D is the cause and 
E the effect. But what I. am maintaining 
is that this seems not to be how we ordin- 
arily see this matter.- 5 
I maintain that how "we ordinarily seethis matter" involves an 
incorrect metaphysical theory which is nonetheless not logically 
incompatible with generally accepted truths. 
Argument Four: Mackie argues in favour of the conceptual distinction 
between causal and temporal priority on the grounds that "we regard 
causes as explaining their effects in a way in which effects do not 
explain their causes, and the mere fact of temporal priority would 
16 
not account for this". 
This argument raises two important issues which will be discussed 
in Section Three. The first is that the causal anti-realist should 
give some account of why causes are ordinarily considered to explain 
their effects, but not vice versa. Otherwise the causal anti-realist's 
account is suspect (See Section 3.5). 	The second issue is more dir- 
ectly relevant to the discussion of backwards causation; are there 
situations in which quasi-events E l .... En precede L, and of which 
the only plausible explanation is that E l ... En are collateral ef-
fects of L? 	This second issue is closely related to the problem of 
finding the "time-reversed image" of the (forwards-causal) collateral 
effects situation. Such a "time-reversed image" is, presumably, a 
forwards-causal-description of the situation in which E l ... En pre- 
cede L but in which one is teMpted to say that E l 	En are the 
backward-causal collateral effects of L. Mackie argues that the des-
cription of the situation as one of causal overdetermination does not 
explain the coincidence of E l ... En , but as he himself points out 
this is not in any case an adequate description of the "time-reversed 
Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.163. 
Ibid., p.169 
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image". For example, if there are several precognisers and events 
E 	En are their precognitions of the same event, 
L, then L seems 
to be sufficient for E 	..., En in a way which would not be so if 
El ,..., 	overdetermined L. 	It seems that the relevant difference n. 
is that (in the precognition example) in the circumstances, if any 
events D1, 	D, which are earlier than 
E1 , 	E' were prevented n 
yet L were ensured, then E 	En  would still occur; while in the 
case of overdetermination E. '  E n would not occur. Here the cir-1'  
cumstances include the quasi-events that the precognisers are trying 
to precognise and have the ability to precognise. I provide a suitable 
forwards causal description of chis situation in Section 3.6. Thus, 
assuming that these two interesting issues are treated satisfactorily, 
not one of Mackie's arguments shows that one cannot incorporate into 
an analysis of causation the condition that the cause is not later 
than the effect. 
0 0 Having argued that one cannot in a straightforward way identify 
causal and temporal priority, Mackie considers three accounts of 
causal priority. 
• Russell's Account 17  : 	Russell's suggestion is that if there is 
a law that entails that an event of kind E occurs if and only if 
either an event of kind A or an event of kind. B or ... occurs, then 
if an A and an E occur the A causes the E. 
Mackie proposes the following counter-example to Russell'; 
suggestion; the indeterministic chocolate machine L should, on 
Russell's account, involve backwards causation (this example is clearer 
if the machine says "thank you" if a shilling is put in but no bar 
comes out ...). However controversial Mackie's chocolate machine 
might be as an example of forwards causation, it is certainly not an 
17. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.166. 
(1) 
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example of backwards causation! 
(2) The Effectiveness  Account: In my Introduction I claimed that 
the paradigms of producing causation are cases in which a person pro- 
duces (or prevents) one event in order to produce (or prevent) another. 
The Effectiveness Acccunt of causal priority is as follows: 
Given X and Y are causally related, X is 
causally prior to Y if one can produce (or 
prevent) Y by producing (or preventing) X, 
but not vice versa. 
Mackiehas two objections to the Effectiveness Account both of which 
I have considered in the Introduction. His first objection is that if 
one considers the hypothetical causal situation in which the approach 
of another star towards the Sun. caused the formation of the planets, 
then it is clear that such cases of causation are ones in which no 
human being could produce the cause. But if one claims that in prin-
ciple an agent could produce planets by making a star approach the 
Sun, then one's grounds for making this assertion are not based on any 
experience of making planets. Here it seems one is asserting that 
in principle an agent could bring about X in order to bring about Y 
	F 
(hut not vice versa) either precisely on the grounds that X is 
causally prior to Y,, or because the situation has some features in 
common with the producing paradigms of causation. In the former case 
the effectiveness account is circular, in the latter case it must 
depend on some other account of causal priority (such as the account 
which I have given of causation in Chapters Two and Three). So in 
neither case is the effectiveness account by itself an adequate account 
of causal priority. 
Mackie's second objection is based on Chisholm's example in which 
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a. person raises his arm in order to make certain earlier neural events 
occur. Mackie claims that on the Effectiveness Account this should 
be considered a case of backwards causation, which is counter-intuitive. 
(Although von Wright considers that as part of a suitable "closed 
system" this would be a case of backwards causation. 18 
(3) Popper's Account 19 : 
Mackie also discusses an account of causal priority according to 
which X is causally prior to Y if X is "prior with respect to the 
dispersal of order". The paradigm of order-dispersion is the example 
in which waves spread out from the centre of a pool. This process of 
expanding waves is explicable if it is the effect of a single event - 
say a stone being dropped into the centre of the pool. 	But the re- 
verse process, though physically possible, would involve there being 
many generators of waves. Popper proposes a Dispersal of Order Account 
of the direction of time. But, as Mackie points out, it is logically 
possible that there is a process in which the event which is prior 
with respect to dispersal of order of order is later in time; for 
instance, suppose the waves move inwards from the outside of the pool, 
without any previous outward movement and without there being coherent 
•generators of waves. - Thus dispersal of order seems to be. related to 
causal, rather than temporal priority. 
Mackie suggests that priority with respect to dispersal or order 
is not itself causal priority but rather constitutes evidence fo 
causal priority. That priority with. respect to dispersal of order 
is not the same as causal priority is, presumably, shown by the logi-
cal possibility of many random processes at the edge of the pool 
von Wright, G.H., Er,planation and Understanding, pp. 74-81. 
Mackie, j.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.183. 
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happening to result in a coherent pattern of inward-moving waves. 
That priority with respect to the dispersal of order is evidence for 
causal priority is based on the claim that the situation can only 
be explained as collateral effects of a common cause; for Mackie 
says: 
An example of dispersed order, then, 
such as the outer circular wave, is 
a set. either of collateral effect 6 Dr 
of joint causes of the central events. 
... Since causes explain effects, and not 
vice versa, the central event will explain. , 
the dispersed order only it it is its 
cause ... 20 
I argue in Section 3.6 that such apparent cases of collateral effects 
of a later cause can be interpreted in forwards causal terms. 
Thus Mackie has argued that none of the three accounts of causal 
priority considered (Russell's account, the Effectiveness Account 
and Popper's account) is satisfactory. 
2.3 A  Proposed Example of Backwards Causation 
Mackie considers a hypothetical precognition experiment based on 
an example of Scriven's. 21 Mackie does not base his example on the 
assimilation of precognition tefamiliar processes of visual perception,. 
and so when he talks about precognition one could substitute (as he 
suggests) the appearance of a pattern in iron filing on a glass sheet. 
A. pattern, is displayed on Tuesday (event B) and one (or more) precogn-
nisers correctly draw that pattern on Monday (or the pattern appears 
on the sheet of iron filings on Monday). The agreement is too good 
to be a coincidence. Mackie considers three possibilities. 
A causes B; 
B causes A; 
A and B are collateral effects of 
Mackie, J.L.,The Cement of te Universe, p.185. 
Scriven, M., "Randomness and the Causal Order", Analysis, 
vol.17 (1956), pp. 5-9. 
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some third event C earlier than A. 
Provided that the pattern is selected at random - in the sense of hav-
ing no cause - the first and the third of these possibilities can be 
rejected. So it would seem that B causes A. 	However, asMackie points 
out, the notion of a random event itself depends on the notion of a 
cause. Thus he says "the item which. just happens, which pops up from 
nowhere, is simply something to which nothing is causally prior ” .
22 
This remark is especially relevant to Hackle's search for an appro-
priate analysis of causal priority. However, it also shows-that one 
is begging the question if one assumes that, say, the radio-active 
decay responsible for the selection of a pattern is random. Here one 
might consider a cruder example: the Geiger-counter which registers 
radiation one minute before the radium atom decays - call this the 
precognitive Geiger -counter. Perhaps the clicking of the precognitive 
Geiger-counter could itself be a random process and cause the radium 
atom to decay (see Section 3.3). 
Mackie then considers Black's argument discussed in Section 1.2. 
He suggests that Black's argument shows not merely, as I claim, that 
it is fixed (by an earlier event D) at the time of event A that no one 
intervenes to prevent B, but also that it is fixed that B occurs. So 
Mackie excludes the case in which some free choice or random device is 
used to produce B. But D might, I claim, be sufficient for the non-
intervention, yet D and the random event B might be jointly sufficient 
and individually necessary for A. Thus it is not B, but rather the 
randomness of B, that must be fixed. Indeed, in the case of the pre-
cognitive Geiger-counter there is no normal way in which anyone could 
intervene to prevent the radium atom decaying. One might claim that 
the randomness has always been fixed. 
22. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.177. 
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Mackie suggests that for an example of backwards causation. one 
requires that A be fixed after B is fixed (but B occurs later than A). 
Perhaps the random device is used to generate random numbers at time 
to , then it is used, at time t 1 , to select the precognisers from the 
population. The precognisers make their drawings at t 2 and the pattern 
is selected using the previously generated random numbers and is dis- 
played at time t,. In this case, the argument for interpreting the a 
situation as one of backwards causation is that.the alternative for-. . 
wards causal explanation is excessively complicated. For it seems 
to involve a clairvoyant knowledge of the randomly generated numbers 
and a clairvoyant knowledge of the procedure used to convert the 
numbers into a pattern. I discuss whether or not this is the only 
alternative in Section 3.4.. 
Finally, Mackie suggests that the precognition Experiment would 
be more decisive if there were several precognisers who all make the 
correct drawing. This argument seems also to depend on. the rejection 
of the alternative interpretation of the situation as one of forward-
causal collateral effects. 
So Mackie's example raises three interesting issues. The first 
is whether one should assimilate precognition to, say, visual percep-
tion, and treat a case of precognition as one in which the knowledge 
is the effect of the known state of affairs. (I discuss this issue 
in Section 3.2.) 	The second issue is whether, where an apparently 
random device is used, it is reasonable to interpret the experiment 
as a situation in which the random device is affected by, say, the 
precogniser. The third issue is whether or not one can interpret the 
situation in which a precogniser makes a drawing which has already 
been selected but has not yet been displayed, without treating the 
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precogniser as a clairvoyant. 
2.4 Mackie's Account of Causal Priority 
I now briefly criticise Mackie's account of causal priority in 
terms of fixity, which is as follows: 
Suppose that ... X is seen as necessary (and 
sufficient) in the circumstances for Y 
Then despite this, X was not causally prior to 
Y if there was a time at which Y was faxed but 
X was unfixed. If on the other hand X was fixed 
at a time when Y was unfixed, then X was causally 
prior to Y. Again if X was not fixed until it_ 
occurred, then even if Y [occuring later than X] 
also was fixed as soon as X occurred, ... X was 
causally prior to Y. And further,- if there is 
some line or chain, of causation ... linking X 
and Y and some other event Z so that X was between 
Y and Z, and if Z was not fixed until it occurred., 
then X was causally prior to Y. 23 
I object to Mackie's account of causal priority because it is ineffect-
ive. 	For I argue that his account of causal priority is of no use 
in handling the problems of collateral effects and simultaneous 
causation which it is partly designed to handle. But if one provides, 
as I have done in Chapter Two, an analysis which handles these pro-
blems without using causal priority, there seems to be no need to 
use that notion in the analysis of causation. 1 
Consider first cases of collateral effects. None of the examples 
considered in the discussion of the Necessity Thesis involved random 
processes and so they are compatible with Total Determinimn(that is, 
the theory that every event has always been fixed). But as Mackie 
points out, in the case of Total Determinism there is no contrast be-
tween fixity and unfixity and so there are no considerations of causal 
priority as analysed by Mackie. 	 • 
Again, even if one ignores the possibility of Determinism, there 
23. Mackie, J.L., The Cement of the Universe, p.190. 
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will still be many hypothetical cases in which X and Y are simultan-
eous and are simultaneously fixed at a time earlier than X or Y. On 
Mackie's account, to decide whether X causes Y or Y causes X, one has 
to find an earlier event Z, not fixed until it occurs, such that the 
causal chain is Z to X to Y, rather than Z to Y to X. But unless 
one can decide whether X causes Y or Y causes X, one cannot decide 
whether the causal chain is Z to X to Y or Z to Y to X. 
For example, consider the ball on the cushion. It is supposed _ 	. 
that a ball sometimes simply stops above the cushion. , or sometimes 
drops onto the cushion . Let X be the event that the ball is on the 
cushion, let Y be the event that the cushion is depressed. 	Let Z 
be the event that the ball did not stop above the cushion. Then, in 
this example, Z is only fixed when it occurs; when Z is fixed so also 
are X and Y. One does not know that the causal chain is Z to X to Y, 
rather than Z to Y to X, until one knows whether X causes Y or Y causes 
X. 	So I conclude that Mackie's account of causal priority is 
ineffectual. 
Note: 	Presumably, since Mackie is giving an account of causal pri- 
ority in terms of fixity, fixity must itself not involve the notion 
of causal priority. I suggest that the time at which an event Y is 
fixed is the time of occurrence of the earliest quasi-event X. such 
that it is nomically necessary that if X occurs Y also occurs. 
—Section -Three: 	Some Remarks Relevant to the Discussion of 
Backwards Causation  
In this section I gather together some remarks which will be 
relevant to the examination of proposed cases of backwards causation 
in the next section. 
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3.1 On Requiring a Simple Causal Explanation  
Suppose that a hypothetical example, say of precognition, is 
explained in terms of a hypothesis about the causal relations between 
events, and the simplest such explanation involves backwards causation. 
Is that evidence for backwards causation? The causal realist might 
treat this as evidence, for by abduction the simplest account of causes 
"in the objects" would be the one most likely to be correct. But if 
one is an anti-realist about causal priority and if one can give a 
simple alternative explanation which does not involve the notion of a 
cause but involves only, say, the notion of a law of Nature or of a 
regularity, then one is not committed to backwards causation. In that 
case, if a causal description of the situation is demanded, it would 
not be irrational to give a very complicated description involving 
forwards causation, provided one has a simple account of what is happen-
ing in terms of laws of Nature. 
— 3.2 Precognition without BackwardsCausation 
If one were to assimilate precognition to visual perception one 
would claim that the known event causes the knowledge. But I claim 
that the following 	conditions are sufficient for a person P to 
precognise an event E: 
E occurs and P believes that E occurs; 
The event E is later than P's belief that E occurs. 
and (3) P's belief that E occurs is nomically sufficient in the 
circumstances for the event E to occur. In other words, 
if 'N4)' is an abbreviation for '4) is nomically necessary', 
if c is a sentence describing the circumstances (up to 
the time of P's belief), if b is the sentence 'P believes 
that E occurs and if e is the sentence 'The event E occurs', 
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then 
NC (c&b) D (c&e) ). 
First notice that the question of the believer's justification 
of the belief is. not usually considered when discussing precognition. 
If someone with psychic powers has a vision in which he seems to see 
the future and in fact, unknown to the psychic, it is a. law of Nature 
that visions of this kind are always correct, then one would say that 
there was precognition even though the psychic might not be justified • 
in believing that the vision is veridical.. 
Now consider the case in which an event of kind C invariably causes 
events of kinds A and B, and events of hind A are only caused by events 
of kind C. For example, heating a sodium compound produces light of 
a characteristic yellow colour which has two different wavelengths 
(the Sodium D lines). If I know the light contains one of the wave-
lengths, then I know that there has been a sodium compound heated (or 
otherwise excited) and so I know the light also contains the other 
wavelength. Yet in this case the known events and the knowledge are 
collateral effects of heating t1-.:2 sodium. Perhaps in some strict 
sense the "knowledge" that the unobscured wavelength has occurred is 
not genuine knowledge. But I claim that precognition would not be 
required to be genuine knowledge in such a strict sense of 'knowledge'. 
Hence I conclude that conditions (1), (2) and (3) are sufficient 
for P to precognise it and I conclude that one requires neither that 
P's belief be justified nor condition (3*) namely: 
(3*) Event E is causally necessary in the circumstances 
for P's belief that E occurs. 
Note: 	The difference between conditions (3) and (3*) is most clearly 
seen in a case of simultaneous causation. Suppose that X and Y are 
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simultaneous, that X is necessary in the circumstances for Y and that 
X causes Y. Then. Y does not cause X, yet Y is nomically sufficient 
in the circumstances for X. 
— 3.3 On Affecting "Random" Devices 
Suppose that a precogniser correctly draws a pattern which. is 
selected a day later by a device which is usually considered to be 
random, such as a device which measures the time between the clicks 
	1 
of a Geiger-counter in the presence of a small quantity of . a.radioactive 
substance. Assume that the precogniser is always successful and that 
the success is not an accident. I claim that the situation can be 
adequately described in terms of laws of Nature, without reference to 
causation, as follows: 
Given, as the circumstances, the state of 
mind of the precogniser, P, at the time of the 
experiment, P's drawing X is nomically necessary 
and sufficient for the later selection of the 
pattern X. 
Thus I assume that, given P's peculiar mental state, he would not draw 
the wrong pattern and if no pattern were displayed he would not .draw 
a pattern at all. 
Although it is not necessary to do so, one could also describe 
the situation as one of forwards causation, P's drawing X causes the 
pattern X to be displayed. I. now consider two objections to this 
description of the situation in forwards causal terms. 
Objection One: 	It might be objected that precisely because the 
device is random the selection of the pattern cannot be caused by the 
precogniser's drawing. 
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Reply: Either one means by 'random' 'not having a transeunt cause', 
or one means by 'random' 'having an equal propensity to select any 
pattern', or one means by 'random' statistically random'. 	In the 
first two cases, one should distinguish between an essentially random 
process and a materially random process. If it is part of the nature 
of the device that it must be random then it is said to be essentially 
random. But if the device is random only because it happens to lack 
a cause then it is materially random. If to devices are identical . 
one could be materially random and the other not. The cauSal anti-
realist can deny that there are any essentially random devices. He 
can argue that whether the device is random depends not on the nature 
of the device but on various events and regularities. He can argue 
that his forwards-causal description of the situation shows that the 
device is not random. In the third case, where the device is statis-
tically randoui, assume that there are a thousand patterns from which 
X is selected. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether' 
the device is random, assume that the. precogniser affects the device 
in such a way that whichever of the thousand patterns he draws that 
• *pattern is subsequently displayed. 	It follows that the patterns 
displayed vary over the thousand in precisely the same manner as the 
drawings. Therefore if the precogniser draws at random one of the 
thousand patterns, it is necessarily the case that the patterns are 
- subsequently selected in a statistically random fashion. Consequent-
ly the statistical. randomness of the device for selecting the pattern 
is consistent with the precogniser affecting the random device. 
Objection Two: 	The description of the situation in forwards-causal 
terms involves an excessively complicated hypothesis, because: 
(1) a device which is usually uncaused is on this 
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occasion caused; 
(2) 	the precognition affects the "random" numbers 
generator, but the precogniser knows neither what 
the numbers are nor the procedure for converting 
random numbers into patterns. 
To this objection, I reply that the complexity of the hypothesis 
is entirely due to the insistence that it be stated in causal terms - 
I do not deny that precognition has occurred, and •I do not deny that 	• 
the content of the precogniser's knowledge has nothing to do with 
random numbers. The situation can be simply described as one in which 
it is nomically necessary and sufficient that the precogniser draw the 
pattern which is displayed the next day. No causal description is requir-
ed.. 	But the causal anti-realist can, if he wishes, interpret the - 
situation as one which involves forwards causation (See Section 31). 
3.4 	On Clairvoyance and Precognition  
• Consider a precognition experiment like that described in Section 
3.3, but in which before theprecognition the random numbers are 
generated which are used to select a pattern after the precognition. 
In this case, it is already determined what pattern v.d.11 be displayed. 
The description of the situation in terms of the laws of Nature has 
not altered; it is nomicany necessary (given the state of the precog-
niser's mind) that the precogniser draws a certain pattern if and only 
if that pattern is displayed a day later. But the causal description 
designed to avoid backwards causation is different. One now says that 
the precognition and the display of the pattern are both caused by the 
random selection cf numbers. It is important not to confuse such a 
case of precognition with clairvoyance. If a clairvoyant knew the 
random numbers, and if he also knew the procedure for converting the 
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numbers into patterns he could then infer that a certain pattern 
would be displayed. But the precogniser need not know anything about 
either random numbers or selection procedures; the content of his 
knowledge is the display of the pattern a day later. Nor am I suggest-
ing that he is an unconscious clairvoyant; I am simply describing, 
in a complicated causal fashion, what can be more simply described in 
terms of nomic necessity. 
Finally, suppose one sometimes selects the random numbers before,. 
and sometimes after, precognition. In that case the situation involv-
ing the same laws of Nature has to be variously interpreted as one of 
the precognition affecting the random device and as a case of collateral 
effects. Such complexity, while it might embarrass the causal realist, 
does not embarrass the anti-realist who has, in all cases, a simple 
description in terms of laws of Nature. 
The discussion in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 shows, I claim, that 
the causal anti-realist need not treat hypothetical examples of pre-
cognition as cases of backwards causation. Furthermore, the distinction 
between precognition and clairvoyance is one of the content of the 
knowledge (conscious or unconscious) rather than one of the kind of 
causal relations involved. 
— 3.5 Why do Causes Explain their Effects, hut not Vice Versa? 
An objection might be raised to Causal Anti-realism on the grounds 
that without some irreducible element of causal priority "in the 
objects", it is totally mysterious why effects do not explain causes. 
I. attempt to answer this objection without discussing the various 
theories of explanation - such as the Covering Law Theory - which would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
I. begin by distinguishing between absolute and relative explanations. 
An absolute (but perhaps parf;ial) explanation of some state-of-affairs 
is an account which makes the state-of-affairs either simpler or 
less mysterious. A relative explanation of one state-of-affairs in 
terms of another is some account of why, given the explanans the 
explanandum is simpler or not so mysterious as it would otherwise be. 
In other words, in an absolute explanation the explanandum together 
with the explanans is simpler or less mysterious than the explandum 
by itself. Whereas in a relative explanation the following counter-
factual is correct: 
If the explanans were to be treated as simple or 
as not mysterious then pointing to the explanans 	2 
renders the explandum simpler or less mysterious 
than it would otherwise seem to be. 
For example, suppose that one held a "Big Bang" theory in which the 
initial state of the universe is very simple, and suppose one could 
show that given this initial state and the laws of Nature, there would 
have to evolve the complex arrangement of galaxies in clusters which. 
astronomers observe. In that case, one would have provided a partial, 
absolute, explanation of the arrangement of galaxies in clusters. 
However, suppose one explained the occurrence of ancient paintings on 
an uninhabitable island near Antarctica in terms of this island having 
been inhabited 2,000 years ago. Unless one could explain why this 
island was then inhabited, this explanation would not be absolute: 
For, in this case the conjunction of the explanandum and the explanans 
is quite as mysterious as the explanandum by itself. 
Note: 	A mark of the difference between absolute and relative explan- 
ations is that if p would, if it were true, be an absolute (but- per-
haps partial) explanation of a known truth q then one has grounds for 
inferring by abduction that p is true, whereas one should not use 
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abduction to argue to a purely relative explanans. For instance, if 
one argued rationally to the past inhabitation of the island from 
the presence of paintings on the island, the argument would have to 
be by ordinary induction not by abduction. 
In the case of causation, the occurrence of the cause and of the 
effect can be, 	suggest, partial or total relative explanations of 
each other. The house burning is explained in terms of the fault in 
the wiring, but one can also provide what von Wright calls quasi-tele-
ological explanations: 
We observe that the state following after the 
explanandum c is the state d c we think, is 
a necessary condition of this state. The state 
d materialised - but had it not been for c, 
d would not have come about; c was needed to 
make it possible, one could say. We are are 
here interested in explaining d. We take its 
occurrence for granted. 24 
For example, I observe the behaviour of a mechanical tortoise, and I 
am puzzled until I realise that its complicated behaviour is neces-
sary in the circumstances for it to recharge itself frcm an electric 
power-point. I have then provided a relative explanation. of the be-
haviour of the tortoise in terms of its recharging itself; that is, 
I have explained the cause in terms of the effect. One is te.mpted to 
say that the explanation is in terms of either the tortoise being. 
designed to recharge itself or having some goal-seeking mechanism. 
But I suggest that the relative explanation would still hold if I did 
not know whether the tortoise was designed or not, or even if I dis-
covered that the tortoise only contained a battery and motor and no 
complicated electronics, provided the tortoise could not recharge 
itself without moving roughly as it did. If the tortoise only con-
tained a battery and motor, this quasi-teleological explanation would 
24. von Wright, G.H., Explanation and Understanding, pp. 57,58. 
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not be an absolute explanation. 
The regularity-theorist can give an account of relative causal 
explanations; instances of a regularity seem less mysterious than 
pairs of events that cannot be subsumed under a regularity. Notice 
that if one is considering relative explanations, one can also explain 
one collateral effect in terms of another provided the two are con-
stantly conjoined. For example, one could explain the alarm (which is 
set for 7 o'clock) going off at 5 o'clock in terms of the clock hands 
being at the 7 o'clock position, even though one might be totally ignor-
ant of whether the position of the clock hands and the alarm going off 
are cause and effect or collateral effects. 
Now consider absolute explanation. 	I suggest that there are two 
reasons why causes seem to explain effects but not vice versa. 
(1) If an agent acts (event X) in order to produce Y, the explanation 
• of the agent's action X is his intention to produce Y. 	So there is a 
relative explanation of Y in terms of X which is itself explained in 
terms of the intention to produce Y. That an agent who has whar are 
generally considered to be good reasons to act as well as the power to 
act, does act, might be considered a state of affairs lacking in mystery. 
So one obtains a partial but an absolute explanation of the occurrence 
of Y, and this explanation involves a chain of relative explanations 
from the agent's intention to X to Y. I suggest that one of the 
reasons for treating causes as partial absolute explanations of their 
effects is that often the cause itself can be explained in terms of an 
agent's actions. 
It is interesting to notice that in the case where the agent 
seems to produce the effect in order to produce the cause (for instance 
he raises his arm in order that certain neural events occur earlier) 
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one seems to provide a partial absolute explanation of the mysterious 
cause (the neural event) in terms of the less mysterious effect (the 
raising of the arm). Here the quasi-teleological explanation is ap-
parently absolute, not relative. 
(2) One can consider causal chains in which C causing E forms one 
link. It is logically necessary that, on the whole, the chains stretch 
from past to future because otherwise there would, I suggest, be no 
coherent temporal ordering. 25 Irrationally perhaps, it is assumed 
that what occurs in the distant past (or at the initial moment) is 
peculiarly lacking in mystery - it is to be taken for granted. By 
tracing a causal chain backwards from .f fact to cause one approaches 
the distant past, but if one traced the chain from cause to effect 
one would approach the distant future which is thought of as mysterious. 
Hence explanations of effect in terms of causes (even if the causes 
are later than the effects) would he relative, not absolute, for they 
are leading one in the wrong direction along the causal chain. 
The justification, if any, for this bias in favour of the past 
over the future is not any supposed simplicity of the initial state 
of the universe, for the initial state could be complicated and the 
final state very simple. I suggest - speculatively and tentatively - 
that this bias has two sources. 	The first source might be the influ- 
ence of crude ideas about creation: God acts like a human being and 
so produces the cause (the initial state of the universe) in order to 
produce the effect. 	The second source might be an obscure meta- 
physical theory that in some sense the past, being fixed, has ontologi-
cal priority over the future and so is less mysterious than the future. 
It follows that the causal anti-realist might be committed to denying 
25. See my account of time (Section 1.5), pp. 191-194- 
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widely held views that the past explains the future, and consequently 
denying that causes absolutely explain effects. Nonetheless, he can 
sketch an account of why causes seem to explain effects, but effects 
do not seem to explain causes. 
• 
3.6 	The Interpretation of Situations in which, it is Claimed, 
Several Earlier Events are the Collateral Effects of a 
Later Event. 
Suppose quasi-events E l 	En occur and later a quasi-event L 
occurs, and the co-occurrence of E l 	E can be explained if one 
accepts that L causes E 1 	En . The quasi-events E1 ... En might , 
be the various drawings by different precognisers. L might be the 
display of a randomly selected pattern. The challenge to produce an 
alternative simple explanation in terms offorwardscausation is mis-
guided. 	For, as I argue, there is a satisfactory explanation either 
in terms of laws of Nature or in terms of regularities. If one demands 
a forwards causal description, one can be provided but it is very 
complicated. 
Given the precognisers' state of mind, if it is nomically neces-
sary that the pattern which. they draw is later displayed, then it is 
also nomically necessary that they agree with one another. Hence, 
assuming that only one pattern is to be displayed, the co-occurrence 
of the events does not require a causal explanation at all; it only 
requires there to be laws which ensure that each drawing is sufficient 
for the display of the patterns, That the precognisers agree is a 
consequence of their ability to precognise; it does not require Any 
explanation in causal terms. A roughly analogous situation involving 
overdetermination is the case in which several mechanical tortoises 
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all find the one power-point in the room and the first to get there 
switches on that power-point. The behaviour of any of the tortoises 	1 
I. 
is sufficient in the circumstances for the power-point to be switched 
on, and because there is only one point, it is not a coincidence that 
all tortoises go to the same place. Furthermore, suppose there is no 
mechanism of any kind inside the tortoises except a battery and a 
motor yet it is a law of Nature that mechanical tortoises move towards 
electric power-points when their batteries have run down. In that 
case although this law explains the tortoises all going to the same 
point, the situation might nonetheless be interpreted as one in which 
a quasi-teleological explanation rather than a backwards causal explan-
ation is appropriate. The case of the precognisers' drawing the cor-
rect pattern has a somewhat more complicated forwards causal descrip-
tion. For, if before the precognition, one had taken steps to prevent 
the pattern being displayed, then the events E l 	En would not have 
occurred, but if one had fixed the 
tortoises would nonetheless have 
Conversely, if one were to prevent 
switch in the off position, the 
moved towards the power-point. 
all the precognisers' drawing, one 
would not prevent some pattern being displayed. But in the circum-
stances, if one were to prevent all the mechanical tortoises from mov-
ing one would prevent the power-point being switched on. Also, in 
the precognition example, the pattern which is displayed is selected 
on a statistically random basis. 
In the example of the several precognisers there are interlocking 
(forwards) causal and logical relations. 
Some quasi-event D 1 prevents interference by any agent.
26 
Some quasi-event D2' perhaps the same as D„ causes there to 
26. See p. 18], where I discuss Black's argument. 
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be a limited range of possibilities in the display of the pattern. 
The effects of D 2 are: 
that one and only one pattern is displayed. 
that this pattern is chosen from a given range 
of patterns. 
Let R be the conjunction of these two effects. 
(3) D1, D2 or some other quasi-Event is necessary but not sufficient 
in the circumstances for El , ..., E. (the quasi-events that the 
precognisers make their drawings). 
(4)Theithprecogniser'sdrawingthepatternX.causes the display 
of the pattern X. (Drawing Xi is suffecient in the circumstances 
for the display of X i .) 
(5) The occurrence of R logically entails that all the patterns X i 
which are displayed are the same. 
Note One: R is not causally effective since R entails that all the 
X. to be displayed are the same. 	The cause of the patterns all being 
the same is the quasi-event D 2 . Hence D 2 forces thEprecognisers to 
agree, just as there being only one power-point forces the mechanical 
tortoises to move to the same point. 
Note Two: Given the circumstances before the precognition, D 2 but not 
E. is necessary for the selection of the pattern drawn by the ith pre-
cogniser. (E i is not necessary since even. if E had not occurred R 
would ensure that some pattern is selected so it might have been the 
pattern which, in fact, the ith precogniser drew.) 
As I warned the description is of some complexity, but this com-
plexity, I claim, does not embarrass the causal anti-realist. There 
are, however, four other objections to this account to which I now reply. 
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Objection One: The above account is only a relative explanation of 
the agreement of the precognisers, but for an absolute explanation one 
requires backwards causation. 
Reply: 	The agreement of the precognisers is explained in terms of 
the laws of Nature and the quasi-event D 2' which causes only one pattern 
to be displayed. 	backwards causal explanation would also be in terms 
of one and only one pattern being displayed. The success of an abso-
lute (but perhaps partial) explanation depends in both cases on how 
one explains the occurrence of D. Notice that if several patterns 
were displayed, but the precogniser drew only one pattern, even if one 
were usine, the notion of backwards causation one would be d":iven to 
the conclusion that there was some interaction between the precognisers; 
there being only one pattern is an essential feature of the backwards 
causal explanation. 
Objection Two: 	It is inconceivable that the disjunctive state-of- 
affairs R is fixed at a time (the occurrence of 1)2? when none of the 
disjuncts is fixed. 
Reply: 	Consider the following hypothetical example. It is discovered 
that if ordinary lead is exposed to a beam of a-rays, the lead, with- 
out any other apparent change, becomes radio-active and inevitably decays 
within two months. There are two possible interpretations. The first 
is to insist that some undetectable change has occured in the lead. 
The second is to say that it is nomically necessary that when a lead 
atom has been bombarded by an a-ray it will decay within two months. 
Now one might insist on the former interpretation, but the latter is, 
surely, a coherent interpretation. If one wished one could then say 
that bombarding the lead by an a-ray (mnemically) causes the indeterminate 
state of affairs that the lead decays at some time in the two months. 
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If one rejects any causal description in this case - as one might - 
one should not, I suggest, demand a causal description of the fixing 
of R by D2 . 	One should simply say that it is nomically necessary 
that if D 2 occurs then some pattern appears. 
Objection Three: 	If the precognisers affect the selection of the 
patterns then several precognisers have the power to freely decide 
whether to bring about the quantitatively identical event, which is 
absurd. 
Reply: The precognition would be the producing cause of the selection 
of the pattern. It does not follow that the precogniser has power 
over the pattern. The precogniser is not a fraud with extra-sensory 
powers other than precogntion; he is a genuine precogniser. As such 
he has no power over what he precognises, even though his precognition 
causes the pattern to be selected. 
Objection Four: 	Suppose a random device is first used to select 	the 
number of patterns to be displayed and each pattern is subsequently 
selected at random. If it then happens that only one pattern is sel-
ected, one can no longer explain the agreement of the precognisers' 
drawing in terms of forward causation. 
11!.:21y. : 	On the one hand there is still a forwards causal relative 
explanation; if only one drawing is selected, the precognisers' draw-
ings agree (for unless the precognisers' drawings agree there would be 
more than one drawing). But, on the other hand, the backwards causal 
explanation is also no longer absolute for one cannot explain why only 
one pattern was displayed. 
No suppose that it is rather unlikely that more than one pattern 
is displayed. In that case, Black's argument 27 shows that there is 
1 
27. 	See p.181. 
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some quasi-event D i no later than the precognition such that D i pre-
vents interference with the number of patterns shown. So, although 
D1 is not sufficient in the circumstances for R . D1 
renders R likely; 
consequently the forwards causal explanation is as successful as the 
backwards causal explanation is in explaining why the precognisers 
agree. 
Section Four: A Discussion of Some Proposed Hypothetical  
Examples of Backwards Causation  
In this section I discuss five hypothetical examples which one 
is tempted to treat as cases of backwards causation. In all cases I 
argue that a causal anti -realist need not treat the situation as one 
which involves backwards causation. 
4.1 	Three Preliminary Points of Clarification  
I am not claiming that a causal anti-realist is committed to deny-
ing that backwards causation occurs. I am claiming that no hypotheti-
cal example could force him to accept backwards causation on pain of 
irrationality. 
If some of the situations described actually occurred, people 
might begin to call them cases of backwards causation. But, whether 
they would or not is of no consequence to the causal anti-realist. The 
situations are describable without using the notion of a producing 
cause, nor would there be any good reason for closing the open texture 
of the notion of cause in this respect. 
I assume throughout this section that peoples intuitions are 
divided on the issue of backwards causation, and so one cannot simply 
point to an example as an accepted case of backwards causation. On 
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the one hand, one intuitively tends to deny that a cause could be 
later than its effect. On the other hand, one intuitively tends to 
accept Causal Realism and the causal realist has, I shall argue, 
grounds for describing some hypothetical examples as examples of 
backwards causation. 
4.2 	Example One - Precognition  
In Section 3.2 I argue that in some cases of precognition, the 
knowledge could cause the known event. In section 3.4 I argue that 
• 
in other cases of precognition the knowledge and the known event could 
be treated as collateral effects without treating the precogniser as 
a very ciaver clairvoyant who merely pretends to be a precogniser. The 
apparent difficulty that the precognised event might be randomly 
selected is answered by distinguishing between a kind of event whose 
occurrence is statistically random, and an event without a cause. 
Except by begging the question, one cannot assume that the device is 
random in the sense of having no cause. But if the precogniserS i 
drawing is itself statistically random, and it affects the device so 
that there is a one to one correspondence between the pattern drawn 
and the pattern selected, then the device not only can be but also 
must be itself statistically random. In order to avoid a backwards 
causal description of Precognition, an extremely complicated.descrip-
tion is required. Depending on when the pattern wasselected, the 
situation is sometimes described as one of collateral effects, and 
sometimes as one of cause and effect. Sometimes the device is random 
only in the statistical sense; sometimes it is random also In the 
sense of having no cause. But as I argued in Section 3.1, the com-
plexity of the description need not embarrass the causal anti-realist. 
However, the causal realist might interpret this complexity as grounds 
for believing in the possibility of backwards causation. 
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4.3 ExaTple Two: An Agent Affecting the Past 1 r 4 
If an agent intentionally performs action A in order to bring 
about an earlier event B, and whenever he so acts the earlier event 
has occurred, one might be tempted to describe the situation as one 
in which A causes B. Consider again Dummett's example mentioned in 	
•-• 
Chapter One: 
Someone who believes in magic ... has 
..., among his spells a-formula for 
producing good weather in a particular • 
place on a particular day ... An occasion 
arises when he has reason for wanting the 
weather at, say, Liverpool, to have been 
good on the previous day, but he does not 
know whether there was [good weather] or 
not; he there':ore recites his spell, 
putting in yesterday's date. Subsequently 
he finds out that there is fine weather at 
Liverpool on that day; ... whenever he • 
recites the formula with a past date, not 
knowing what the weather was like ..., 
later investigation proves the weather 
to have been fine then. 28. 
29 
In this case Gale's argument shows that it was fixed, at the time 
the good weather occurred in Liverpool, that the magician would not 
know that good weather had occurred when he recited the spell- Also, 
as Black's (and perhaps Swinburne's) argument shows, although the 
.reciting of the spell was intentional it would he free only in a 
compatabilist sense, and since the action is intentional it is not 
random: hence it is determined by some previous event D. With these 
provisos, the situation seams coherent. The argument that it should 
be considered a case of backwards causation is based on its similarity 
to the paradigms in which an agent brings A about in order to bring 
B about. 
But now consider again Chisholm's example of the man raising 
A.E. Dummett, "Can an Effect Precede its Cause?' 
Aristotelian Society, supp.vol.28. pp. 35,36. 
See p. 187. 
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his arm in order to bring about some earlier neural event. Unless 
one accepts that example as a case of backwards causation it shows 
that the intended means to an end can be the effect of the intended 
end. 	Likewise, in the example of the magician one might argue that 
the intended means is not the cause of the intended end. In this case 
the intended end and the intended means to that end are collateral 
effects. For some quasi-event D, say the state of mind of the magician, 
determines that the magician recites his spell and so, even on the 
_ 
backwards causal hypothesis, D would be an (indirect) cause of the fine 
weather. 	The causal anti-realist treats the situation as a case 
of collateral effects rather than as a causal chain. 
Note: 	If one does not accept the corollary to Black's argument 
30 
(that is, no agent freely affects the past, in a libertarian sense of 
'freely'), one might interpret the situation as one of backwards 
immanent causation. The magician directly affects the weather, 
and the fine weather causes the magician torecite his spell. Here 
the intended means is the effect of the intended end. Alternatively, 
someone might argue that some event in the magician's mind - call it 
a volition - is itself uncaused and causes the fine weather. In that 
case the interpretation would indeed involve backwards transeunt 
causation. But if one analyses a free action as an action which has as 
its cause a volition which itself has no cause, then one has given a 
description of the proposed example in transeunt causal terms; by say-
ing that the action is free one has already stipulated that the voli-
tion is not to be treated as an effect. Hence one has not provided 
an example described in non-causal (that is, not transeunt causal) 
terms which is to be interpreted as a case of backwards causation. 
30. 	See p. 184. 
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4.4 Example Three - "Time-reversal"  Examples 
Suppose that in some distant part of the universe there is a 
planet on which, it seems, the temporal ordering is reversed. In 
other words, the processes occurring on that planet seen quite unlike 
those occurring on Earth, until it is noticed that they are the temp-
oral inverses of processes very like those occurring on Earth. Thus 
31 one is to suppose that on that planet entropy is apparently decreasing. 
Someone might argue that both on Earth and on that planet lightning 
strikes cause bush fires, not vice versa. Hence, either on Earth 
or on that planet, there is a case of backwards causation. 
I call these cases "time-reversal" examples because one is tempted 
to say that time is "flowing in different directions" in different 
parts of the universe, so there is no backwards causation. However, 
one cannot coherently say that time flows in different directions in 
different parts of the universe. For either the two parts are spatially 
disconnected, in which case one cannot even compare the direction of 
their temporal orderings, or the two parts are spatially connected so 
there is a boundary between the two parts consisting of at least one 
point. In order that the temporal orderings in the two parts of the 
universe be compared, there must be some correlation of events at the 
boundary. So one may assume that A 1 and A, are simultaneous; A1 is 
on one side and A, on the other side of the boundary. Likewise B1 
and B 2 are simultaneous; B l is on the same side as A/ , B 2 is on the 
same side as A 2 . But if Al is earlier than B l but A2 is later than B 2' 
the temporal ordering cannot be transitive for A 2 is simultaneous 
with Al which is earlier than B l which is simultaneous with B 2 , so by 
transitivity A2 is earlier than B 2. But A2 is later than B 2* 
Because one cannot describe the world as having two different 
31. This kind of example is due to Michael Tooley. 
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temporal directions (except by sacrificing transitivity) one might be 
tempted to interpret the situation as involving backwards causation 
in one part or the other. However, I suggest that the ordinary temp-
oral ordering, which is necessarily transitive, presupposes the sub- 
stantial agreement of the proto-temporal orderings cf phenomenological 
time, physical time, and causal priority. So in such a case there is 
no coherent temporal ordering and hence no backwards causation. There 
would however still be local temporal ordering which would apply only 
to the different parts of the universe. 
4.5 Examnle Four  
Suppose that on the vast majority of occasions in which one heats 
an iron bar to 1000' the bar glows. 	Now suppose that, very rarely, 
the iron begins to glow after the bar is heated, and, even more rarely, 
the iron begins to glow before the bar is heated. 
In that case the simplest causal hypothesis is that heating the 
iron bar always causes it to glow. Hence, if one requires a simple 
causal hypothesis, one is committed to there being some cases of back-
wards causation. This kind of example can be elaborated. °I-1 10 'pose 
that usually events of kind C are followed by events of kinds El , 
E2 , ..., En , but that very rarely one or more of the E1 , 	En pre- 
cede the C. 	The forwards causal hypothesis is a very complicated 
disjunction of the cases: 
The C causes the E 
The E1 causes the C $ - F	E if the E is the earliest event; 2 n 
Etc. 
. E if the C is the earliest event; n 
The simplest causal hypothesis is that in all cases the C causes the 
El , E2 , ..., E. 	However, in such cases there is a simple description 
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in terms of laws of Nature: 'If a C occurs, then shortly before or 
shortlyaftersomeE.occurs' for l=1 	n. 	As I have said in 
Section 3.1, the complexity of an unnecessary forwards causal explan-
atory hypothesis does not embarrass the causal anti-realist. However, 
the realist about causal priority would have grounds for interpreting 
this situation as one which involves backward causation. 
4.6 • Example. Five - Collateral Effect Examples  
In some situations one might be able to explain the co-occurrence 
of quasi-events E l , ..., En on the hypothesis that they are all col-
lateral effects of some later cause C (of kind C). I have already 
discussed this in Section 3.6 using the example of the several pre-
cognisers who all draw the same pattern. There is no need whatever 
for a causal explanation; the co-occurrence of E l , ..., En is 
explainedjustasreadilybYassumingthateachoftheE-is nomical- 
4 sufficient for some event of kind C, and by assuming that it is 
already fixed that only one event of kind C occurs. 
In this case one might say that C is the explanation of 
El , ..., En , but C need not be interpreted as the producing cause of 
E1" H. 
I suggest that a tendency to assimilate explanations to 
producing causes lies behind the urge to treat this kind of example as 
one of backwards causation. But, as in the example of the mechanical 
tortoise, there seem to be cases of quasi- teleological explanations 
where the effect explains the coincidence cf several overdetermining 
factors. As in the previous examples, the complexity of the forwards 
causal description need not embarrass the causal anti-realist, but it 
provides some grounds for the causal realist to accept the possibility 
of backwards causation. 
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4.7 
rl 
The discussion of these five examples of proposed cases of 
backwards causation illustrates the general strategy that a causal 
anti-realist could use, if he proposed an analysis of causation 
incompatible with the occurrence of backwards causation. He provides 
suitably simple descriptions of the situation in terms of laws of 
Nature and, if one is demanded, he provides a complicated description 
in forwards-causal terms. 
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